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Gender governance and the global grammar of illiberal inclusion

by Ourania Filippakou

Across global higher education, the terms of justice, equality and inclusion are being rewritten. In recent years, the rollback of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in the United States (Spitalniak, 2025) has unfolded alongside a global resurgence of anti-gender, ultra-nationalist, racialised and colonial politics (Brechenmacher, 2025). At the same time, the rise of authoritarian and far-right ideologies, together with deepening socioeconomic inequalities fuelled by an ascendant billionaire class (Klein and Taylor, 2025) and the growing portrayal of feminist and queer scholarship as ideological extremism (Pitts-Taylor and Wood, 2025), signal a profound shift in the rationalities shaping the politics of higher education. These developments do not reject inclusion; they refashion it. Equality becomes excess, dissent is recast as disorder, and inclusion is reconstituted as a technology of governance.

This conjuncture, what Stuart Hall (Hall in Hall and Massey, 2010, p57) would call the alignment of economic, political and cultural forces, requires a vocabulary capable of capturing continuity and rupture. It also reflects the deepening crisis of neoliberalism, whose governing logics become more coercive as their legitimacy wanes (Beckert, 2025; Menand, 2023). As Hall reminds us, ‘a conjuncture is a period when different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions… or as Althusser said ‘fuse in a ruptural unity’’ (Hall in Hall and Massey, 2012, p57). A conjuncture, in this sense, does not resolve crisis but produces new configurations of ideological coherence and institutional control. In my recent article, ‘Managed Inclusion and the Politics of Erasure: Gender Governance in Higher Education under Neoliberal Authoritarianism’ (Review of Education, Pedagogy & Cultural Studies, 2025), I theorise these developments as a global grammar of illiberal inclusion: a political rationality that appropriates the language of equity while disabling its redistributive, democratic and epistemic force. The article develops a typology of symbolic, technocratic and transformative inclusion to examine how feminist, anti-caste and critical vocabularies are increasingly absorbed into systems of civility, visibility and procedural control. Transformative inclusion, the configuration most aligned with redistribution, dissent and epistemic plurality, is the one most forcefully neutralised.

Across geopolitical contexts, from postcolonial states to liberal democracies, gender inclusion is increasingly appropriated not as a demand for justice but as a mechanism of control. The techniques of co-option vary, yet they consolidate into a shared political rationality in which equity is stripped of redistributive force and redeployed to affirm institutional legitimacy, nationalist virtue and market competitiveness. This is not a rupture with neoliberal governance but its intensification through more disciplinary and exclusionary forms. For example, in India, the National Education Policy 2020 invokes empowerment while enacting epistemic erasure, systematically marginalising the knowledges of women from subordinated caste, class and religious communities (Peerzada et al, 2024; Patil, 2023; Singh, 2023). At the same time, state-led campaigns such as Beti Bachao elevate women’s visibility only within ideals of modesty and nationalist virtue (Chhachhi, 2020). In Hungary, the 2018 ban on gender studies aligned higher education with labour-market imperatives and nationalist agendas (Barát, 2022; Zsubori, 2018). In Turkey, reforms under Erdoğan consolidate patriarchal norms while constraining feminist organising (Zihnioğlu and Kourou, 2025). Here, gender inclusion is tolerated only when it reinforces state agendas and restricts dissent.

Elsewhere, inclusion is recast as ideological deviance. In the United States, the Trump-era rollback of DEI initiatives and reproductive rights has weaponised inclusion as a spectre of radicalism, disproportionately targeting racialised and LGBTQ+ communities (Amnesty International, 2024; Chao-Fong, 2025). In Argentina, Milei abolished the Ministry of Women, describing feminism as fiscally irresponsible (James, 2024). In Italy, Meloni’s government invokes ‘traditional values’ to erode anti-discrimination frameworks (De Giorgi et al, 2023, p.v11i1.6042). In these cases, inclusion is not merely neutralised but actively vilified, its political charge reframed as cultural threat.

Even when inclusion is celebrated, it is tethered to respectability and moral legibility. In France, femonationalist discourses instrumentalise gender equality to legitimise anti-Muslim policy (Farris, 2012; Möser, 2022). In Greece, conservative statecraft reframes inclusion through familialist narratives while dismantling equality infrastructures (Bempeza, 2025). These patterns reflect a longer political repertoire in which authoritarian and ultra-nationalist projects mobilise idealised domestic femininity to naturalise social hierarchies. As historian Diana Garvin (Garvin quoted in Matei, 2025) notes, ‘what fascisms old and new have in common is they tend to look to women to fill in the gaps that the state misses’, with contemporary ‘womanosphere’ influencers in the US reviving fantasies of domestic bliss that obscure intensified gendered precarity (Matei, 2025).

Such gendered constructions coexist with escalating violence. More than 50.000 women and girls were killed by intimate partners or family members in 2024, which means one woman or girl was killed every ten minutes, or 137 every day, according to the latest UNODC and UN Women femicide report (UNODC/UN Women, 2025). This sits within a wider continuum of harm: 83.000 women and girls were intentionally killed last year, and the report finds no sign of real progress. It also highlights a steep rise in digital violence, including harassment, stalking, gendered disinformation and deepfakes, which increasingly spills into offline contexts and contributes to more lethal forms of harm. These global patterns intersect with regional crises. For example, more than 7.000 women were killed in India in gender-related violence in 2022 (NCRB, 2023); eleven women are murdered daily in femicides across Latin America (NU CEPAL, 2024). At the same time, masculinist influencers such as Andrew Tate cultivate transnational publics organised around misogyny (Adams, 2025; Wescott et al, 2024). As UN Secretary-General António Guterres (2025) warns: ‘Instead of mainstreaming equal rights, we are seeing the mainstreaming of misogyny’.

These global pressures reverberate across institutions that have historically positioned themselves as democratic spaces, including universities, which increasingly recast gender equity as a reputational risk or cultural flashpoint rather than a democratic obligation (D’Angelo et al, 2024; McEwen and Narayanaswamy, 2023). Equity becomes an emblem of modernity to be audited, displayed and curated, rather than a demand for justice. Ahmed’s (2012) theorisation of non-performativity is essential here: institutions declare commitments to equality precisely to contain the transformations such commitments would require. In this context, symbolic and technocratic inclusion flourish, while the structural conditions for transformative inclusion continue to narrow.

These shifts reflect broader political and economic formations. Brown (2015) shows how neoliberal reason converts justice claims into performance demands, hollowing out democratic vocabularies. Fraser’s (2017) account of ‘progressive neoliberalism’ illuminates the terrain in which market liberalism coupled with selective diversity politics absorbs emancipatory discourse while preserving inequality. Patnaik (2021) argues that the rise of neofascism is a political necessity for neoliberalism in crisis, as rights are redefined as privileges and inclusion is repurposed to stabilise inequality. In this conjuncture, these tendencies intensify into what Giroux (2018, 2021, 2022a) names ‘neoliberal fascism’, a formation structured by three interlocking fundamentalisms: a market fundamentalism that commodifies all aspects of life, a religious fundamentalism that moralises inequality; and a regime of manufactured ignorance and militarised illiteracy that discredits critical thought and erases historical memory (Giroux 2022b, p48-54).

The United States now offers a further manifestation of this global pattern, illustrating how attacks on DEI can function as a broader assault on higher education. As recent analyses of US politics show, the first and particularly the second Trump administration is actively modelling itself on Viktor Orbán’s illiberal statecraft, centralising executive power, purging public institutions and mobilising ‘family values’ and anti-‘woke’ politics to reshape education and media governance (Giroux, 2017; Smith, 2025; Kauffmann, 2025). The dismantling of DEI under the Trump administration, framed as a defence of merit, free speech and fiscal responsibility (The White House, 2025), marks the beginning of a wider attempt to consolidate political influence over higher education. Executive orders targeting DEI have been followed by lawsuits, funding withdrawals and intensified federal scrutiny, prompting universities such as Michigan, Columbia and Chicago to scale back equality infrastructures, cut programmes and reduce humanities provision (cf Bleiler, 2025; Pickering, Cosgrove and Massel, 2025; Quinn, 2025). These developments do not simply eliminate DEI; they position anti-gender politics as a mechanism of disciplining universities, narrowing intellectual autonomy and extending political control over academic life. They exemplify wider global tendencies in which inclusion becomes a field through which illiberal projects consolidate authority. The assault on DEI is thus not a uniquely American phenomenon but part of a broader authoritarian turn in which inclusion is recoded to stabilise, rather than challenge, existing power.

Understanding gender governance in higher education through this conjunctural lens reveals not merely the erosion of equity but the emergence of a political formation that reconfigures inclusion into an apparatus of civility, visibility and administrative control. These tendencies are not aberrations but expressions of a larger global grammar that binds emancipatory rhetoric to authoritarian-neoliberal governance. The result is not the dilution of equality but its rearrangement as a practice of containment.

The implications for the sector are profound. If inclusion is increasingly reorganised through metrics, decorum and procedural compliance, then reclaiming its democratic potential requires an epistemic and institutional shift. Inclusion needs to be understood not as a reputational asset but as a commitment to justice, redistribution and collective struggle. This means recovering equality as political and pedagogical labour: the work of confronting injustice, protecting dissent and renewing the public imagination. Academic freedom and equality are inseparable: without equality, freedom becomes privilege; without freedom, equality becomes performance.

As Angela Davis (Davis quoted in Gerges, 2023) reminds us: ‘Diversity without structural transformation simply brings those who were previously excluded into a system as racist and misogynist as it was before… There can be no diversity and inclusion without transformation and justice.’ And as Henry Giroux (2025) argues, democracy depends on how societies fight over language, memory and possibility. That struggle now runs through the university itself, shaping its governance, its epistemic life and the courage to imagine more just and democratic possibilities.

Ourania Filippakou is a Professor of Education at Brunel University of London. Her research interrogates the politics of higher education, examining universities as contested spaces where power, inequality, and resistance intersect. Rooted in critical traditions, she explores how higher education can foster social justice, equity, and transformative change.


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Engaging policy review to smooth lumpy futures into transformative higher education

Brewing troubles and wobbles

Figure 1: Current and frontier contributions

Frontier topics to bump beyond lumps

Research that twirls headwinds into tailwinds


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The Harvard experience: could it happen here?

by GR Evans

On 1 May 2025 The Guardian headline read: ‘Trump administration exploits landmark civil rights act to fight universities’ diversity initiatives‘. What prevents a British King or Prime Minister from attempting to impose sanctions on universities?

US higher education is exposed both to presidential and to state interference. Government powers to intervene in US HE reside in presidential control of federal funding, which may come with conditions. Trump cannot simply shut down the Department of Education by executive order but it seems he can direct that the Department’s grant- and loan-giving functions are taken on by another government department.

As early as 2023 Donald Trump had said ‘We are going to choke off the money to schools that aid the Marxist assault on our American heritage and on Western civilization itself’. In response to campus protest he removed $400m of Columbia’s federal funding in March 2025 on the grounds that the University had failed to address the alleged ‘persistent harassment of Jewish students’. In April 2025 he gave orders to Ivy League universities, threatening withdrawal of funding if their teaching and research did not comply with Government policy as the President defined it and that their appointments should have regard to those expectations.

On 8 April the Washington Examiner reported a planned attempt to counter such action by legislation, that is to prevent Trump’s directives taking effect by amending the Higher Education Act of 1965 ‘to prohibit political litmus tests in accreditation of institutions of higher education and for other purposes.  On 10 April the Chronicle of Higher Education foresaw an Executive Order.

A letter to Harvard dated 11 April signed on behalf of the Department of Education and other federal agencies asserted that the United States had ‘invested in Harvard University’s operations’ because of ‘the value to the country’ of its work, but warned that ‘an investment is not an entitlement.’ This letter, if accepted, was to constitute ‘an agreement in principle’. Governance was to be ‘exclusively’ in the hands of those ‘tenured professors’ and ‘senior leadership’ who were ‘committed to the ‘changes indicated in this letter’. Its ‘hiring and related data’ and its student ‘admissions data’ were to be ‘shared with the federal Government’. International students ‘hostile to American values’ were not to be admitted and those already admitted  were to be reported to federal authorities. Policies on diversity, equity and inclusion were to end and student protest restricted.

Harvard and other Ivy League Universities were indignant. Harvard in particular rode the headlines for some days, objecting to the Government demand that it immediately agree:

to implement the Trump administration’s demands to overhaul the University’s governance and leadership, academic programs, admissions system, hiring process, and discipline system—with the promise of more demands to come

and thus ‘overtly seek to impose on Harvard University political views and policy preferences advanced by the Trump administration and commit the University to punishing disfavored speech’. There were reports that US academics were seeking to escape to employment in Canada,  the UK or Europe.

The American Association of Colleges and Universities(AACU), founded in 1915 as the Association of American Colleges, now has a wide-ranging  and international membership. It is a loose counterpart to the British Universities UK which also has a membership including an extensive range of higher education providers. The AACU issued a Call for Constructive Engagement on 22 April, 2025, but litigation was already in hand, with the President and Fellows of Harvard seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on 21 April. Harvard is listed as the plaintiff with a considerable list of defendants identified (paras 15-30). In its submission Harvard argued that:

American institutions of higher learning have in common the essential freedom to determine, on academic grounds, whom to admit and what is taught, how, and by whom

and that such ‘American institutions of higher learning’ were ‘essential to American prosperity’.

It stressed alongstanding collaboration between universities such as Harvard and the federal government dating back to the Second World War’. It pointed to Harvard’s success in using federal funding to achieving significant research outcomes. The recent ‘broad attack of Government’ on ‘universities across America’, not only on Harvard and the other Ivy League Universities listed, had affected the ‘critical funding partnerships’ that made this invaluable research possible.

This case was being brought because, it was argued, the Government had been using ‘the withholding of federal funding as leverage to gain control of academic decision making at Harvard’. Harvard cited the Government’s letter of 11 April as demanding governance reform and a ‘third-party’ audit ‘of the viewpoints of Harvard’s student body, faculty, and staff’, followed by the hiring of new Faculty and admission of students whose views were satisfactory to the Government. It had asserted that teaching should be ‘to the Government’s satisfaction as determined in the Government’s sole discretion’ and to that end Harvard  should ‘terminate or reform its academic “programs” to the Government’s liking’. The Government had since ‘launched multiple investigations and other actions against Harvard’.  

The Government had ‘within hours of the Freeze Order ‘ended ‘$2.2 billion in multiyear grants and $60M in multiyear contract value to Harvard University’ and Harvard began receiving ‘stop work orders’. In order to bring a case against the Government it was essential for Harvard to establish that the Government’s action constituted a breach of public law. To that end it stated that the ‘Court has jurisdiction over Harvard’s claims’ because the University did not ‘seek money damages or an order mandating specific performance of any contract’, but:

an order declaring unlawful and setting aside sweeping agency action taken in violation of Harvard’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and its rights guaranteed by statute and regulation.

Harvard stressed that even though it is a private university its research is federally funded ‘through a grant process administered by federal agencies’. It cited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which requires ‘a detailed and mandatory statutory framework’ of procedures to be followed. Harvard had its own procedures, added to or created in August, September and November 2024. Specifically in March 2025, Harvard released updated “Frequently Asked Questions” clarifying that both Jewish and Israeli identities are covered by the University’s Non-Discrimination Policy.

Harvard explained that it had attempted ‘collaboration’ in the weeks following the government letter and the Federal Task Force’s press release announcing campus visits. It had sought to arrange a meeting on the campus and that was scheduled for late April 2025, yet on April 20 it was reported that the ‘Trump administration has grown so furious with Harvard University’ that ‘it is planning to pull an additional $1 billion of the school’s funding for health research.’

Trump’s threatened sanctions concerned the future of Harvard’s funding. Harvard has endowments  of c$53 billion so any threat from Trump to reduce federal funding posed a limited risk to its future. However he made a further proposal on 18 April to remove Harvard’s exemption from Government tax on its income, which could have hit its normal operation harder.

The US counterpart to HMRC is its Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS may grant tax-exempt status to a charitable, religious, scientific or literary organization, on condition that it refrains from campaigning or seeking to modify legislation. However, the President is not permitted to direct the IRS to conduct an investigation or audit. To that extent the counterbalancing of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the US seems to be holding.

Harvard was making its challenge at a time when the balance between the executive and the judiciary in the US had come into question in a number of cases where Trump’s executive orders sought to override the courts. It claimed that ‘the Freeze Order is part of a broader effort by the Government to punish Harvard for protecting its constitutional rights. … multiple news outlets have reported that the Internal Revenue Service is considering revoking its recognition of Harvard’s tax exempt status’. Representing 86 universities, the Presidents’ Alliance has filed an Amicus brief supporting the litigation.

Harvard sought in its litigation to have the Freeze Order declared unconstitutional and also the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ sought to be imposed  in the April 3 and April 11 and any action taken under it so far, also banning any future orders in the same vein. It pleaded six Counts, first a violation of the First Amendment in that the letters had targeted the ‘academic content that Harvard professors “teach students”’. Count 2 was that ‘even if the prerequisites of review under the Administrative Procedure Act were not satisfied, federal courts have the “equitable power” to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers.”’ Count 3 was that Title VI does not permit wholesale freezing of a recipient’s federal financial assistance. Instead, it requires that a “refusal to grant or to continue assistance” be “limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been so found.” Count 4 was the Government’s failure to ‘comply with their own regulations before freezing Harvard’s federal financial assistance’. Count 5 alleged that the action had been arbitrary and capricious and Count 6 that it had been ultra vires.

At Indiana University a professor of Germanic studies was recently investigated under a state law after a student accused him of speech in support of Palestine.

Could this happen in the UK?

English higher education providers have their autonomy protected by the Higher Education and Research Act (2017)s.2 [HERA]. This legislation created the Office for Students, a non-departmental public body, whose nearest US counterpart is the Higher Learning Commission, an independent agency founded in 1895 which accredits higher education institutions. The University of Michigan, for example seeks, renewal of its accreditation from the Higher Learning Commission every ten years.

The Office for Students is both regulator and funder, and distributes Government funding to higher education providers. This may take into account ‘particular policy areas and government priorities. Yet HERA outlaws any attempt by the OfS to impose the restrictions Trump sought to impose on the universities of the USA.  English higher education providers must be free:

(i) to determine the content of particular courses and the manner in which they are taught, supervised and assessed,

(ii) to determine the criteria for the selection, appointment and dismissal of academic staff and apply those criteria in particular cases, and

(iii) to determine the criteria for the admission of students and apply those criteria in particular cases.

Academic staff in England also enjoy ‘freedom within the law’:

(i) to question and test received wisdom, and

(ii) to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions,

without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at the providers.

There is some Government oversight. In protecting ‘the institutional autonomy of English higher e providers’, the Office for Students is subject to the ‘guidance’ of the Secretary of State, though Government requirements are held off by the legislative fencing.  The guidance of a higher education provider by the Office for Students:

must not relate to—

(a) particular parts of courses of study,

(b) the content of such courses,

(c) the manner in which they are taught, supervised or assessed,

(d) the criteria for the selection, appointment or dismissal of academic staff, or how they are applied, or

(e) the criteria for the admission of students, or how they are applied.

The legislation adds that:

guidance framed by reference to a particular course of study must not guide the OfS to perform a function in a way which prohibits or requires the provision of a particular course of study.

This seems to place universities safely out of reach of the kind of restrictions Trump sought to impose on Harvard and other Ivy League Universities, but the Office for Students is potentially able not only to set its Government funding levels but also affect its students’ access to loans from the Student Loans Company. That can certainly be at risk, for example in the case of the Oxford Business College, whose funding (via franchise arrangements) was blocked in April 2025 when it was found to have abused the student loan system by admitting unqualified students. (US accreditors do hold a lot of power, because universities must be accredited by a federally recognized agency in order to access federal student aid.)

Access to Government funding through the OfS requires listing by the Office for Students on its Register as an approved provider. The Office for Students did not impose its Conditions of Registration on pre-existing universities before including them in 2018 on its first Register under HERA. It simply treated them as proven acceptable providers of higher education. Each university duly publishes an account of its compliance (eg at Oxford) with the requirements which enable it to remain on the Office for Students Register. What might happen if they were found not to have done so? Short of removal from its Register the OfS has been known to impose fines, notably of more than £500,000 in the recent case of the University of Sussex when it was alleged to have failed to follow its own procedures designed to protect academic freedom.

Government oversight of the work of HE providers may overlap with or sit uneasily beside forms of ‘accreditation’ and ’qualification’. The accreditation of qualifications in the UK may be the responsibility of a number of ‘agencies’ external to HE providers, some of which are bodies offering professional qualifications. For example the Solicitors Regulation Authority keeps its own register of qualified solicitors. A university degree may not constitute a ‘qualification’ without the completion of further recognised study, some of which may be provided by the university itself, for example the Postgraduate Certificate in Education.

An area of ‘accreditation’ undergoing significant reform and expansion in the UK covers ‘skills’, including  apprenticeships. Not all universities offer their own apprenticeships, though they may recognise some of those available from other providers at Levels 4 and 5. Nevertheless ‘skills’ are potentially at risk of Government intervention. At the beginning of March 2025, the House of Lords was debating whether  ‘skills’ might benefit from the establishment of a ‘new executive agency’.

It was recognised that there would need to be a report from the Secretary of State  ‘containing draft proposals’ for an agency, ‘to be known as “Skills England”. Ian Sollom MPobjected that that that would represent ‘a significant centralising of power in the hands of the Secretary of State, without providing proper mechanisms for parliamentary oversight or accountability.’ A ‘statutory, departmental body would have more clout’, he argued.

An Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (IfATE) already existed, but it was concerned with qualifications up to Level 5, short of degree-level 6. ‘Skills England’ was intended to begin work in April 2025. ‘When Skills England calls, will anybody answer the phone?’ asked HEPI, pointing to ‘limited autonomy, complex cross-departmental coordination, tensions between national and local priorities, and competing objectives between foundational and higher-level skills need’. Its ‘cross-departmental working’ with Government was unclear.

It looks as though some universities, at least, are safe from any initiative to interfere from above with the right to self-government and to determine what to teach and research. Harvard records a ‘revenue base’ of $65billion, with ‘federal funding ‘ as its largest source of support for research. The research income of Oxford, for example, is £778m, with commercial research income of £148m. That cannot compare with Harvard, but at least Oxford and some others will remain free to choose how to use that income for its academic purposes.

This is a modified version of an article first published by the Oxford Magazine No 477 in May 2025, republished with the permission of the editor and author.

SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.


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Restoring academic values: a key for university effectiveness

by John Kenny

This blog post is based on research into the effectiveness of higher education policy, published in Policy Reviews in Higher Education. The article, ‘Effectiveness in higher education: What lessons can be learned after 40 years of neoliberal reform?’, takes a systemic perspective to consider a range of roles needed for HE to function effectively in the more accountable HE environment of today (Kenny, 2025).

It focusses on three key stakeholder groups arguably most pertinent to effectiveness: government policy makers, university corporate leaders and the academic profession, with a particular focus on the academic role, as this is typically overlooked in much of the research into higher education policy, yet we argue critical to the effectiveness of the system.

A systemic approach to HE policy assumes that reform in educational systems is complex and unpredictable. It also accepts that different stakeholders may experience change differently, there needs to be an understanding of the different roles played within the system and how they interact. Of particular concern in this article is how the academic role interacts with other stakeholders, especially the government regulators and university corporate leaders.

For over 40 years, a top-down ‘command and control’ approach to change has been adopted in HE. Typically, when this mind-set drives change, the inherent complexities of systemic change are disregarded, and it is assumed the outcomes of a reform can be pre-determined. It largely ignores the relationships, values and experiences of other stakeholder groups, which systems theory suggests is not appropriate for effective educational reform (Checkland, 2012; OECD, 2017).

By contrast, this article points to research into effective organisations that identified four ‘culture groups’ as present in any organisation: the Academic, the Corporate, the Bureaucratic and the Entrepreneurial. Each of these has a unique values perspective from which it approaches the decision-making process. These ‘competing values’ determine the organisational values, but with the values of the dominant group tending to prevail. The research linked organisational effectiveness (or performance) to a “strong culture” defined as one in which the practices and processes are in alignment with the espoused values position of the organisation (Smart & St John, 1996; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981).

For academic institutions such as universities, HE policy specifically identifies both Corporate and Academic governance as the two most important (Gerber, 2010; MCU, 2020; TEQSA, 2019a; 2019b; 2023). It follows that, in an effective organisation, a “strong culture” would be based on both the corporate and academic values having a more equal influence over decision-making.

Many of the current problems have arisen because, under the neoliberal reform agenda, with government policymakers aligned with corporate values, a corporate culture has dominated for the last 40 years. This has led to a situation in universities where corporate leadership dominates and academic leadership has been diminished (Gerber, 2010; Magney, 2006; Yeatman & Costea (eds), 2018).

The intention of this work is not to demonise any culture group nor argue for a return to a ‘Golden Age’ where academics tended to dominate. It proposes that, in the more accountable HE environment of today, from a systemic perspective the unique nature and purposes of universities as trusted organisation means each of these roles is important. It argues that across the system the government, corporate leaders and Academia, each play an important, but distinct role in ensuring the system, and universities, function effectively. For the HE system and universities to be effective, as opposed to more efficient, we need better understanding of these distinctions and more clarity about the accountabilities that should apply to each group (Bovens, 2007; Kearns, 1998).

This work pays particular attention to understanding the academic role. It argues that, with the domination of a corporate mind-set, which values control, compliance, competitiveness and productivity, academics are seen as “mere employees” (Giroux, 2002; Harman 2003), whose autonomy and academic freedom need to be curtailed (Hanlon, 1999).

This paper argues this situation has been exacerbated by the failure of the academic profession to define their role in this more accountable HE environment. The paper points to research that aims to fill this gap by re-defining academic professionalism in the more accountable HE environment, but in a way that does not sacrifice its essential ethical and autonomous underpinnings.

It further argues these unique characteristics of academic work, which have compelling implications for the overall quality of university education, have come under sustained attack from the rise of political populism (Hiller et al, 2025), increased disinformation and misinformation on social media, and the growing use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

An extensive review of national and international literature identified four ‘foundational principles’ (Kenny et al, 2025) which present a definition of the academic role involving a holistic combination of academic leadership, shared professional values, and independence in scholarship, underpinned by a “special” employment relationship. The historical, political, legislative, educational and cultural context of any particular HE system, however, requires these ‘foundational principles’ to be translated into a set of ‘enabling principles’ to suit that HE context (Freidson, 1999; Kenny & Cirkony, 2022).

To test this empirically, a set of ‘enabling principles’ were developed for the Australian HE context as a case study. Kenny et al (2024) described how, in the three phases of this action research study already completed, a set of ‘enabling principles’ has been developed and incorporated into a Professional Ethical Framework for Australian Academics (The Framework).

This case study aims to re-define the nature of academic work to re-emphasise its contribution to the effectiveness of HE, both in Australia and around the globe. The Framework represents our current re-definition of the academic profession in the more accountable Australian HE context. However, the universality of the foundational principles suggests this approach might be replicable by researchers in other HE contexts (Kenny et al, 2025).

This work addresses the compelling question of the sustainability of the academic profession by:

  1. Providing greater alignment across the HE system between the broader social purpose of universities and the important role that academics play.
  2. Unifying individual academics as professional scholars through a set of common professional values and a justification for their professional autonomy and academic freedom.
  3. Contributing to the sustainability of the academic profession by enabling individual academics to better navigate the competing tensions within their institutions as they build their professional identity based-on transparent professional standards, adequate resourcing and accountability mechanisms that will minimise exploitative practices currently evident in the system (AUA, 2024).
  4. Providing a common language that enables non-academic stakeholders, including governments, university management, industry, students, etc, to better understand the unique role academics play in ensuring the HE system and universities are effective in meeting their obligations to Society.
  5. Providing foundational principles that can be adapted to other HE contexts and facilitate the creation of a global academic community of practice through which the profession can enhance is voice in shaping the future of HE around the globe.

This work should help to restore a balance of power between the academic and corporate leadership in the governance of universities by facilitating more purposefully designed governance structures and accountability mechanisms that enable academic staff to influence HE policy formation, decision-making and resource allocation, which is especially important against a backdrop of growing political and economic challenges to universities.

Feedback from our national and international academic colleagues is encouraged. Those wishing to find out more are directed to the website of the Australian Association of University Professors (AAUP) at https://professoriate.org, where more information can be found about this research and how you might participate in the further development of The Framework,which has been made available for consultation with and feedback from a broader national and international academic audience.

John Kenny has extensive experience as a teacher and teacher educator and leadership in academic professional issues. His growing concern over the long-standing systemic issues in higher education, loss of independence for universities and loss of prestige for the academic profession led him to take a more systemic perspective and initiate this research looking into the role of academia in the effectiveness of higher education.

The author may also be contacted directly by email (John.Kenny@utas.edu.au).


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Effect of Institutional Autonomy on Academic Freedom in Higher Education Institutions in Ghana

By Mohammed Bashiru and Professor Cai Yonghong

Introduction

The idea of institutional autonomy in higher education institutions (HEIs) naturally comes up when discussing academic freedom. These two ideas are connected, and the simplest way to define how they relate to one another is that they are intertwined through several procedures and agreements that link people, institutions, the state, and civil society. Academic freedom and institutional autonomy cannot be compared, but they also cannot be separated and the loss of one diminishes the other. Protecting academic freedom and institutional autonomy is viewed by academics as a crucial requirement for a successful HEI. For instance, institutional autonomy and academic freedom are widely acknowledged as essential for the optimization of university operations in most African nations.

How does institutional autonomy influence academic freedom in higher education institutions in Ghana?

In some countries, universities have been subject to government control, with appointments and administrative positions influenced by political interests, leading to violations of academic autonomy and freedom. Autonomy is a crucial element in safeguarding academic freedom, which requires universities to uphold the academic freedom of their community and for the state to respect the right to science of the broader community. Universities offer the necessary space for the exercise of academic freedom, and thus, institutional autonomy is necessary for its preservation. The violation of institutional autonomy undermines not only academic freedom but also the pillars of self-governance, tenure, and individual rights and freedoms of academics and students. Universities should be self-governed by an academic community to uphold academic freedom, which allows for unrestricted advancement of scientific knowledge through critical thinking, without external limitations.

How does corporate governance affect the relationship between institutional autonomy and academic freedom?

Corporate governance mechanisms, such as board diversity, board independence, transparency, and accountability, can ensure that the interests of various stakeholders, including students, faculty, and the government, are represented and balanced. The incorporation of corporate governance into academia introduces a set of values and priorities that can restrict the traditional autonomy and academic freedom that define a self-governing profession. This growing tension has led to concerns about the erosion of academia’s self-governance, with calls for policies that safeguard academic independence and uphold the values of intellectual freedom and collaboration that are foundational to higher education institutions. Nonetheless, promoting efficient corporate governance, higher education institutions can help safeguard academic freedom and institutional autonomy, despite external pressures.

Is there a significant difference between the perceptions of males and females regarding institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and their relationship?

The appointment process for university staff varies across countries, but it is essential that non-academic factors such as gender, ethnicity, or interests do not influence the selection of qualified individuals who are necessary for the institution’s quality. Unfortunately, studies indicate that women are often underrepresented in leadership positions and decision-making processes related to academic freedom and institutional autonomy. This underrepresentation can perpetuate biases and lead to a lack of diversity in decision-making. One solution to address these disparities is to examine gender as a factor of difference to identify areas for improvement and promote gender equality in decision-making processes. By promoting diversity and inclusivity, academic institutions can create a more equitable environment that protects institutional autonomy and promotes academic freedom for everyone, regardless of their gender.

Methodology and Conceptual framework

The quantitative and predictive nature of the investigation necessitated the use of an explanatory research design. Because it enabled the us to establish a clear causal relationship between the exogenous and endogenous latent variables, the explanatory study design was chosen. The simple random sample technique was utilised to collect data from an online survey administered to 128 academicians from chosen Ghanaian universities.

The conceptual framework, explaining the interrelationships among the constructs in the context of the study is presented. The formulation of the conceptual model was influenced by the nature of proposed research questions backed by the supporting theories purported in the context of the study.

Conclusions and Implications

Institutional autonomy significantly predicts academic freedom at a strong level within higher education institutions in Ghana. Corporate governance can restrict academic freedom when its directed to yield immediate financial or marketable benefits but in this study it plays a key role in transmitting the effect of institutional autonomy. Additionally, there is a significant difference in perception between females and males concerning the institutional autonomy – academic freedom predictive relationship. Practically, higher education institutions, particularly in Ghana, should strive to maintain a level of autonomy while also ensuring that academic freedom is respected and protected. This can be achieved through decentralized governance structures that allow for greater participation of academics in decision-making processes. Institutions should actively engage stakeholders, including academics, in discussions and decisions related to institutional autonomy and academic freedom. This will ensure that diverse perspectives are considered in policy development.

This blog is based on an article published in Policy Reviews in Higher Education (online 02 January 2025) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23322969.2024.2444609

Bashiru Mohammed is a final year PhD student at the faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University. He also holds Masters in Higher education and students’ affairs from the same university. His research interest includes School management and administration, TVET education and skills development.

Professor Cai Yonghong is a professor at Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University. She has published many articles and presided over several domestic and international educational projects and written several government consultant reports. Her research interest includes teacher innovation, teacher expertise, teacher’s salary, and school management.

References

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Neave, G. (2005). The supermarketed university: Reform, vision and ambiguity in British higher education. Perspectives:.

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Nokkala, T., & Bacevic, J. (2014). University autonomy, agenda setting and the construction of agency: The case of the European university association in the European higher education area..

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Zulu, C (2016) ‘Gender equity and equality in higher education leadership: What’s social justice and substantive equality got to do with it?’ A paper presented at the inaugural lecture, North West University, South Africa


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University autonomy and government control by funding

by GR Evans

A change of government has not changed the government’s power to intrude upon the autonomy of providers of higher education, which is constrained chiefly by its being limited to the financial. Government can also issue guidance to the regulator, the Office for Students, and that guidance may be detailed. Recent exchanges give a flavour of the kind of control which politicians may seek, but this may be at odds with the current statutory framework.

As Secretary of State for Education, Gillian Keegan sent a Letter of Guidance to the Office for Students on 4 April 2024. She stated her priorities, first that ‘students pursue HE studies that enable them to progress into employment, thereby benefitting them as well as the wider economy’. She also thought it ‘important to provide students with different high-quality pathways in HE, notably through higher technical qualifications (HTQs), and degree apprenticeships’ at Levels 4 and 5. These ‘alternatives to three-year degrees’, she said, ‘provide valuable opportunities to progress up the ladder of opportunity’. As a condition of funding providers were to ‘build capacity’ with ‘eligible learners on Level 4 and 5 qualifications via a formula allocation’.  The new Higher Technical Qualifications were to attract ‘an uplift within this formula for learners on HTQ courses’. ‘World leading specialist providers’ were to be encouraged and funded ‘up to a limit’ of £58.1m for FY24/25.

The change of Government in July 2024 brought a new Secretary of State in the person of Bridget Phillipson but no fresh Letter of Guidance before she spoke in the Commons in a Higher Education debate on 4 November, 2024. Recognising that many universities were in dire financial straits, she  suggested that there should be ‘reform’ in exchange for a rise in tuition fees for undergraduates which had just been announced. That, she suggested, would be needed to ensure that universities would be ‘there for them to attend’ in future.

However, commentators quickly pointed out that Phillipson’s announcement that there would be a small rise in undergraduate tuition fees from £9,250 to £9,535 a year would not be anywhere near enough to fill the gap in higher education funding. The resulting risks were recognised. When the Office for Students reviewed the Financial sustainability of higher education  providers in England in 2024 in May 2024 it had looked at the ‘risks relating to student recruitment’ by providers in relation to the income from their tuition fees.

Phillipson was ‘determined to reform the sector’. She called for ‘tough decisions to restore stability to higher education, to fix the foundations and to deliver change’ with a key role for Government.  Ministers across Government must work together, she said, especially the Secretary for Education and the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology in order to ‘deliver a reformed and strengthened higher education system’. This would be ‘rooted in partnership’ between the DfE, the Office for Students and UK Research and Innovation’.

“… greater work around economic growth, around spin-offs and much more besides—I will be working with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology on precisely those questions.

In the debate it was commented that she was ‘light on the details’ of the Government’s role’.  She promised those for the future, ‘To build a higher education system fit for the challenges not just of today but of tomorrow’. She undertook to publish proposals for ‘major reform’.  There were some hints at what those might include. She saw benefits in providers ‘sharing support services with other universities and colleges’. Governing bodies, she said, should be asking ‘difficult strategic questions’, given the population ‘changing patterns of learning’ of their prospective students. The ‘optimistic bias’ she believed, needed to be ‘replaced by hard-headed realism’. ‘Some institutions that may need to shrink or partner, but is a price worth paying as part of a properly funded, coherent tertiary education system.’ She saw a considerable role for Government. ‘The government has started that job – it should now finish it.’

Like her predecessor she wanted ‘courses’ to provide individual students as well as the nation with ‘an economic return’. She expected providers to ‘ensure that all students get good value for money’. Other MPs speaking in the debate pressed the same link. Vikki Slade too defined economic benefit in terms of the ‘value for money’ the individual student got for the fee paid.  Laura Trott was another who wanted ‘courses’ to provide individual students as well as the nation with ‘an economic return’. Shaun Davies asked for ‘a bit more detail’ on ‘the accountability’ to which ‘these university vice-chancellors’ were to be held in delivering ‘teaching contact time, helping vulnerable students and ensuring that universities play a huge part in the wider communities of the towns and cities in which they are anchor institutions’.

Government enforcement sits uncomfortably with the autonomy of higher education providers insisted on by the 2017 Higher Education and Research Act. This Act created the Office for Students as ‘a non-departmental public body’, ‘accountable to Parliament’ and receiving ‘guidance on strategic priorities from the Department for Education’. Its ‘operations are independent of government’, but its ‘guidance’ to providers as Regulator is also heavily restricted at s.2 (5) which prevents intrusion on teaching and research. That guidance may not relate to ‘particular parts of courses of study’; ‘the content of such courses’; ’the manner in which they are taught, supervised or assessed’; ‘the criteria for the selection, appointment or dismissal of academic staff, or how they are applied’; or ‘the criteria for the admission of students, or how they are applied’.

This leaves the Office for Students responsible only for monitoring the financial sustainability of higher education providers ‘to identify those that may be exposed to material financial risks’. Again its powers of enforcement are limited. If it finds such a case it ‘works with’ the provider in a manner respecting its autonomy, namely ‘to understand and assess the extent of the issues’ and seek to help.

Listed in providers’ annual Financial Statements may be a number of sources of funding to which universities may look. These chiefly aim to fund research rather than teaching and include: grants and contracts for research projects; investment income; donations and endowments. The Government has a funding relationship with Research England within UKRI (UK Research and Innovation). UKRI is another Government-funded non-departmental public body, though it is subject to some Government policy shifts in the scale of the funding it provides through the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.

Donations and endowments may come with conditions attached by the funder, limiting them for example to named scholarships or professorships or specific new buildings. However  they may provide a considerable degree of financial security which is not under Government control. The endowments of Oxford and Cambridge Universities are substantial. Those made separately for their Colleges. may be very large, partly as a result of the growth in value of land given to them centuries ago. Oxford University has endowments of £1.3 billion and its colleges taken together have endowments of £5.06 billion. Cambridge University has a published endowment of  £2.47 billion, though Cambridge’s Statement for the Knowledge Exchange Framework puts ‘the university’s endowment ‘at nearly £6 billion’.  Cambridge’s richest College, Trinity, declares endowments of £2.19 billion.

The big city universities created at the end of the nineteenth century are far less well-endowed.  Birmingham had an endowment of £142.5 million in 2023, Bristol of £86 million. Of the twentieth and twenty-first century foundations, Oxford Brookes University notes donations and endowments of £385,000 and Anglia Ruskin University of £335,300. The private ‘alternative’ providers of higher multiplying in recent decades have tended to have a variety of business and commercial partnerships supporting their funding. Categories of funding provided by such gifting remain independent of Government interference.

The Review of Post-18 Education and Funding (May 2019) chaired by Philip Augur stated ‘Principles’ including that ‘organisations providing education and training must be accountable for the public subsidy they receive’, and that ‘Government has a responsibility to ensure that its investment in tertiary education is appropriately spent and directed’. ‘Universities must do more to raise their impact beyond their gates’, Phillipson said, so as ‘to drive the growth that this country sorely needs’ including by ‘joining with Skills England, employers and partners in further education to deliver the skills that people and businesses need’.

In the same Commons debate of 4 November Ian Roome, MP for North Devon, was confident that in his constituency ‘universities work in collaboration with FE sector institutions such as Petroc college’. Petroc College offers qualifications from Level 3 upwards, including HNCs, higher-level apprenticeships, Access to HE diplomas, foundation degrees and honours degrees (validated by the University of Plymouth) and ‘in subjects that meet the demands of industry – both locally and nationally’. Roome saw this (HC 4 November 2024) as meeting a need for ‘a viable and accessible option, particularly in rural areas such as mine, for people to access university courses?’ Phillipson took up his point, to urge such ‘collaboration between further education and higher education providers’. Shaun Davies spoke of the £300 million the Government had put into further education, ‘alongside a £300 million capital allocation’, invested in further education colleges’.  

However in an article in the Guardian on 4 November 2024,Philip Augur recognised that ‘the systems used by government to finance higher and further education are very different’. ‘Universities are funded largely through fees which follow enrolments’, in the form of student loans of £9,250, now raised to £9,535. ‘Unpaid loans are written off against the Department for Education’s balance sheet’. At first that would not be visible in the full  government accounts until 30 years after the loan was taken out. Government steering had become more visible following the Augur Report, with the cost of student loans being recorded ‘in the period loans are issued to students’, rather than after 30 years.  

By contrast the funding of individual FE colleges is based on annual contracts from the Education and Skills Funding Agency, an executive agency of the DFE for post-18 education. They may then spend only within the terms of the contract and up to its limit. The full cost of such contracts is recorded immediately in the public accounts. This makes a flexible response to demand by FE colleges far from easy. Colleges may find they cannot afford to run even popular courses such as construction, engineering, digital, health and social care, without waiting lists for places. The HE reform Phillipson considered in return for a rise in tuition fees had no immediate place in FE.

Government funding control maintains a pragmatic but very limited means of means of giving orders to universities. This depends on regulating access to taxpayer-funded student loans. The Office for Students measures a provider’s teaching in terms of its ‘positive outcomes’. These are set out in the OfS ‘Conditions’ for its Registration, which are required to make a provider’s students eligible for loans from the Student Loans Company. Condition B3 requires that a provider’s ‘outcomes’ meet ‘numerical thresholds’ measured against ‘indicators’: whether students continue in a course after their first year of study; complete their studies and progress into managerial or professional employment.

An Independent Review of the Office for Students: Fit for the Future: Higher Education Regulation towards 2035 appeared in July 2024. The Review relies on ‘positive outcomes’ as defined by the OfS’s ‘judgement’,  that ‘the outcome data for each of the indicators and split indicators are at or above the relevant numerical thresholds’. When such data are not available the OfS itself ‘otherwise judges’.

The government’s power to intrude upon the autonomy of providers of higher education continues to be constrained, but chiefly by its being limited to the financial, with many providers potentially at risk from their dependence on government permitting a level of tuition fee high enough to sustain them.

GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.


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Governance as a topic in Higher Education Studies

By Michael Shattock

Editor’s note: Michael Shattock is a global authority on governance studies in HE; SRHE Blog is delighted to bring you his invitation to researchers in HE to expand their work in governance – a definitive statement about the many contributions that governance research can make to our understanding of higher education.

Introduction

Higher Education Studies is not an academic discipline like History, Politics or Sociology but falls naturally within Marginson’s definition of it as a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary field of enquiry (Marginson, 2024). The study of the governance of higher education, at national and institutional levels, is, however, an important but often neglected strand of the larger field. Having just completed three books around the topic (Shattock and Horvath, 2020; Shattock, Horvath and Enders, 2023; and Shattock and Horvath, 2023) I thought it might be useful to spell out how the study of governance can frame researching the development of higher education and how changes in its structure or modus operandi, whether introduced from above or below, can influence the underlying principles and practices on which higher education is based. Thus, besides being an important strand in its own right it provides a context for other studies to be pursued in the field.

‘Governance’ is not well defined in the literature. The OED offers no more than “The act or manner of governing” and, misleadingly in respect to universities, defines a governing body as “the managers of the institution” ignoring the concept of ‘shared governance’ between governing bodies and senates implicit historically in the constitutions of most pre-1992 universities. Moodie and Eustace, authors of the classic Power and Authority in British Universities, published in 1974, 50 years ago, duck the question of definition and merely write, complacently as it seems now: “British universities continue to govern themselves and by any test seem to do reasonably well” (p24). In the absence of an authoritative definition we adopted the following form of words:

“Forms of governance [in higher education] at both national and institutional levels critically shape the culture , creativity and academic outcomes of higher education. Governance … is not just a matter of constitutional structures but encompasses how decisions are made and by whom, how different levels of governance interface with one another, what pressures are exerted by internal and external forces and how institutions and their members respond to them” (Shattock and Horvath, 2020 p1).

I have used the UK as the basis of my argument for recognising the importance of governance as a contributory discipline to higher education studies. This is not to undervalue other systems as case studies but to assist the presentation of a coherent account of a single system for illustrative purposes: if we look at continental Europe or at the USA similar principles apply even when their constitutional structures are different. It was, after all the USA which gave us, through the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the phrase ‘shared governance’ to describe the desired relationships between governing boards and the academic community. (This was a phrase that had little traction in the UK until the constitution of the former polytechnics was first published in 1992). In Europe we have the European Universities Association’s (EUA) monumental series of reports which  purport to measure and rank levels of university autonomy across countries. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the UK’s (and particularly England’s) high ranking with the situation on the ground unless the ranking is based on legislative provisions alone rather than other measures (Prevot, Estermann and Poprhadze, 2023). My own research would suggest that from the point of view of an academic many European country systems in practice offer as great or greater  autonomy than is now available in UK universities.

Governance and the State

A good illustration of how changes in governance at system level can change the context and indeed the culture of university work can be found in the decision by the UK Government (but not by the Scottish Government) to abandon the direct recurrent funding of teaching in institutions and substitute a tuition fee regime in which the student borrows the cost of the fee from a Student Loan Company and repays the loan over the next 40 years. Simultaneously the Government removed the cap on home student numbers in each institution administered by the Higher Education Funding Councils thus creating a highly marketized system. There were benefits both for the pro- and anti- sides of the argument about doing this:

  • It fulfilled a political ambition of the Government to make the development of higher education more responsive to market forces;
  • At a time of financial constraint it provided a way to respond to complaints from institutions about underfunding while keeping the costs off the Government’s annual budget by using the accounting device of counting the fees as debts which were an off line government expenditure;
  • It represented a considerable potential increase in university funding at a time when university costs were rising rapidly;
  • It gave institutions greater freedom in terms of student expansion and additional resources to support it – universities could plan against targets they had designed themselves. To most people’s surprise the new fee regime did not discourage continuing progress in widening participation.

What was less clearly seen were the changes it brought in institutional organisational cultures: the university system became necessarily much more competitive; students became more consumerist; historic inequalities between institutions were enhanced; marketing departments began to play a role in student selection; and, in some universities, in curriculum formation, universities became more top down and directive in their management style, the professional lives of academics were strongly affected. In addition mental health issues among students assumed a new prominence as they found debt and employment prospects weighed heavily on them. In time the greater freedoms offered to institutions have largely evaporated with the Government’s freezing of tuition fees so that in 12 years they have not kept pace with inflation, rising only minimally. The boom period following the introduction of tuition fees in 2012 has been replaced by financial crisis in the system.

While the introduction of full cost fees and the relaxation of student number controls may have been the largest governance change in the last 20 years we should not forget the impact of research selectivity, now crystalised in the Research Excellence Framework (REF), and the impact of the Teaching Excellent Framework (TEF) on the governance and management of the institutions and on the working lives of their staff and students. The REF is perhaps the more important both because of its longevity and the way it has affected the internal academic character of universities. Introduced in 1985-86 under pressure from H M Treasury, on the grounds that there was inadequate accountability  for the research element of the recurrent grant to universities, it was Initially intended as a one off exercise but became a regular feature every five years or so acting as a sorting mechanism between universities and a determinant of the distribution of research resources from central government to institutions.

Data collection for the REF has always been rooted in the research performance of individual members of academic staff discipline by discipline and the process has fed into ranking orders in the media enhancing institutional ambition. Most universities will now have a pro-vice-chancellor  (research) and a research office within its administration and will buy in advisers, often from previous REF subject committees, to assist in the construction of REF submissions. The results represent a key indicator of external institutional reputation as well as a critical component of an institutional budget. No exercise is more calculated to breed stress within the academic community or to shape academic career profiles.

The TEF is not so personal in its outcomes. It was introduced to attempt to offer a counterbalancing  force to the REF, and a populist institutional reward structure of Gold, Silver and Bronze was intended to provide simplified information to the student market. Of course, it also plays to media ranking tables so represents an incentive to institutions to seek high scores. From the internal university point of view the most significant consequence has been the increase in the bureaucracy and internal regulation it has brought about and the creation of new authority structures which have significantly changed the academic workplace. From a governance perspective the TEF’s origin, like the REF’s, began in government concern over accountability:

“‘The taxpayer’, the Minister of Higher Education said, ‘has a right to know what is being provided in return for public funding. Prospective students also have a right to know the quality of courses on offer’”. (quoted in Shattock, 2012 p201)

‘ Accountability’ became redefined as ‘quality assurance’ (and in some circles as ‘standards’) and, after numerous structural compromises in respect to the extent that the processes remained controlled by the universities, was at last made firmly the responsibility of a government body, the Office for Students (OfS). This was a final realisation of the government’s intention to create the legal conditions which enable it to be able to intervene over and above the academic authority of a university on what is taught in universities and how. It contrasts starkly with Moodie and Eustace’s statement of 50 years ago:

“In general the formal limitations upon institutional autonomy [in the UK] are minimal. There is a tradition of non-interference by the state in the affairs of the university”. (Moodie and Eustace, 1974 p46)

The two exercises, REF and TEF combined, represent a severe reorientation of university academic work and the prosecution of their core business of teaching and research. They are augmented by individual interventions on matters such as freedom of speech. The system is being substantially reshaped from above even when it is responding to pressures set by a market framework.

Higher education is now formally regulated by a government body, the OfS, while in 1974, the university sector, as it was then, was self regulated and had an intermediary body, the University Grants Committee (and later the Higher Education Funding Councils), to withstand possible political encroachments on autonomy from the government or elsewhere. System change in governance of this significance affects how higher education is delivered, how teachers and scholars approach their profession and their relationship, and that of their students, to society and provides a crucial sub text to the study of higher education as a whole.

Governance within institutions.

It is often assumed that the study of institutional governance is primarily a matter of the role of university governing bodies but this ignores the hierarchy of bodies within institutions which in effect determine academic strategy, implicitly define priorities and coordinate the academic and financial affairs of a university. Here we are talking about not just the relationships between the governing body  and the senate/academic board but the constitutional roles within the university of a senate/ academic board, a vice-chancellor’s executive committee, the powers of specialist senate/academic board committees, the relationships between faculty boards and with academic departments/ schools of studies. One might also include the constitutional powers of the vice-chancellor, pro-vice-chancellors, deans and heads of departments.

For governance and decision-making to operate smoothly and inclusively the procedures need to be well understood and trusted. Such a modus operandi may be dismissed, as it was by the Jarrett Committee on Efficiency Studies in Universities (1985) established to review university governance and management in the light of the 1981 cuts ,or in the Lambert Review on internal decision-making  (2003) which described university committees as “tortuous, time consuming and indecisive”. The fact remains that no university went bankrupt as a result of the 1981 cuts even with one being cut by 47% while, in direct contradiction of Lambert’s views on the effectiveness of academic committees, the senate at another university voted down a proposal by its vice-chancellor to open a campus in Singapore. The proposal was heavily supported by his governing body which regarded the invitation from the Singapore Government as a sign of the university’s international reputation. The senate’s decision to reject the invitation was regarded as decisive however. Two years later it was vindicated by the withdrawal, at a heavy cost, of a major Australian university, which had received a parallel invitation. The importance of good governance in maintaining a flow of opinions on the complex issues confronted by institutions on the boundaries  between academic policy and financial security is that it can make a major contribution to institutional strategy and wellbeing.

There is no doubt that, within a university, the most fundamental set of governance relationships  are between the triangle of the governing body, the senate/academic board and the variously described vice-chancellor’s executive committee. It is often forgotten that the UK university system contains two radically different constitutional models. The first is the historic pre-1992 model of a council (governing body) and a senate (often described in the university’s statutes as the ‘supreme academic authority) and a vice-chancellor, seen primarily as an academic leader, and chair of the senate but who the Jarrett Committee (1985) said was also a university’s ‘chief executive.’ The council and senate worked closely in tandem and in many universities, de facto if not de jure, the council’s decision-making was mostly shaped by senate’s recommendations. One third of the council’s membership comprised members of the senate nominated by the senate effectively to provide support for the vice-chancellor in the presentation of the senate’s report to council. The second model is the post-1992 Higher Education Corporation (HEC) where the vice-chancellor is designated as the ‘chief executive’ answerable to a lay governing body which acts like a board and is responsible for the determination of the educational character and mission of the university. Under this model the academic board was confined to narrowly conceived academic matters with no formal role in academic planning, which was reserved to the chief executive answerable directly to the governing body. Academic membership of the governing body was restricted to one or two members  elected often from the body of the academic staff who in practice acted more like tribunes of the people than supporters of the vice-chancellor. It might be thought that this model, which we might call ‘the business model’ was the creation of the government but in fact it was the product of ideas put forward in 1988 by a group of polytechnic directors in the face of the management situation they were confronting in the transfer of the polytechnics out of local authority control. No attempt was made to amend this constitution when the polytechnics became universities in 1992.

Thirty plus years since 1992 has blurred the distinction between the two governance approaches: most pre-1992 vice-chancellors have adopted the chief executive role exercised in the HECs, the government’s clear preference of the two models. The heavy reinforcement of the governing bodies’ responsibilities for finance, strategy and even academic quality has been influential in ‘modernising’ pre-1992 practice. Many HECs have moved rather closer to recognising the strength of the voice of the academic board. But it remains the fact that the divide has an impact on the organisational culture of the institution, the decision-making processes and the management style: academics and academic concerns can be less integral to the academic direction of the institution; governance is more ‘top down’.

This is reinforced by the practice in both pre-1992 and HEC universities of appointing senior academic officers, pro-vice-chancellors and deans, from outside the institution rather than through internal promotion. Originally intended to import new ideas or new leadership to an academic area, analogous to bringing in a new professor to give new leadership to an academic discipline, these new appointments have tended to become explicitly managerial, answerable to the vice-chancellor not to the academic community and to be part of the vice-chancellor’s management team. They take over responsibility for specific areas of university business, quality assurance, research including the REF submission, student welfare and relations with students, international recruitment or, if deans, the management of groups of academic departments/schools and the unelected chairmanship of faculty boards where they continued to exist. Even more important they become members of the vice-chancellor’s executive or senior management committee and, meeting weekly, suck authority away from senates and academic boards. In almost all universities they become a decision-making hub which can bypass academic protocols and, in some universities, can have a direct relationship with governing bodies. These are not appointments where the holders return to their academic posts when their term of office ends. If they move on it will be to similar or more senior posts elsewhere.

The result is that, instead of being participants in a university’s governance, academics can often be relegated to the role of simply an academic workforce lacking secure academic employment in the event of a market downturn. Of course these changes have been brought about in considerable part through growth in institutional size, the management challenge of responding to income cuts and the demands of government but they have also had the effect of changing the balances of internal governance and of substituting a managerial authority for a culture which was designed to encourage participation and debate in a climate of professional engagement.

There is considerable diversity in actual practice: governing bodies may be dominant and demanding, or collegial and respectful of the concept of ‘shared governance’; senates may have become rubber stamps or may have retained the ability to enforce a view on priorities and principles; academic boards may have become partners in decision-making or continue to have only a narrow remit; vice-chancellors’ executive committees may be consultative over policies or directorial; heads of departments may be disciplinary leaders or simply middle managers working to targets. These variations in internal governance provide the context in which academic work is carried out. Whether staff have freedom to innovate in teaching and research and whether a university’s organisation is sufficiently flexible to take on board ‘left field’ ideas or objections to new and resented management decisions, they become too easily airbrushed out in sectoral surveys or wide scale reviews but may be critical to the way an institution manages itself. Good governance sits at the heart of good staff morale, good academic performance and a sense of institutional wellbeing; flawed governance, on the other hand, can undermine academic performance, poison staff relations and encourage disaffection amongst students.

Universities as communities – the governance implications

All communities need governance arrangements; most do so through a mixture of formal rules and informal understandings. Universities are in principle no different although the degree of internal governance control, binding regulation or managerial hierarchy may differ from institution to institution and by type and history. The charters of the pre-1992 universities normally define the membership of the ultimate authority of the university, the Corporate Body, as the officers, lay and academic, the members of the governing body and the senate, the academic staff and the graduate and undergraduate students of the university. By contrast the articles of governance of the HEC universities are more restrictive vesting Corporate Body status and power in the governing body alone and excluding the academic board or staff or students.

The differences of approach in the practical day to day management of the institution and the application of the Common Seal are negligible and may be unremarked by academic staff and students but the pre-1992 constitution reflects implicitly the view of the university as a self-governing community rather than that of an organisation managed on the basis of an externally dominated governing body, a chief executive and associated managerial staff. The pre-1992 formulation assumes that the academic staff are partners in the organisation, not simply employees, and that students are not just consumers but are contributors to a learning enterprise where their views on its operations are a legitimate and entirely appropriate part of the governance process. It would be a caricature to assume that these stereotypes from over 30 years ago are representative in the diversity of universities  now but in some respects they still provide an underlying set of assumptions, particularly in regard to the position of academic staff in relation to representation in policy consideration and decision-making. The practice of HR in some universities does not reflect to any degree that academic staff might professionally have a sense of partnership with their institution.

The concept of community implies a degree of equality among its members. This is clearly under threat across the university sector. Referred to in the 1960s as ‘an academic civil service’ (Sloman, 1963) university administration found itself responding to a more authority-laden climate and to increasing demands for data on accountability from external sources: ‘administrators’ became ‘managers’ and more managerialist as they became agents of decisions handed down from the decision-making hierarchy  in their universities. (The current favoured designation of them as ‘professional services staff’ is ambiguous in relation to the status of their academic colleagues and by implication derogatory). For both academics and administrators, universities have become less stimulating and more divisive places in which to work.

A key element in a well governed community is trust. Good governance in universities does not breed a highly regulated environment because its organs of governance are trusted and because their individual members act within an understood framework. A newcomer will be told ‘This is the way we do things around here’ not ‘This is the way it is done’. Good governance encourages supportiveness rather than naked competition between colleagues and departments. In 1957, when the Science Research Council (SRC) failed to renew its grant to support the Jodrell Bank radio telescope at the University of Manchester, the senate of the University, then representative of all departments, voted that the University should carry the costs itself even though to do so would have had a crippling effect across all academic activities. (The grant was later restored after the telescope’s successful monitoring of Sputnik).

Trust builds confidence in a decision-making process even when negative decisions have to be taken. It also builds a climate of mutual respect for academic endeavour across the institution so that young academics feel encouraged to propose new teaching modules in their own areas of interest or young scientists feel emboldened to bid for additional lab space to accommodate promising research ideas. Above all it provides a route whereby issues can be ventilated and discussed in an orderly way and new ideas can be transmitted upwards in the decision-making structure and perhaps be captured as new sources of progress and change. Good governance is thus a stimulus to innovation and new thinking. By encouraging a heterarchical approach to issues  (Stark et al, 2009) it unlocks flexibility and new ideas in institutions while at the day to day level it provides a consistent and regular format for the conduct of institutional business.

Nowhere is this more important than in relations with students. Students’ interests in governance are markedly different from academic staff: at the academic level the primary student interest is to be a partner in the teaching enterprise, to have the opportunity at departmental and faculty level to address issues in the educational process but in social and political matters their priorities are more short term and are more appropriately considered in discussion centrally with university officers or at meetings of senate or governing body. A critical element here is the stability of the governance machinery, the consistency in the way issues are handled and the seriousness and respect with which they are addressed. Widespread student dissent can be destructive of a university’s sense of community.

Conclusion

We live in unsettled times in higher education both in the UK and across an international spectrum of systems: questions of governance are becoming more pressing. Good and bad governance at system and institutional levels are linked and can sometimes reinforce one another but neither captures as much discussion and research attention as it deserves. Large issues remain unexplored, for example:

  • In the UK does the separation at government level of research management from the management of the rest of higher education benefit the government’s innovation agenda more than it dislocates the higher education system?
  • Has the application of market principles in the management of UK higher education been in force for a sufficient period to be made the subject of a searching review?
  • Should higher and further education in England be brought together in a single tertiary system and be decentralised?
  • How should institutional governance best adapt itself to institutional growth?
  • What principles of governance should guide universities in respect to satellite campuses?
  • How far should resources be devolved to academic areas (faculties, departments or schools) while maintaining an appropriate balance between encouraging academic autonomy and initiative and central accountability?

These and many other governance issues can be lost in more short term concerns. But besides offering fruitful areas of research in its own right, governance also offers an underlying context to much else within the field of higher education studies. As such it is arguable that it is fundamental to study in the field.

Michael Shattock holds an OBE and an MA Oxon and honorary degrees from Aberdeen, Leicester, Reading and Warwick Universities and the University of Education, Ghana.  He is a Fellow of SRHE and was Registrar of the University of Warwick 1983-99. He is currently a Visiting Professor in Higher Education at UCL Institute of Education and an Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Education, Oxford, and was the leader of the Governance Group in the Centre for Global Higher Education, Oxford 2017-24.

References

Lambert, R (2003) Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration, Final Report London: HMSO

Marginson, S (2024) Higher Education and the Public and Common Good  CGHE Working Paper No 114, April

Moodie, G and Eustace, R (1974) Power and Authority in British Universities London: George Allen and Unwin

Shattock, ML (2012) Making Policy in British Higher Education 1945-2011 Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill

Shattock, ML and Horvath, A (2020) The Governance of British Higher Education: The impact of governmental, financial and market pressures London: Bloomsbury

Shattock, ML, Horvath, A and Enders, J (2023) The Governance of European Higher Education: Convergence or Divergence London: Bloomsbury

Shattock, ML and Horvath, A (2023) Universities and Regions: The impact of locality and region on university governance and strategies London: Bloomsbury

Sloman, AE (1963) A University in the Making London: BBC

Stark, D, Beunza, D, Girard, M and Lukacs, J (2009) The Sense of Dissonance Princeton: Princeton University Press Prevot, EB, Estermann, T and Popkhadze, N (2023) University Autonomy in Europe IV  The Scorecard 2023 Brussels: EUA


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Inclusive research agendas: what’s excluded?

by Jess Pilgrim-Brown

University discourse, policy, and practice has focused increasingly on access, widening participation and inclusion over the course of the last thirty years (Heath et al, 2013). In particular, understanding access, participation and inclusion for those who align with the different protected characteristics (as defined by the Equality Act 2010) has been of interest to academic research, given various political movements to widen access to higher education. There is a wealth of research in the space of equity, equality, and inclusion which has started to prise open the daily lived experiences of those who hold one or more of the protected characteristics as being part of their identity. Both in the tradition of UK academia, but also from research conducted in the US, we – as a research community – have begun to recognise the institutional and systemic structures which lead to sexism, microaggressions, blatant overt racism, disabilities and health inequalities, issues of access, pastoral burden and caring responsibilities. These facets can lead to extreme workloads, extreme discomfort, bullying and sometimes harassment routinely endured by members of both the academic community and the student body. Of course, research which seeks to make inequalities more transparent has also focused on social class background, which does not feature as one of the nine characteristics outlined by the Equality Act 2010. Here, research has predominantly focused on the experiences of working-class students, academics (and on one occasion, parents) but as yet, in the UK, the remit of who is included here is limited (Crew, 2020; 2021a; 2021b).

There are groups which exist outside the current research narrative which are less considered within the wider body of experiential evidence within the academy (Moreau & Wheeler, 2023; Caldwell, 2022). The ambition to promote access to these voices formed the basis of the rationale for my doctoral thesis research ‘Doing the heavy lifting: the experiences of working-class professional services and administrative staff in Russell Group universities’, completed in 2023. The study featured 13 participants who self-identified as working-class and worked in professional services and administrative roles in UK Russell Group universities. Using a novel approach it combined narrative inquiry (to understand historical personal biography and context) with more traditional semi-structured interviews, to understand the phenomena of existing in contemporary university spaces (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).

As I discussed both in a presentation at SRHE’s annual conference and within my doctoral thesis research, there are distinct limitations within the academic research body which have isolated the experiences of students and academics with particular protected characteristics, often at the expense of intersectionality or of the representation of other stakeholders who have critical value within university spaces. I addressed the ways in which administrative staff and professional services staff are included within academic research, as a representation of their human capital, roles and responsibilities, the ‘minions of management’ that Dopson & McNay discuss leads to an absence of voice and authority. These accounts focus on the actions performed within the university space rather than the experience these individuals have of that space, and how these experiences reflect the wider institutional culture at play (Caldwell, 2022). This understanding of other people within higher education research as being inextricably connected with role rather than identity and experience is something which was also exemplified by Marie-Pierre Moreau and Lucie Wheeler (2023) in their recent SRHE conference presentation on the current status of academic research literature with ancillary workers in higher education in the UK. Finding little UK-based research, Moreau & Wheeler concluded that the everyday experiences of ancillary workers had thus far, to their knowledge, failed to have been included in the wider narrative about institutional culture and lived experience in UK HEIs. 

In a previous blog post for SRHE, Michael Shattock discussed the centralisation of UK higher education away from regional responsibility and governance. Similarly, the degree to which the internal systems of university administration is centralised, or not, has the potential to facilitate or negate healthy working relationships and partnerships, fostered by governance structures. It is particularly pertinent that the brokers of the relationships which are formed from levels of centralisation are the professional services and administrative staff who facilitate the function and process of legislation, administration and research management and the teaching, research, and technical expertise of those working on academic contractual pathways. And yet, like the ancillary workers who provide critical support to the daily function of the university in the most literal form, the experiential perspectives of these huge groups of university employees are left largely outside of the scope of academic research.

Organisational culture literature dictates that culture is predominantly dictated by three elements: assumptions, values and artefacts (Schein, 2004). Where assumptions are a mental model used by managers to make sense of the environment, values are the socially constructed principles that guide behaviour; these are reflected through speech, approaches and spoken goals. Artefacts are the ‘visible and tangible layer’, in the case of the university, the statues and buildings (Harris, 1998; Joseph & Kibera, 2019). In understanding the possibilities for development and promotion, career trajectories, workload, working environments and relationships between people in higher education it might be possible to make some small-scale assumptions about how much these institutions are indeed changing towards becoming more inclusive or how far removing cultural icons of oppressions, such as statues, is a purely performative act.

By collecting first-hand experiential evidence around the assumptions and values of an institution, the nature of organisational culture might be possible to discern (Harris, 1998). I fail fundamentally to understand how research culture initiatives, which, in their broadest sense tackle the measurement and progression of positive research cultures in universities in the UK, can make any progress on the status and environment of our institutions without having legitimate, robust, empirical evidence driving policy and practice. And that empirical evidence needs to include the perspectives, insights, and opinions of everyone who is a direct stakeholder within the organisation. By omitting large swathes of those who directly affect and are directly affected by that organisation we omit the opportunity to make credible, inclusive, necessary progress both in policy, but also in the implementation of practice. The absence of these voices is an academic failure which, in its current form, fails to address the full spectrum of the political economy of UK universities. It is only in doing more work in this area that progress in equalities agendas can fully be realised.

Dr Jess Pilgrim-Brown is a sociologist and researcher in education. She focuses on issues relating to social class, gender and wider social inequalities. Her thesis research ‘Doing the heavy lifting, the experiences of working-class professional services and administrative staff in Russell Group universities’ was the first of its kind in the UK. Her research interests span sociological theory, innovative methods in qualitative research designs and research ethics. She is a current Research Associate at the University of Bristol and Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford.

Ian Mc Nay


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The higher education business and alternative providers.

By Ian McNay

The sale of two recently designated ‘for-profit’ universities to owners outside the UK is one indication of the government’s market approach to higher education. I return to this below, after covering another piece of evidence.

Those who do not read the financial pages of the Guardian will not have seen an article by Rupert Neate Cannes on student accommodation as giving ‘first class returns to investors’ (17 March 2017, p33). It included two things that shocked me. ‘Last month, the value of contracts awarded to build student housing projects in the UK totalled more than the deals to build care homes, housing associations, local authority housing and sheltered housing added together’, and flats in ‘some student blocks… in London cost as much as £650 a week’. In Reading, there is one block where prices are £300 per week, and the UK average for one builder was £175 a week. Rents for university owned properties already constitute a supplementary fee and exceed the level of the maintenance loan, adding another financial obstacle to equity of access.

That may be one reason why, paradoxically, students are turning to private HE – alternative providers as they were called by government in last year’s White Paper, and now the subject of an enquiry by the Higher Education Commission, to which Ron Barnett and I were recently invited to give evidence. I did some digging around and the picture that emerged surprised me, and moved me from my initial stance of total opposition. Continue reading