The Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA) has stressed in its Annual Reportthat the system it operates is under strain. The expectation that universities would offer a route for students to make complaints became a requirement at the turn of the century as providers began to recognise the existence of a ‘student contract‘. That made the student a ‘consumer’ of the ‘higher education provider’. ‘Complaints procedures’ for students to use began to appear alongside ‘grievance procedures’ for employees. Scrutinising the performance of higher education providers in that task falls to the Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA).
The OIA was created as a company in 2003 and began work as a voluntary scheme. It was designated as operator of a student complaints scheme in 2005. Its current ‘members’ are various sector bodies including Universities UK and GuildHE. Its Board, headed by the actual Adjudicator, and it includes student representatives.
It first needed to show itself to be independent. The OIA faced criticism early on when a petition with 43 signatures, called for its abolition, complaining that it was a ‘biased, unreasonable, and non-impartial organisation. The petition called for:
Full evidence-based investigation into student complaints, fully independent of the University’s internal processes, and in accordance with existing educational and non-educational law,
and ‘a public enquiry into all decisions made against student complaints, by the OIAHE since its inception’, withnew rules:
to provide full legal aid cover for all students whose employment prospects are, or may have been, damaged as a result of their adverse experience with a public educational institution, and who remain unemployed as a result.
This was not followed through in those express terms. The stated objective of the process now followed by the OIA is to ‘put the student back in the position they would have been in if the problem hadn’t occurred’.
Meeting that demand presents difficulties in two respects. The relationships of students to their ‘higher education provider’ have changed. They are its ‘members’ in the case of Oxford and Cambridge but in other providers a governing body of between twelve and twenty-four constitute the ‘members’ under the Higher Education and Research Act 1992. Elsewhere they are likely to be, in effect, paying customers ‘buying’ a course. There is a contract and if the providers does not fulfil its part, the student may complain and seek redress in the form of repayment of fees.
A sense of student entitlement may arise from the sheer cost to a student. In England, tuition fees for the academic year 2026-7 will rise to £9,790 for standard full-time courses, £11,750 for full-time accelerated courses and £7,335 for part-time courses, for providers with a Teaching Excellence Framework award and an Access and Participation Plan. That will increase for the year 2027-8 to £10,050 for standard full-time courses, £12,060 for full-time accelerated courses and £7,530 for part-time courses. Costs for ‘maintenance’ and accommodation are additional.
The procedures to be followed in making a complaint have needed repeated updating. Key terms have had to be defined. For example, the Annual Report of Oxford’s Sexual Harassment and Violence Support Service reports ‘an increasing complexity of cases, and those requiring a longer duration of support’. Where there is a complaint it recognises the need for clarity as to whether a dispute is a ‘University’ or a ‘college’ matter, noting ‘a marked increase in college-based, student-to-student reports of reported incidents’. The University is therefore improving its provision for training to ensure that those with responsibilities for students are clear about what constitutes ‘consent’.
Nationally, is the system now simply overloaded? The OIA published its Annual Reportin April, recording the scale of the rise in the number of complaints it receives. In 2008 the OIA received 900 complaints against an England and Wales enrolment denominator of 2,117,535 – a rate of 42.5 complaints per 100,000 students. In 2025 there were 4,234 complaints, an increase of 17 per cent from the previous year. The 4,234 complaints in 2025 ‘translate’, it says, ‘to roughly 165.8 per 100,000. in 2025’. In October 2025 alone there had been 516 complaints, recorded as the busiest single month in its history. In the face of this demand the OIA resolved 3,950 cases within six months and brought the average case handling time down to 81 days.
Stress-points are evident. Its Report notes that the complaints the OIA receives ‘prematurely’ are brought by students who ‘have begun the process but feel that they have waited too long for a decision’:
most of the complaints raised with us prematurely are brought by students who have begun the process but feel that they have waited too long for a decision. Delays are a symptom of a system under strain and may be one impact of the financial challenges facing providers.
Jim Dickinson’s blog for WonkHE on 26 April 2026 pointed to further evidence arguing that the fact that 42% of complainants now disclose a disability could mean a sector which is still structurally unable to accommodate them. So even if the growth in complaints may reflect an increasing sense of entitlement among students, the OIA suggests that the Adjudicator makes recommendations – or requires compensation to be made – that is ‘an indication that a student has not received the service they expect at a time when fees and cost of living pressures are increasing’.
The continuing multiplication of ‘alternative providers’ seems likely to lead to more complaining. They may admit unqualified students and be imperfectly regulated. The OIA publishes a list of ‘case summaries’ on providers where problems have emerged. The ‘worked example’ given in the OIA’s Report is that of Brit College, on which the OIA had already published concerns as of ‘public interest’ in November 2025.
The OIA had made Recommendations and had reported the College’s refusal to comply with its Recommendations to its Board in September 2025 and shared information about the complaint with the Office for Students (OfS), Department for Education (DfE) and Ofqual. None of this led to reform. Companies House reports that Brit College Ltd is subject to Receiver Action, with its accounts and confirmation statement overdue and apparently heading for liquidation.
There seems, then, to be a question as to the effectiveness of the OIA not in terms of its work but in terms of its powers, where a provider of higher education falls beyond the reach of a complaints procedure.
SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.
The Office for Students has had a significant reset, after it was heavily criticised, not just by the HE sector, but also in a coruscating report by the House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee in 2023. That report said “the regulator had a poor relationship with both students and providers, and that it lacked independence from the government.” In January 2024 the National Audit Office produced a scathing report on student finance in franchised providers, and Sir David Behan was commissioned to produce an independent review of the Office for Students, published in July 2024 as Fit for the Future: Higher Education Regulation Towards 2035. After the general election in 2024 the new Labour Government replaced the Chair of the OfS, former Conservative MP Lord Wharton, appointing Edward Peck CBE, the widely-experienced former VC at Nottingham Trent in March 2025. Peck had been appointed by DFE as the first Higher Education Student Support Champion in 2022, so might be seen as bipartisan. OfS chief executive Susan Lapworth left at Easter 2026, and John Blake, Director for Fair Access and Participation, left in 2025 to join Wonkhe’s new venture The Post-18 Project, replaced on an interim basis by his widely-respected predecessor Chris Millward.
There are now almost 500 OfS staff, about twice as many as the Higher Education Funding Council for England had when it was disbanded. The Chief Executive has a leadership team comprising eight ‘Directors’ and another 13 ‘Senior leaders’; it is difficult for outsiders to understand exactly who is responsible for what. There are Directors for: Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom; Quality and Access; Strategy and Delivery; Regulation, and Enabling Regulation; Resources and Finance (2); and Legal Counsel (but, mysteriously, not the Director of Fair Access and Participation). The ‘Senior Leaders’ are Heads of: Interventions; Monitoring; Student Equality and Welfare; Financial Sustainability; Enforcement; Quality and Standards; Communications; Market Entry; Chief Data Officer; Student Outcomes; Provider Governance; Consumer Protection; Pathways and Funding.
If only most problems would fit into those pigeonholes – there must be a lot of day-to-day negotiation about who leads on which issues. With 500 staff there is scope to give every one of the 424 institutions under OfS regulation a different contact person, without even troubling the 22-strong leadership team, but perhaps that would just be too easy to understand. Behan’s 25th recommendation was “That the OfS develops a more transparent style of communications to demonstrate to the sector its independence from government.” It could start with more communication about staff and how the organisation is supposed to work.
New chair Peck wasted no time in recasting the OfS strategy to take account of the many criticisms of the OfS. After the Lords inquiry the Behan review called for a narrower focus on key priorities, and the Strategy for 2025-2030 said the OfS goals were “grouped into three areas”: quality; student experience and support; and sector resilience. Equality of opportunity was “woven into everything we do”. Peck chose four phrases to capture the approach:
“Ambitious for all students from all backgrounds”
“Collaborative in pursuit of our priorities and in our stewardship of the sector”
“Vigilant about safeguarding public money and student fees”
“Vocal that higher education is a force for good, for individuals, communities and the country”
The OfS announced on 30 March that Ruth Hannant and Polly Payne had been appointed as the new CEO of the OfS, job-sharing as they did as Director-General at the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, after previously being DCMS interim Permanent Secretary during 2023. They also job-shared as Director of Higher Education in the DfE from 2014-2017. Josh Fleming, current director of strategy and delivery at the OfS, will be interim chief executive until Hannant and Payne take up their new role on 15 June 2026. How will they make the new strategy work? What will be at the top of their agenda?
Their first problem is that the Office for Students, because of its name and remit, has a Strategy which can only deal obliquely with the most pressing and interconnected problems facing English HE: finding a way to finance HE sustainably (and sorting out the student loans row) and finding a way to cope with the many failures of the statutory HE market. Issues of academic freedom, freedom of speech and the once-ubiquitous culture wars may now be receding in prominence; at least, that will be the hope on all sides. Financing and markets will be the primary concern of the DfE’s promised review of HE finance, but there is no reason to suppose it will appear soon. Chancellor Rachel Reeves recently declared that the student loans issue was not top of her agenda. This gives scope for the new brooms at the OfS to rearrange the HE furniture in ways which may guide the DfE development of workable proposals.
The NAO issued a damning report on 7 December 2017 on The higher education market. It said that, if HE had been a financial product, they would be complaining of mis-selling by universities. But the NAO’s deeper criticism was of the idea that HE could be treated as a market at all, with the report listing all the ways that the market and its regulation fell short of what was necessary and desirable. The new chief executive(s) at OfS were in charge of HE at the DfE from 2014-2017. They must have been closely involved with the NAO investigation, but even more closely involved in the passage of the Higher Education Act 2017, which created a statutory HE market and the Office for Students.
Markets, student tuition fees and higher education financing have been inextricably linked since 2017. The Labour government in 2006 raised undergraduate full-time fees from £1000pa to £3000pa and created income-contingent loans as a means of repayment. In the 2010 general election a new Coalition government faced the perennial question of how to finance mass HE. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg had made a very public pre-election ‘pledge’ to abolish undergraduate fees, but instead the government tripled them, to £9000 pa from 2012. Deciding exactly how to make it work proved to be rather tricky. David Willetts, the universities minister in BIS, repeatedly promised an HE Bill setting out new policy, but it took years to arrive, prompting scepticism if not ridicule. Willetts declared that markets would “drive up quality” in HE. The hare had been running on ‘low quality courses’ even before Labour HE minister Margaret Hodge complained about ‘Mickey Mouse courses’ in universities (so the hare was really Bugs Bunny). Willetts believed that HE institutions would choose to set fees in a range from £6000-9000, reflecting their supposed ‘competitiveness’ in the market. Every university, of course, understood that price signals quality and accordingly set fees at £9000. From that moment the HE market – as imagined by statute – was dead.
“I am of the view that higher education is not a ‘pure’ or ‘perfect’ market, but rather a ‘quasi-market’. Some of the reasons for this include:
• There is a complex relationship of choice between the student and the provider whereby students’ choices are dictated not solely by their preferences, but also by their expectations at being accepted/rejected by the provider.
• Government not only sets the price of a domestic undergraduate course that a provider can charge, but also heavily funds the sector through student loans.
• There are numerous and significant cross-subsidies between cohorts of students.
• There are significant asymmetries of power and information between providers and students. Taking on a student loan and pursuing higher education is likely to be the biggest contract new undergraduate students will ever have entered.”
With that list of deficiencies, calling HE a ‘quasi-market’ was charitable, even if – at a stretch – it reflected academic thinking. HE providers responded to the market in various ways, many eventually frowned on or outlawed. After 2010 new ‘challenger institutions’ expanded sub-degree business courses in London, exploiting the income from students able to gain £9000 tuition fee loans – money paid direct to institutions. They grew so much that in 2013 23 private colleges were suspended from student loans eligibility by the DfE. Government didn’t want that kind of response to market demand.
As universities increasingly suffered from rising cost but frozen tuition fees, many saw international student recruitment as the answer. Increasing numbers of universities outside London decided to open a London campus to exploit the overseas market, but were and still are criticised for it. The sector’s broad reliance on optimistic projections for international recruitment was deemed unsustainable and too risky. Government didn’t want that kind of response to market demand – but it decided to cash in anyway, with a levy on institutions for every international student recruited. Meanwhile some institutions thought they could still tap into new demand by expanding franchise relationships with partner colleges, but some of the largest of these have also now been discouraged or discredited. Government didn’t want that kind of response to market demand either.
Despite the downturn in franchising some people made a lot of money. Mike Ratcliffe noted on his MoreMeansBetter blog that the for-profit London School of Commerce had been “… incredibly profitable, with over £100 million paid in dividends to the family that own it.” He asked “Surely we can’t allow companies to stop being providers but to hang onto tens of millions in cash or other assets if either there have been a majority of non-genuine students or only a fraction of genuine students have completed their courses?”. It seems there were Mickey Mouse students as well as Mickey Mouse courses. Elsewhere, responsible HE institutions faced increasing financial problems as their real income fell precipitously. That line in the OfS strategy about resilience has a lot of work to do, and the OfS should look again at Behan’s recommendation “That the OfS board reviews its risk appetite framework and approach with a view to becoming more proactive in anticipating, identifying, and responding rapidly to address emerging risk.” After all, the new Strategy says; “We intervene where we have concerns that public money is not being used as intended …”
Students have repeatedly pronounced themselves largely satisfied with their course experiences in successive National Student Surveys, but this did little to quell the politicians’ and media obsession with course quality. The 2017 Act envisaged a Designated Quality Body to work with the OfS, the QAA was accordingly designated, but the OfS set increasingly restrictive conditions which the QAA ultimately deemed incompatible with its international role and credibility. The House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee
“… expressed concern about the circumstances surrounding the QAA’s de-designation … The QAA … “blamed” this suspension on the “OfS’ regulatory approach”. The committee said it was “concerning” that England’s regulatory framework had “shifted away from European standards” because it had the potential to damage the international reputation of England’s HE sector. … it was unclear if the OfS had the capability to take on the role previously carried out by the QAA. It called on the regulator to align its framework with international standards and to appoint the QAA or another arms-length body to perform the quality assurance role.”
The OfS instead formed an apparently permanent intention to conduct quality investigations itself, defying the explicit intention of the 2017 Act. OfS now has many Senior Leaders with a finger in the pie, presumably including those for Interventions, Monitoring, Enforcement, Student Outcomes, and Consumer Protection, but most of the others might have grounds to join in.
The quality investigations by OfS generally reach conclusions much too late to benefit the students whose experience prompted the investigations. The OfS strategy says: “We will help drive improvement across the sector, recognising that while much provision is already excellent, there is room to improve further. And we will hold institutions to account when they fall short.” So far the OfS investigations have focused on newer providers or universities near the bottom of the pecking order. The OfS has not, for example, investigated the very public problems with veterinary courses at Cambridge. In those as in many others it seems that institutional self-regulation can deliver better and quicker results.
Those with long memories will recall the opposition of the pre-1992 universities to any incursions by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, as it then was, which had the run of post-1992s. But HMI were able exactly to be “proactive in anticipating, identifying, and responding rapidly to address emerging risk.” Perhaps the OfS should not only reappoint a DQB but also look around for an independent and respected cadre of, say, His Majesty’s Inspectors. Behan said: ”The OfS should develop its regulatory model to create a virtuous policy circle with the objective of driving improvements in the quality of the higher education sector, and thus acting in the interests of students. The OfS and higher education providers should regard quality improvement as their common shared goal.”
English HE continues to be highly respected and in demand worldwide, but time is running out. The ‘narrow reputational range’ acclaimed by David Watson is jeopardised by misbehaviour by some new providers, misjudgments by a handful of institutions in desperate financial straits, and cutbacks everywhere. Nevertheless, the National Student Survey shows that students continue to be broadly satisfied, while identifying particular problems such as feedback which institutions have worked hard to address. Some in the media persist in asking “Is higher education worth it?” by highlighting graduate debt, but student demand remains doggedly high. This suggests that you really can’t buck the market, and what we need is the right kind of review to deal with the student loans row and make higher education finances sustainable. In this the OfS has a huge role to play: the new OfS Chief Executives have to transform how the OfS works, to live up to this optimistic but necessary condition for success: “We will deliver our work in collaboration with students and the institutions we regulate. Accepting there will be issues on which we disagree, we will cultivate relationships based on mutual respect, confidence and trust. We will work with student bodies, sector agencies and other partners that share responsibility for stewardship of this important sector to support a cohesive regulatory environment and foster a thriving ecosystem equipped to create opportunity and drive growth. We will champion the many benefits of higher education for society, culture and the economy and regulate in a way that enables universities and colleges to drive growth, create opportunity, champion free expression and support a flourishing society.”
Rob Cuthbert is Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner,Practical Academics rob.cuthbert@btinternet.com. X/Twitter @RobCuthbert. Bluesky @robcuthbert22.bsky.social.
US higher education is exposed both to presidential and to state interference. Government powers to intervene in US HE reside in presidential control of federal funding, which may come with conditions. Trump cannot simply shut down the Department of Education by executive order but it seems he can direct that the Department’s grant- and loan-giving functions are taken on by another government department.
A letter to Harvard dated 11 April signed on behalf of the Department of Education and other federal agencies asserted that the United States had ‘invested in Harvard University’s operations’ because of ‘the value to the country’ of its work, but warned that ‘an investment is not an entitlement.’ This letter, if accepted, was to constitute ‘an agreement in principle’. Governance was to be ‘exclusively’ in the hands of those ‘tenured professors’ and ‘senior leadership’ who were ‘committed to the ‘changes indicated in this letter’. Its ‘hiring and related data’ and its student ‘admissions data’ were to be ‘shared with the federal Government’. International students ‘hostile to American values’ were not to be admitted and those already admitted were to be reported to federal authorities. Policies on diversity, equity and inclusion were to end and student protest restricted.
Harvard and other Ivy League Universities were indignant. Harvard in particular rode the headlines for some days, objecting to the Government demand that it immediately agree:
to implement the Trump administration’s demands to overhaul the University’s governance and leadership, academic programs, admissions system, hiring process, and discipline system—with the promise of more demands to come
and thus ‘overtly seek to impose on Harvard University political views and policy preferences advanced by the Trump administration and commit the University to punishing disfavored speech’. There were reports that US academics were seeking to escape to employment in Canada, the UK or Europe.
American institutions of higher learning have in common the essential freedom to determine, on academic grounds, whom to admit and what is taught, how, and by whom
and that such ‘American institutions of higher learning’ were ‘essential to American prosperity’.
It stressed a ‘longstanding collaboration between universities such as Harvard and the federal government dating back to the Second World War’. It pointed to Harvard’s success in using federal funding to achieving significant research outcomes. The recent ‘broad attack of Government’ on ‘universities across America’, not only on Harvard and the other Ivy League Universities listed, had affected the ‘critical funding partnerships’ that made this invaluable research possible.
This case was being brought because, it was argued, the Government had been using ‘the withholding of federal funding as leverage to gain control of academic decision making at Harvard’. Harvard cited the Government’s letter of 11 April as demanding governance reform and a ‘third-party’ audit ‘of the viewpoints of Harvard’s student body, faculty, and staff’, followed by the hiring of new Faculty and admission of students whose views were satisfactory to the Government. It had asserted that teaching should be ‘to the Government’s satisfaction as determined in the Government’s sole discretion’ and to that end Harvard should ‘terminate or reform its academic “programs” to the Government’s liking’. The Government had since ‘launched multiple investigations and other actions against Harvard’.
The Government had ‘within hours of the Freeze Order ‘ended ‘$2.2 billion in multiyear grants and $60M in multiyear contract value to Harvard University’ and Harvard began receiving ‘stop work orders’. In order to bring a case against the Government it was essential for Harvard to establish that the Government’s action constituted a breach of public law. To that end it stated that the ‘Court has jurisdiction over Harvard’s claims’ because the University did not ‘seek money damages or an order mandating specific performance of any contract’, but:
an order declaring unlawful and setting aside sweeping agency action taken in violation of Harvard’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and its rights guaranteed by statute and regulation.
Harvard stressed that even though it is a private university its research is federally funded ‘through a grant process administered by federal agencies’. It cited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which requires ‘a detailed and mandatory statutory framework’ of procedures to be followed. Harvard had its own procedures, added to or created in August, September and November 2024. Specifically in March 2025, Harvard released updated “Frequently Asked Questions” clarifying that both Jewish and Israeli identities are covered by the University’s Non-Discrimination Policy.
Harvard explained that it had attempted ‘collaboration’ in the weeks following the government letter and the Federal Task Force’s press release announcing campus visits. It had sought to arrange a meeting on the campus and that was scheduled for late April 2025, yet on April 20 it was reported that the ‘Trump administration has grown so furious with Harvard University’ that ‘it is planning to pull an additional $1 billion of the school’s funding for health research.’
Trump’s threatened sanctions concerned the future of Harvard’s funding. Harvard has endowments of c$53 billion so any threat from Trump to reduce federal funding posed a limited risk to its future. However he made a further proposal on 18 April to remove Harvard’s exemption from Government tax on its income, which could have hit its normal operation harder.
The US counterpart to HMRC is its Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS may grant tax-exempt status to a charitable, religious, scientific or literary organization, on condition that it refrains from campaigning or seeking to modify legislation. However, the President is not permitted to direct the IRS to conduct an investigation or audit. To that extent the counterbalancing of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the US seems to be holding.
Harvard was making its challenge at a time when the balance between the executive and the judiciary in the US had come into question in a number of cases where Trump’s executive orders sought to override the courts. It claimed that ‘the Freeze Order is part of a broader effort by the Government to punish Harvard for protecting its constitutional rights. … multiple news outlets have reported that the Internal Revenue Service is considering revoking its recognition of Harvard’s tax exempt status’. Representing 86 universities, the Presidents’ Alliance has filed an Amicus brief supporting the litigation.
Harvard sought in its litigation to have the Freeze Order declared unconstitutional and also the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ sought to be imposed in the April 3 and April 11 and any action taken under it so far, also banning any future orders in the same vein. It pleaded six Counts, first a violation of the First Amendment in that the letters had targeted the ‘academic content that Harvard professors “teach students”’. Count 2 was that ‘even if the prerequisites of review under the Administrative Procedure Act were not satisfied, federal courts have the “equitable power” to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers.”’ Count 3 was that Title VI does not permit wholesale freezing of a recipient’s federal financial assistance. Instead, it requires that a “refusal to grant or to continue assistance” be “limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been so found.” Count 4 was the Government’s failure to ‘comply with their own regulations before freezing Harvard’s federal financial assistance’. Count 5 alleged that the action had been arbitrary and capricious and Count 6 that it had been ultra vires.
At Indiana University a professor of Germanic studies was recently investigated under a state law after a student accused him of speech in support of Palestine.
Could this happen in the UK?
English higher education providers have their autonomy protected by the Higher Education and Research Act (2017)s.2 [HERA]. This legislation created the Office for Students, a non-departmental public body, whose nearest US counterpart is the Higher Learning Commission, an independent agency founded in 1895 which accredits higher education institutions. The University of Michigan, for example seeks, renewal of its accreditation from the Higher Learning Commission every ten years.
The Office for Students is both regulator and funder, and distributes Government funding to higher education providers. This may take into account ‘particular policy areas and government priorities. Yet HERA outlaws any attempt by the OfS to impose the restrictions Trump sought to impose on the universities of the USA. English higher education providers must be free:
(i) to determine the content of particular courses and the manner in which they are taught, supervised and assessed,
(ii) to determine the criteria for the selection, appointment and dismissal of academic staff and apply those criteria in particular cases, and
(iii) to determine the criteria for the admission of students and apply those criteria in particular cases.
Academic staff in England also enjoy ‘freedom within the law’:
(i) to question and test received wisdom, and
(ii) to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions,
without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at the providers.
There is some Government oversight. In protecting ‘the institutional autonomy of English higher e providers’, the Office for Students is subject to the ‘guidance’ of the Secretary of State, though Government requirements are held off by the legislative fencing. The guidance of a higher education provider by the Office for Students:
must not relate to—
(a) particular parts of courses of study,
(b) the content of such courses,
(c) the manner in which they are taught, supervised or assessed,
(d) the criteria for the selection, appointment or dismissal of academic staff, or how they are applied, or
(e) the criteria for the admission of students, or how they are applied.
The legislation adds that:
guidance framed by reference to a particular course of study must not guide the OfS to perform a function in a way which prohibits or requires the provision of a particular course of study.
This seems to place universities safely out of reach of the kind of restrictions Trump sought to impose on Harvard and other Ivy League Universities, but the Office for Students is potentially able not only to set its Government funding levels but also affect its students’ access to loans from the Student Loans Company. That can certainly be at risk, for example in the case of the Oxford Business College, whose funding (via franchise arrangements) was blocked in April 2025 when it was found to have abused the student loan system by admitting unqualified students.(US accreditors do hold a lot of power, because universities must be accredited by a federally recognized agency in order to access federal student aid.)
Access to Government funding through the OfS requires listing by the Office for Students on its Register as an approved provider. The Office for Students did not impose its Conditions of Registration on pre-existing universities before including them in 2018 on its first Register under HERA. It simply treated them as proven acceptable providers of higher education. Each university duly publishes an account of its compliance (eg at Oxford) with the requirements which enable it to remain on the Office for Students Register. What might happen if they were found not to have done so? Short of removal from its Register the OfS has been known to impose fines, notably of more than £500,000 in the recent case of the University of Sussex when it was alleged to have failed to follow its own procedures designed to protect academic freedom.
Government oversight of the work of HE providers may overlap with or sit uneasily beside forms of ‘accreditation’ and ’qualification’. The accreditation of qualifications in the UK may be the responsibility of a number of ‘agencies’ external to HE providers, some of which are bodies offering professional qualifications. For example the Solicitors Regulation Authority keeps its own register of qualified solicitors. A university degree may not constitute a ‘qualification’ without the completion of further recognised study, some of which may be provided by the university itself, for example the Postgraduate Certificate in Education.
An area of ‘accreditation’ undergoing significant reform and expansion in the UK covers ‘skills’, including apprenticeships. Not all universities offer their own apprenticeships, though they may recognise some of those available from other providers at Levels 4 and 5. Nevertheless ‘skills’ are potentially at risk of Government intervention. At the beginning of March 2025, the House of Lords was debating whether ‘skills’ might benefit from the establishment of a ‘new executive agency’.
It was recognised that there would need to be a report from the Secretary of State ‘containing draft proposals’ for an agency, ‘to be known as “Skills England”. Ian Sollom MPobjected that that that would represent ‘a significant centralising of power in the hands of the Secretary of State, without providing proper mechanisms for parliamentary oversight or accountability.’ A ‘statutory, departmental body would have more clout’, he argued.
It looks as though some universities, at least, are safe from any initiative to interfere from above with the right to self-government and to determine what to teach and research. Harvard records a ‘revenue base’ of $65billion, with ‘federal funding ‘ as its largest source of support for research. The research income of Oxford, for example, is £778m, with commercial research income of £148m. That cannot compare with Harvard, but at least Oxford and some others will remain free to choose how to use that income for its academic purposes.
This is a modified version of an article first published by the Oxford Magazine No 477 in May 2025, republished with the permission of the editor and author.
SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.
In England the use of the title ‘university’ is regulated by law, a duty which now lies with the regulator, the Office for Students (OfS). When a new institution is created, or when an existing institution wishes to change its name, the OfS must consult on the proposed new name and may or may not approve it after consideration of responses to the consultation. The responsible agency for naming was once simply the Privy Council, a responsibility transferred to the OfS with the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. For existing older universities where legislative change is needed, the Privy Council must also still approve, but will only do so with a letter of support from the OfS. The arrangements were helpfully summarised in a blog by David Kernohan and Michael Salmon of Wonkhe on 8 April 2024, before most of the recent changes had been decided.
That which we call a university would probably not smell quite as sweet if it could not use the university title, and with its new power the OfS has made a series of decisions which risk putting it in bad odour. In July 2024 it allowed AECC University College to call itself the Health Sciences University. Although AECC University College was a perfectly respectable provider of health-related courses, this name change surely flew in the face of the many larger and prestigious universities which had an apparently greater claim to expertise in both teaching and research in health sciences. The criteria for name changes are set out by the OfS: “The OfS will assess whether the provider meets the criteria for university college or university title and will, in particular: … Determine whether the provider’s chosen title may be, or may have the potential to be, confusing.” It is hard to see how that criterion was satisfied in the case of the Health Sciences University.
Even worse was to come. In 2024 Bolton University applied to use the title University of Greater Manchester, despite the large and looming presence of both Manchester University and Manchester Metropolitan University. And the OfS said yes. If you google the names Bolton or Greater Manchester University you may even find the University of Bolton Manchester, which is neither the University of Bolton nor the University of Manchester, but is “Partnered with the University of Bolton and situated within the centre of Manchester” – indeed, very near the Oxford Road heartland location of Manchester and Manchester Metropolitan universities.
This is rather more confusing and misleading than University Academy 92, founded by a group of famous football team-mates at Manchester United, formed in August 2017 and based near Old Trafford. Wikipedia says that “the approval by the Department of Education (DoE) to allow UA92 the use of ‘University Academy 92’ was questioned with critics claiming the decision to approve the use of the name makes it ‘too easy’ for new providers to use ‘university’ in a new institution’s name”. This criticism continues to have some merit, but a high-profile football-related initiative, now broadened, is perhaps less likely to cause any confusion in the minds of its potential students. It may be significant that it was created at the same time as the HERA legislation was enacted, with government perhaps relaxing its grip in the last exercise of university title approval powers before the Privy Council handed over to the OfS. UA92 was and continues to be a deliverer of degrees validated by Lancaster University. In 2024 the OfS the University of Central Lancashire applied to be renamed the University of Lancashire, despite the obvious potential confusion with Lancaster University. And the OfS said yes.
It was not ever thus. The Privy Council would consult and take serious account of responses to consultation, especially from existing universities, as it did after the Further and Higher Education 1992 when 30 or so polytechnics were granted university title. A massive renaming exercise was carefully managed under the Privy Council’s watchful eye. As someone centrally involved in one such exercise, at Bristol Polytechnic, I know that the Privy Council would not allow liberties to be taken. The renaming exercise naturally stretched over many months; the Polytechnic conducted its own consultations both among its staff and students, but also much more widely in schools and other agencies across the South West region. Throughout that period, in a longstanding joke, the Polytechnic Director playfully mocked the Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University by suggesting that the polytechnic might seek to become the ‘Greater Bristol University’. It was a joke because all parties knew that the Privy Council, quite properly, would never countenance such a confusing and misleading proposal.
How would that name change play out now? In the words (almost) of Cole Porter: “In olden days a glimpse of mocking was looked on as something shocking, now heaven knows, anything goes.”
Rob Cuthbert is the editor of SRHE News and Blog, and a partner in the Practical Academics consultancy. He was previously Deputy Vice-Chancellor and professor of higher education management at the University of the West of England.
SRHE News is glad to bring you the Augur Report, its prognostications for 2025, based on extensive research into the works of Nostradamus, Old Moore’s Almanac and Mystic Meg.
January
Donald Trump resumes the US Presidency and announces that free speech in HE requires him to ban the use of the words Diversity, Equality and Inclusion in US HE. Elon Musk argues that this should also be applied in the UK.
UUK launches another major campaign to point out that most universities really are in serious financial trouble.
UCEA points out the difficulty of affording any staff salary increases at all in the present climate.
Vice-chancellors point out that the financial difficulties facing their institutions would not be significantly alleviated if they took a 50% cut in salary, and competitive salaries are essential to enable Britain’s world class universities to recruit and retain the best leaders. Especially when it has become so difficult to recruit staff.
The OfS announces a concordat with Russian higher education to support a major increase in its use of AI, using Russian cyber experts. The first expansion of AI will be in the approval of new university titles: the new AI Department will be known as the Nomenklatura Department. The criteria remain unchanged: the OfS “will consult on a provider’s proposed new name and assess the extent to which the proposed name is confusing or misleading”.
The OfS is already the investigating authority, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner for all HE infractions, and now seeks the power to exile to Siberia any academics complicit in breaching Condition of Registration B2. Government agrees in the interests of reducing net migration.
February
After the disappointing application figures for 2025 entry, UCAS launches a major advertising campaign to point out that the increase in undergraduate fees won’t make any difference to most student debt repayments.
UUK launches a new campaign to point out that the increase in undergraduate fees won’t make any difference to the financial troubles in most universities.
Government announces that even after all those new teachers are appointed there might be a bit left over for HE from the proceeds of VAT on private school fees. Teacher educators point out that after yet another year of missed targets in teacher training there is no-one qualified to apply for the new jobs in schools.
OfS approves a name change from Anglia Ruskin University to the University of Cambridge(shire).
March
The OfS approves a name change from Oxford Brookes University to University of Oxford(shire).
UUK relaunches its campaign: “Most universities really are in deep financial trouble, honest.”
Government says there might still be something left for HE from VAT on school fees, and Elon Musk might have a point.
The interim temporary Archbishop of Canterbury says she will renounce the power of the Archbishop to award degrees.
April
The OfS approves a name change from University of the West of England to the Greater Bristol University.
The OfS announces a major increase in the use of AI, to extend to all interventions on quality/standards/ breach of conditions of registration. The OfS Nomenklatura Department has been renamed, partly because no-one remembers the Soviet Union any more, and also because it was too likely to cause confusion with the rest of the OfS, who are already party-appointed bureaucrats. The suggested new name, the Behan Bots – conscripted to work for low pay, completely in the dark – is rejected because nobody remembers the Second World War any more and in any case it was too likely to cause confusion with existing university staff. OfS CEO Susan Lapworth says the new Department will now be known as the Laptops.
The OfS announces a concordat with Chinese higher education which will start with a new student recruitment campaign in the North East: “Huawei the lads”.
May
The OfS approves a name change from Coventry University to Warwick(shire) University.
Government says sorry – even though they couldn’t appoint any new teachers there was nothing left from VAT on school fees because they diverted it to fill the £22billion hole in the public finances. It issues guidance on the use of language in HE, known as the Musk Directive.
UUK’s Taskforce on Efficiency and Transformation in Higher Education announces that it is in advanced talks with Government about restructuring the HE sector in England. Luckily the Taskforce chair is a lawyer specialising in mergers and acquisitions.
June
The OfS approves a name change from Birmingham City University to the Greater Birmingham University
GuildHE issues a reminder that it has no formal connection with the Church of England or any other faiths but remains committed to whatever you are allowed to call diversity, equity and inclusion since the Musk Directive.
Canterbury Christ Church University is renamed University of Kent Two. OfS says this is unlikely to cause confusion among international students, especially since Kent is so near to Paris.
Bishop Grosseteste University becomes the University of Lincoln Two But We Were Here First. Leeds Beckett, Northumbria, Sheffield Hallam, Greater Birmingham and Greater Bristol consider name changes.
UUK issues a media release saying “we did warn you” as 30% of universities merge or close. OfS says everything will be OK, because all universities are required to have plans for an orderly exit from the market. Wimbledon fortnight begins and UCAS says “you cannot be serious”.
July
OfS approves a name change for Liverpool John Moores to Liverpools University.
The BBC is forced to suspend filming of the new series of University Challenge after 30% of universities appearing have merged, have new names or have announced their intention to close.
August
UCAS announces that the 30% reduction in available university places has luckily been matched by an equivalent fall in the number of applicants.
Government announces its three priorities for HE – reduction, reduction, reduction – will apply particularly to the numbers of students from all disadvantaged groups.
September
The OfS approves its own name change from the Office for Students to the Office with No Students on the Board (ONO).
October
Government announces its new higher education policy, with the establishment of a new corporation to take over all the universities not in a position to complain, provisionally titled the Great British University. ONO says this is unlikely to cause confusion, but governments in Wales and Scotland say they are confused since all the universities in the GBU are in England. The Northern Ireland Assembly say they’re glad it wasn’t the Great UK University, or they would have been confused. The new HE policy includes a pledge/mission/milestone promising net zero admissions by 2030, or maybe 2035.
The last Bishop to leave the Church of England is asked to remember to switch off all the lights to comply with its Net Zero Bishops pledge.
November
The Greater London Non-University College of Monkey Business publishes its annual Report and Accounts: income £925,000; expenditure £925,000, all annual salary for the principal. It recruited 100 students but they all left at the end of the year without leaving forwarding addresses. Having no students at all on its Board it claims to be completely aligned with the regulator.
December
ONO announces it has breached its own conditions of registration and has removed itself from the Register of Approved Regulators. Dusting down a forgotten part of the Higher Education and Research Act (2017) it issues an urgent appeal – Quick, Anyone? Anyone! – for a new designated quality body to replace itself, which becomes known as the QAA appeal.
A High Court judgment finds that publishers have mis-sold the copyright of academics to multinational AI corporations and orders financial compensation, known as Publishers Pay Instead (PPI). Publishers set aside £100billion.
Universities launch a counter claim, asserting their ownership of, or failing that a pretty strong interest in, copyright of academics in their employ, and sue to recover the costs of journal subscriptions and transitional agreements. Publishers set aside a further £100billion.
Multinational AI corporation share prices, now quoted only in bitcoin, continue to rise.
The new Wallace and Gromit film, Academic Free-Don, is set in a university where the inmates are planning a mass escape. When they realise that their new zero-hours contracts allow them to leave at any time, they apply for exile to Siberia, where they expect better pay and conditions of employment.
The theme for the 2026 SRHE Conference is announced: “Where do we go from here?”
SRHE News is a not-for-prophet enterprise. No octopuses were harmed in the making of this editorial.
SRHE News EditorRob Cuthbert is Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics rob.cuthbert@btinternet.com. Twitter @RobCuthbert
Higher education has always been something of a playground for junior politicians; HE ministers usually serve only short terms, and many are practising for bigger jobs. (Liz Truss and Boris Johnson were both briefly shadow HE ministers.) The Coalition period was an exception, with David Willetts serving for four years and evidently deeply engaged and interested in HE. Since he left in 2014 the political game-playing has sadly degenerated, becoming ever more disconnected from the real issues facing the HE sector.
In 2024 fifty or more universities have declared or are likely to declare redundancies, as their funding position becomes ever more perilous. Student fees have been frozen at £9250 for a decade, and their real value has declined to the extent that they are now worth no more than the £6000 which applied in 2012 before the fee went to £9000. According to Mark Corver of DataHE: “… universities have lost, in real terms, around a third of their income since 2012. Most of that has happened recently. Universities have lost the equivalent of almost £3 billion from their annual UG teaching funding in just the past 18 months.”
The long-running dispute in half the sector over changes to the Universities Superannuation Scheme might have recently been resolved, but there are now major concerns about the cost of the Teachers’ Pension Scheme in the other half. UUK chief executive Vivienne Stern and UCEA chief executive Raj Jethwa wrote to Minister Robert Halfon on 18 March 2024 asking for more flexibility in whether post-92 universities must offer TPS membership to their staff, noting that 27% of post-92s had declared redundancies in 2022-2023 and 46% had done so since August 2023. TPS contributions rose sharply on 1 April 2024 as Tom Williams reported for Times Higher Education on 18 March 2024.
Pay disputes have led to repeated strikes and action short of strikes, especially marking and assessment boycotts, affecting the whole sector. This, coupled with Covid, has meant increased workloads for academic and professional staff in major and repeated reconstruction of teaching programmes, with many universities relying increasingly on a precariat of staff on short-term contracts. Negotiations between employers and staff are inevitably complicated by the wide range of institutional fortunes, which makes affordable resolution for everyone difficult to achieve. Covid and employment disputes have brought massive disruption for students, with class actions for compensation continuing as an additional looming threat to HE budgets. Problems with student mental health have reached epidemic proportions, affected not only by the pandemic and loan-driven student debt but also the spiralling cost of university and private student accommodation, which is in short supply in many places.
In 2024 we do expect a general election, but we don’t expect the massive problems for UK HE to be an election issue. Voters mostly care much more about cost of living, the energy crisis, climate change, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the NHS … and even within education, universities rank well behind schools and nursery places as topics for political debate. As Tom Williams reported for Times Higher Education on 16 May 2023, HE Minister Robert Halfon declared that “… the sector was in a “fairly strong” position – compared with much of the economy given the current financial difficulties – and implied management may be to blame at universities faring badly, rather than his government’s funding system.” Halfon resigned unexpectedly on 26 March 2024, so after 14 years of Coalition and Conservative government we have our ninth new HE Minister, Luke Hall. It is the eleventh such appointment, since both Jo Johnson and Chris Skidmore served twice, and only four of the 11 appointments lasted for more than a year. There is a striking contrast with appointments as Schools Minister, the role in which Nick Gibb has served for most of the last 14 years, despite being sacked and reappointed by successive prime ministers.
For most of the Coalition period the Universities Minister was David (now Lord) Willetts, who was perhaps the main architect of the Higher Education and Research Act (HERA) 2017, eventually steered into law by Jo (now Lord) Johnson. HERA legislated for the HE ‘market’ and created a new regulator, the Office for Students (OfS). The policy sought to drive up quality through competition, with an influx of new ‘alternative’ providers; the Act made extensive provision for failing HE institutions to go out of business. Willetts’ special adviser, Nick Hillman, later became an effective Director of HEPI, but his HEPI blog of 14 February 2024 asked ‘Whatever happened to all those alternative providers?’, while still defending the policy to which he contributed. A more plausible view is that the HERA version of the ‘market’ in HE had been tried and comprehensively failed. Against the success of a few new providers like the Dyson Institute there have been many more seeking to provide mostly lower-level courses, mostly in business, mostly in London. Operating an HE institution is a complex, difficult and long-term activity, and after relaxing requirements for entry to the higher education ‘market’, government was forced to crack down on the more egregious excesses of some of the new alternative providers. ‘Driving up quality through competition’ has been shown up as a fantasy; what always worked much better was relying on the intrinsic motivation of people in HE to do the best for their students, in what has always been vigorous competition with other institutions. Self-regulation is of course inadequate: HE institutions need external quality assurance and control, but the OfS chose to do away with the QAA, the designated quality body, by setting conditions which jeopardised QAA’s international credibility and forcing QAA to step down. Instead the OfS has set up its own quality arrangements in an apparently long-term plan which goes against all the expectations when HERA was enacted.
That was the good news. A new government was entitled to try a new policy for HE, as it did. It didn’t work, so what happened next? Not repeal, of course, but neither was it, as we might have hoped, adaptation of the new policy to make it work better. In the chaos and increasingly rapid turnover of the post-Brexit administrations, politicians in the DfE and elsewhere became obsessed with culture wars. They brought forward a major new piece of legislation which had nothing to do with HE finance, staffing issues, student problems, or even the supposed focus of ‘levelling up’. Obsessed by immigration numbers, government even doubled down on HE’s financial problems with visa restrictions seriously affecting international student recruitment, especially for postgraduate recruitment which for many years had underpinned the viability of STEM disciplines. It was convenient for government that the OfS continued to give reassurances about HE finance, but it was hardly surprising, since government had installed a Conservative peer as the OfS chair.
The new legislation was the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, education’s contribution to armaments in the culture wars. There were, of course, problems in some, perhaps even many, HE institutions over what might and might not be said in different contexts. A HEPI blog by Josh Freeman on 13 October 2022 argued that there was a problem with self-censorship and ‘quiet’ no-platforming. In the US some prominent university presidents lost their jobs arguing with politicians about the need to protect diversity in HE debate. The war on woke has not perhaps reached that pitch in the UK yet. But the Act required OfS to appoint a free speech ‘tsar’, as it did, and OfS issued proposals on 14 December 2023 on how the free speech regime will operate, launching a consultation on 26 March 2024. The results are unconvincing to those on the ground in the institutions. Jim Dickinson blogged for Wonkheon 6 March 2024 about the shambles which government has created with its free speech legislation: “We are literally less than six months away from OfS opening a complaints scheme under which one group of students will say another’s actions amount to antisemitism, while the other will say they are threatening their right to express legally protected anti-Zionist beliefs – both saying their free speech is threatened as a result, both arguing they are being harassed, and both reasonable in asserting that they were assured their free speech and protection from harassment was assured.” The Act may even rival the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021 for its unworkability in practice.
The principal cheerleader for the new Act was Education Minister (and for two chaotic days in the fall of Boris Johnson, Secretary of State for Education) Michele Donelan, who continued to champion it even as she moved to become Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology in the Sunak administration. Donelan relied on a press release from right wing think tank Policy Exchange to pick a fight with UKRI about the members of its Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Committee. The release was written by Donelan’s former special adviser Iain Mansfield. UKRI suspended its Committee and their membership pending an inquiry, which exonerated the members, one of whom sued Donelan for libel and won £15000 damages, as Faye Brown reported for Sky News on 12 March 2024. The damages were paid by the government, prompting widespread disbelief; Leader of the House Penny Mordaunt even suggested that we should cut Donelan some slack because she had not taken the £16000 redundancy payment to which she was entitled from her two days as Secretary of State for Education. It would all be deeply embarrassing, if government ministers were still capable of feeling shame.
The playground urgently needs more grown-ups, to do higher education policy as if higher education mattered.
Rob Cuthbert is Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics rob.cuthbert@btinternet.com. Twitter @RobCuthbert
Much attention is now directed towards the role of evaluation in efforts to widening higher education participation. Indeed, the evaluation of interventions aimed at broadening HE access, and ensuring the success of those from under-represented groups once they are at university, is considered a priority by the Office for Students [OfS], (Blake 2022; OfS, 2023a; OfS, 2024).
Various guidance documents prepared by the HE regulator, both for individual higher education providers (OfS, 2023b), and Uni Connect, the government funded collaborative outreach programme (OfS, 2022), set out a rationale for this focus. ‘High quality evaluation,’ it is argued, ‘allows universities and colleges to understand the impact of their work to support students’, and to improve the effectiveness of this work (OfS, 2023a), and through sharing the findings of such investigations to ‘contribute to the wider evidence base’ (OfS, 2022, 12). In contrast, the role of research in widening participation [WP] receives far less attention and appears to be considered of less significance. Whilst ‘evaluation’ accumulates 42 references in the OfS’s advice to HE providers’ on their access and participation plans, research is mentioned 16 times (OfS, 2023b). More pointedly, the regulator’s guidance to Uni Connect partnerships states that ‘research is not one of the main aims or expected outcomes of funding’ (OfS, 2022, 13).
Yet, arguably, research has an equally important role to play in supporting and advancing the WP agenda. To appreciate this it is helpful to draw out the distinctions between research and evaluation. Perhaps the most fundamental of these relates to the broader remit that research has in ‘seeking new insights’ and making ‘new discoveries.’ Often this involves testing theories or hypotheses, and generating findings that have wider application (Anon, nd, np; Rogers, 2014). For some, research is viewed as ‘active and proactive’, whereas evaluation is ‘reactive’, in the sense of responding to an activity or practice (Anon, 2024, np).
Arguably, these distinct qualities mean that research has the potential to address a number of key WP challenges that remain unexplored in evaluations. For instance, providing insights into the reasons for the comparatively low rates of HE participation amongst particular groups of learners. These include young men from white, working class backgrounds, along with those taking vocational (applied general) courses and studying in further education colleges. All three are areas of current concern for those engaged in widening participation (Atherton and Mazhari, 2019; Raven, 2022; Raven, 2021).
In addition, it is by means of research that we can learn more about the longer-term impact of the pandemic and the cost of living crisis on the progression plans of those from more deprived neighbourhoods, as well as the reasons why some WP students appear more likely to drop out of university-level study. Research can also tell us about the post-graduation experiences of under-represented backgrounds – insights that are of central importance in presenting the case for HE. Indeed, research can be viewed as complementary to evaluation. Research can provide insights and guidance on how a particular WP challenge can be addressed, with evaluation deployed to assess the effectiveness of the measures taken.
Whilst the OfS’s limited support (and funding) may explain some of the comparative neglect of research, the way much WP-related research (admittedly, this includes my own) has tended to be conducted and disseminated may also act as an impediment to recognising its true value. Therefore, besides calling on the OfS to acknowledge the role that research can play in supporting efforts to widen participation, I have five suggestions aimed at fellow researchers for enhancing the accessibility – and impact – of their work:
Share research findings with WP practitioners through talks and presentations, as well as more interactive workshops
Publish work in journals whose readership includes WP practitioners and policy makers
Explore opportunities to circulate findings in more widely read newsletters and e-bulletins
Engage directly with practitioners in exploring potential research topics
Consider the practical, real world application of research findings.
I would welcome readers’ views on these suggestions.
Neil Raven is an educational consultant and researcher in widening access. Contact him at neil.d.raven@gmail.com.
Acknowledgements – Thank you to Tony Hudson, Lewis Mates, Jessica Benson-Egglenton, Robin Webber-Jones and John Baldwin.
The House of Lords Committee on Industry and Regulators pulls no punches in Must do better. This Report on its Inquiry on the Office for Students published on 13 September finds the OfS to be underperforming in a number of respects. It criticises its ‘prescriptive regulatory requirements and time-consuming processes’ and its ‘inappropriate micromanagement’, with ‘little regard to the need to protect institutional autonomy’. Institutions are found to be reluctant to engage with it ‘for fear of a punitive regulatory response’.
‘The student interest’ in which it was set up is described as ‘defined by the OfS in line with the political priorities of Ministers rather than the priorities of students’. In comparison with its threatening mass of detailed rules for providers the OfS definition of required ‘outcomes’ affecting students (student continuation beyond a first year; progression to completion; gaining employment) is found to be ‘simplistic and narrow’.
The Office for Students is a non-departmental ‘arm’s length’ public body with executive functions. These are far more extensive than HEFCE possessed in its role of ‘buffer’ between Government and providers of higher education and Must do Better is concerned that the OfS has been adding to them. Moreover Must do better says that the lack of close attention to the underlying objectives of his statutory duties ‘makes it difficult for the OfS to be held accountable’.
The OfS is a regulator. Must do Better says it ‘should improve its adherence to best regulatory practice through closer alignment with the Regulators’ Code’ dating from 2014. It should do so ‘with respect to how it implements its policies and procedures, as well as how it develops them’. The Regulators’ Code has ‘accountability’ as its overall aim, and emphasises reciprocal and mutual responsibilities between regulator and regulated, a point on which the OfS is now found conspicuously wanting.
The provisions for its accountability seem inadequate to address the potential abuse of power arising from a failure of the OfS to engage appropriately with the providers it regulates. If it decides a provider ‘must do better’ in meeting its ‘outcomes’ requirements, the Office for Students can remove it from its Register, take away its degree-awarding powers and its university title or impose a monetary penalty, with the provider paying the costs of its investigation, with internal appeal only against the scale of the costs.
Appeal against an OfS decision on such matters lies to the First-tier Tribunal Health, Education and Social Care Chamber (Care Standards). It must be made within 28 days of the issue of the decision by the OfS, on the grounds that the decision was based on an error of fact; was wrong in law, or unreasonable, except where the decision was to revoke degree-awarding powers or University title. In that case the grounds of appeal are not specified and the decision may be made afresh. The Tribunal will take into account evidence that was not available to the Office for Students when it made its decision.
A landmark case was brought by Bloomsbury Institute Ltd, formerly the London School of Business and Management, after its application for Registration was refused by the OfS in May 2019 under Registration Condition B3, namely that ‘student continuation rates from year one to year two (“continuation rates”) and rates of progression to professional employment or post-graduate study (“progression rates”). First came an attempt at judicial review on a several grounds. That was unsuccessful but an appeal succeeded on two grounds, ‘delegation’ and the failure of ‘publication and consultation’. Bloomsbury is now on the Register subject to an Ongoing Condition about student ‘continuation’ (R. v. Bloomsbury Institute Ltd. and The Office for Students [2020] EWCA Civ 1074).
Must do better points to the agreed accountability ‘framework’, not between OfS and providers but between OfS and Government. The current Framework document between the Department for Education and the Office for Students is dated January 2023. This promises ‘reviews’ to ‘ensure intra alia that the OfS is delivering effectively’ against the ‘aims and objectives’ of the Public Bodies Review Programme, but ‘The date of the next review is yet to be determined’.
It may take some time to arrange. Must do Better notes the National Audit Office’s recent criticism in its Central Oversight of Arm’s Length Bodies that ‘review programmes’ had ‘failed to meet their ambition of reviewing every ALB [Arms Length Body] within a Parliament’. Must do better notes ‘that the Government is committed to a public body review of the OfS’, but calls for that to go beyond the ‘considering whether the OfS’ work remains useful and necessary’ by placing ‘ its work in a wider context, focusing on the strategic issues facing the sector’.
In any case the Office for Students’ Framework Document provides accountability only through the Secretary of State (ultimate accountability to Parliament) and the Minister for Higher Education (day-to-day responsibility). The DfE’s Senior Sponsor for OfS will ‘hold quarterly performance reviews with the leadership of the OfS as part of performance monitoring and accountability’. These do not seem to be on published record. Government ‘recognition of the problems created by regulatory duplication in the higher education sector’ is welcomed but Must do better wants the DfE to ‘set out in further detail the steps it is taking to streamline regulatory responsibilities within the sector, including its proposed timetable for this’.
There is published self-criticism. The OfS’s Annual Reportfor 2022-3 took stock of its own performance expressly in terms of the requirements of its Framework relationship with the DfE:
This year we experienced some resource challenges, which had implications for some business plan activities. Our Performance analysis report identifies where this was the case.
OfS accordingly tracked its ‘performance against’ its eleven Key Performance Measures and Operational Measures and ‘reported to the DfE’ on its ‘progress’. KPM 11 covers ‘Efficient Regulation’ and lists under the headings: ‘Minimum and maximum number of OfS data and information returns for providers’; ‘Average number of OfS conditions of registration subject to enhanced monitoring per registered provider’; Amount of regulatory fees paid by providers per student’. The Operational Measures count Reportable Events; Notifications; Registration; Degree awarding powers, and time taken to resolve these. The OfS Annual Report adds that its ‘performance against budget’ is ‘monitored and reported each month’ and its ‘performance against financial target’ on an in-year basis. It has monitored its performance in paying its creditors, ‘greening’, the Cabinet Office’s Functional Standards for Counter Fraud and salaries.
Must do better makes recommendations but it is far from clear how accountability can be insisted on. Must do better finds it ‘worrying that some institutions would be unwilling to engage with the OfS’ particularly ‘in the early stages of falling into financial difficulty for fear of a punitive regulatory response’. The 2022-3 Annual Report looks towards the individual providers with which the OfS has a regulatory relationship, but chiefly in terms of their ‘Financial sustainability and governance’. It had required 250 providers to complete their annual financial return for the 2020/2021 financial year:
Of these, 117 were subject to further assessment, there was informal monitoring of 51 providers, of which 31 were subject to additional formal monitoring. Three providers were subject to Student Protection Directions, which enable the OfS to intervene “quickly and in a targeted way” where there is a material risk of market exit. One provider exited the market.
It was recognised before the burden was increased with the creation of the OfS that already ‘the accountability burden in the higher education sector is out of proportion to the risk of financial or academic mismanagement.’ This may no longer be true, and if so that matters in connection with the full title of Must do better: the Office for Students and the looming crisis facing higher education. The Report outlines this crisis in terms of the diminishing value of the tuition fee against the expanding institutional cost of teaching an undergraduate and the growing reliance on income from international students.
It expresses concerns about the adequacy of OfS’s checking of financial sustainability especially with reference to the latter. It finds it too trusting, which is especially a concern in the light of the recognition that providers in financial difficulties are afraid to raise their concerns with the OfS. The OfS Register defines the providers whose students are entitled to loans from the Student Loans Company. It currently lists 425, in two categories, those which may charge fees up to £9,250 and those without a ‘fee cap’ to which the SLC will lend only £6125, less if the provider has no TEF rating. There is perhaps a further growing concern which Must do better fails to pick up and that is the multiplication of alternative providers not all of which have degree awarding powers or university title and not all of which are offering courses above Levels 4 and 5.
How badly is the Office for Students failing? Can it improve sufficiently to help protect the future of English higher education? It has been publishing reassurance that it is making efforts to connect better with the providers of higher education it now regulates. It has published the findings of two assessment visits on Business and Management courses and celebrates ‘positive engagement’ from local graduates on an OfS programme. It is ‘advising’ on ‘what works in supporting disabled students’. This is all a warrant of a wish to repair flaws and to improve what it does but the criticisms of Must do Better may not be easy to meet piecemeal.
A letter to the Chair of the House of Commons Education Select Committee from the chief executives of the Russell Group, GuildHE, MillionPlus and the University Alliance in January 2023, suggesting that the OfS was failing to comply with the Regulators Code helped to prompt concerns that this was encouraging providers to resort to litigation. That led to further concerns in March about the lack of ‘basic safeguards around transparency, fairness and accountability’ in the conduct of the OfS.
The Lords’ Industry and Regulators Committee began its inquiry in March and the now published evidence submitted to it fully supports the conclusions of Must do Better. If the Office for Students is beyond reform could it be abolished? That would require fresh legislation. The Higher Education and Research Act (2017) depends heavily on the belief that, with the block grant shrunk to vanishing point for teaching and tuition fees a chief source of university income, HEFCE’s allocation of a block grant in the capacity of a buffer between Government and providers would no longer be enough. When providers were attracting their funding directly, institutional autonomy was no longer to be trusted without a new Regulator. The drawbacks of this policy change are now apparent. Perhaps it is time for a radical rethink.
SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.
This week we look set to see these challenges increase with the possible increase in the base interest rates by the Bank of England (the “Bank Rate”) to 5.5% when the Monetary Policy Committee next meets on Thursday 21st September (Guardian, Financial Times, 24 August 2023 ). If there is another 0.25% increase in the base rate, as is widely anticipated, this will place government and university finances under further pressure over the next few years with significant negative implications for HE students, the UK Government’s education budget in general and the further education college budget in particular. Furthermore, this anticipated rise in the Bank Rate may not be the last of these increases if Government spending remains high and inflationary pressures persist through the winter months.
The most immediate and direct effect will be on the interest payments that universities need to pay on short term loans. According to HESA, average HE provider debt as a proportion of turnover stands at 0.16%, but with highs of 454% and lows of 0%, with unrestricted reserves of 204% of income (HESA, 2023). Of course, financial indicators expressed as a percentage of income for institutions of very variable sizes give no feel for the absolute amount of cash owed, or the annual cost of repayments.
The top 13 higher education providers by percentage of debt are all small private institutions; most have recorded deficits in recent years and appear to have low levels of cash available to cover running costs. The next 35 institutions by scale of debt all have debt levels of over 50% of turnover. Among these institutions there are 22 large pre- and post-92 universities in all parts of the UK.
The challenges presented by potential increases in interest payments will be exacerbated over the next two years by the continued decline in the real value of student tuition fees, limitations on the recruitment of overseas students with dependants and a decline in the proportion of students applying to low and mid-tariff universities.
When student tuition fees were first introduced, HE providers were encouraged to set fees at between £6,000 and £9,000 per annum. Some price competition between institutions was expected but in practice the vast majority set their fees at the higher level. Recent analysis by Mark Corver of DataHE, an independent higher education consultancy, indicates that the real level of fees that higher education providers charge students as tuition fees has dropped below £6,000 if the value is deflated by the Retail Prices Index (RPI), slightly higher if other measures of inflation are used.
Over the last five years, many HE providers have been attempting to cover the reduced value of undergraduate home tuition fee income by recruiting larger number of international students, particularly from China, India and Nigeria. This approach has attracted large numbers of students to the most selective universities and those in major cities; many universities now have more than 25% of their students recruited from these sources. The announcement of restrictions on the release of temporary visas to support the dependents of international students has already had an impact on the recruitment of people from overseas who want to study at UK universities.. This impact looks set to continue and increase in 2024.
To illustrate the issues faced by the more highly indebted institutions with a significant number of international students, consider the composite case of the University of Camberwick Green, with net debt of circa £200m and current loans with a weighted average debt cost of 3.5%. If this institution needed to renew all of its existing debt obligations this would likely double the costs of debt servicing from £7million to at least £14million. This would mean an additional annual outlay as a proportion of turnover in excess of 5%, dependent on the interest rates agreed with lenders and the term of their loan (e.g. revolving credit facility, private placement, bond or bank lending). For a university like Camberwick Green, which has also recorded large operating deficits in recent years, additional debt is likely to be more expensive and so the short-term options are likely to focus on selling assets or laying off staff; these are not easy or attractive options. Changes to course portfolios and/or increased international student recruitment and transnational operations are unlikely to produce the necessary returns quickly and without undue financial or reputational risk.
The more prestigious and selective universities in the more affluent parts of the UK are unlikely to face pressures that are likely to bear down hard on those which are, by conventional measures, less prestigious and less selective, in parts of the UK that engaged in levelling up activities with significant HE involvement. The impacts of high indebtedness, declining student recruitment and operating deficits are already being felt with significant redundancies planned at ten universities.
The next most significant impact of higher interest rates will be on student loan repayments and the arrangements for funding this activity. The student loan book currently stands at £206bn with an additional £20bn of loans being issued each year. The internal real interest rate charged on these loan arrangements by HM Treasury, i.e. the real discount rate (excluding inflation), was set at -0.7% in 2021 at the height of the Covid crisis and remains the rate proposed in the Plan 5 changes scheduled to come into place during 2024. The nominal discount rate taking account of inflation is 1.9%. If Bank of England interest rates and by consequence HM Treasury bond/gilt rates move to 6.25% in 2024, as has been forecast, and the student loan rate is changed as a consequence, this will create an adverse upward movement in real interest rate charges on the loan book of circa 5%. Dependent on the scheduling of the loans this will then feed through into the calculation of the principal debt students are required to repay and also the Resource Allocation Budget (RAB) charge paid by the UK Government on loans that are forecast not to be repaid. Under revised accounting rules introduced in 2021, a proportion of this increased RAB charge will need to be accounted for in the national deficit in the year it is incurred and cannot be delayed until the loan matures. With forecast increases in the scale of the student loan book through to the next decade there are likely to be powerful voices in the Treasury wishing to pay down this debt or reduce the scale of its growth. This in turn is likely to mean a need to revisit the current arrangements in advance of the next HM Treasury Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) in 2025.
The current loan book is financed in part by the spread (difference) between the notional interest rate charged to students on loans they have taken out, which is currently set with some reference to the Prevailing Market Rate (PMR) for commercial loans, and the lower rate paid by the Treasury for its borrowings. The PMR was set at 7.3% in February 2023 and confirmed at this level for the period between September and November 2023 on 11th August. . At present the Bank of England Bank Rate is 5.3% and so the spread between the student loan rate and the Bank Rate was 2%. If a similar spread is expected if the base rate rises further to 6.25% the PMR could be 8.25% or even higher. Interest rates at this level would make almost all student loans un-repayable, effectively converting the loan system into a graduate tax confined to new students and also potentially introducing a significant element of “moral hazard” as many students would face little incentive to do anything other than maximise their student loans. Given that they will never repay them; they will face an additional marginal loan repayment (tax) rate of 9% on undergraduate loans and 6% on postgraduate loans, so why not take out as much loan as possible and complete a postgraduate taught or research degree, even when the economic returns to them individually and to the public purse are negative. Beyond this “moral hazard” argument there is also arguably a “moral outrage” argument to be had about imposing an age-related differential income tax rate on younger people who are recent graduates.
The problems outlined above are then likely to be heightened by forecast increases in the number of prospective undergraduate students entering the system over the next seven years. In 2021/2022 there were 2.16 million U.K. domiciled students in UK HE institutions and a further 0.68 million students from the EU and other overseas countries. By 2030 the number of UK domiciled students is expected to increase by between 200,000 and 400,000 as a consequence of increases in the number of people in the relevant age groups. This would be at an average additional cost per student of at least £60,000 per three-year undergraduate degree, based on loans for tuition fees of 3 x £9,250 and for maintenance of 3 x up to £13,022 for students living away from home in London. Many students study for longer than three years on foundation and/or masters programmes, hence the forecast of £60,000 per student. This is an additional annual cost of loan outlay of £12bn or more. This seems unlikely to be fundable.
The implication of these cost pressures would be serious enough if they were confined to HE, but they are not. Far from it. At present the growing costs of HE are being paid for by other parts of the UK Government’s education budget, resulting in real terms cuts to the further education budget, consequent low rates of pay for FE college staff, and cuts to the adult education budget. In adult education, FE and apprenticeship provision pay rates are set locally rather than nationally and so reductions in institutional budgets in this part of the education sector have tended to be accommodated by falling wages and unfilled vacancies rather than through redundancies as has been the case in the university sector. These different parts of the post-school education system are making greater use of part-time and temporary contracts and precarious jobs. This at a time when the need for more and better vocational education is increasingly widely recognised and the need for “industry standard” staff capable of delivering the new and upgraded skills required by rapid technological change has never been greater.
Across the UK 70% of adults have not been to university, but like many older graduates they would benefit from the opportunity to take a course at a local college or other adult education provider. With 20% of the adult working age population (5 million people) currently economically inactive and with chronic skills shortages in all parts of economy it is very worrying that the pay of college lecturers in catering, construction, digital, engineering, health and social care is considerably below the rates paid to comparably skilled people working in the private sector. Employers in the UK spend on average 50% less than their counterparts in mainland Europe on workforce education and training. The combination of reductions in employer spending on training and cuts in UK Government funding for FE and apprenticeships has led to a reduction of over 1 million student places in adult education, apprenticeships and FE per year in the last ten years. This is not the position the UK needs to be in to improve productivity. Indeed, it is the very opposite of what is required to support such mission – let alone to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth.
Who is responsible for monitoring and governing this system? At the moment the financial position of individual universities is overseen by their governing bodies, aided by internal and external auditors predominantly drawn in combinations of two of the big four audit firms. The Office for Students (OfS) monitors the financial position of individual higher education providers as part of its regulatory function, but it is not formally required to intervene financially at an early stage to support institutions in difficulties. It may issue a requirement to improve the plans for protecting students, but it is not required to prevent an institution from failing. The Student Loan Company (SLC) is overseen by an independent board and supported by a representative from the sponsoring departments in the UK’s national governments (i.e. Department for Education, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Office in the absence of the Northern Ireland Executive). Whether the OfS, national regulators in the devolved nations or the SLC have modelled the scenarios outlined in this note is a moot point. Indeed, it is more of a mute point because no one is publicly talking about these issues and the problems that go with them in a joined-up way with a long-term perspective. It would be helpful if they did, and if there was a debate about the consequences for higher and further education providers and student loans of the return to real interest rates more in-keeping with the long run historical average. Given the commitment of central banks around the world to move in this direction after 15 years of ultra-low interest rates there is a pressing need for a comprehensive review of where we are heading and what needs to be done about it.
As we approach a General Election in 2024, now is the time for the major political parties in the UK to commit to the appointment of a Royal Commission or equivalent to look at these issues with an impartial, sector neutral and critical eye. Over the last hundred years all major changes of this type have proceeded in this way (i.e. Smith Report 1919, White Paper on Education 1943, Robbins Review 1964, Dearing Review 1997 and Browne Review 2011). Indeed, in 1997 Gillian Sheppard (Conservative minister) and David Blunkett (prospective Labour minister) agreed in the run up to the General election to respect the Dearing Committee proposals. A similar arrangement was reached regarding the Browne Review between Peter Mandelson (Labour Minister) and George Osborne (prospective Conservative Minister) in the run up to the general election in 2010. The settlements in 1944 and 1963 were similarly effectively cross-party. This is a fundamental issue for the future of the UK and deserves to be made non-political with recommendations for the long term. Previous reviews have produced long term plans which have been implemented when they had cross-party support and straddled a General election.
Sir Adrian Webb was an academic at the London School of Economics and Loughborough University; he was Deputy Vice Chancellor at Loughborough and Vice Chancellor at the University of Glamorgan. As well as holding a number of senior management positions and a wide range of public service/consultancy roles in local and central government (including HM Treasury, DHSS, Home Office, DFES, and the Ministry of Justice) and in Wales, he has also held many roles in the Third Sector. Sir Adrian was a member of the Dearing Review committee in the late 1990s and chaired a review of further education colleges and funding in Wales in 2007.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of any organisation with which the author is affiliated.
The House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee has decided to investigate the OfS. The Committee, with a remit “to consider matters relating to industry, including the policies of His Majesty’s Government to promote industrial growth, skills and competitiveness, and to scrutinise the work of UK regulators”, published 12 questions on which it invited evidence. The first three questions nail it:
Are the OfS’ statutory duties clear and appropriate? How successful has the OfS been in performing these duties, and have some duties been prioritised over others?
How closely does the OfS’ regulatory framework adhere to its statutory duties? How has this framework developed over time, and what impacts has this had on higher education providers?
What is the nature of the relationship between the OfS and the Government? Does this strike the right balance between providing guidance and maintaining regulatory independence?
Michael Salmon, News Editor for Wonkhe, said on 3 March 2023: “This is much of what sector groups have been calling for, and reflects concerns raised in OfS’ recently published review of its engagement with universities.” The HE sector’s ‘mission groups’, memorably labelled ‘gangs’ by the late David Watson, wrote collectively to the new Education Select Committee chair Robin Walker on 16 January 2023 to ask for a proper review of the Office for Students: “… there is growing concern that the OfS is not implementing a fully risk-based approach, that it is not genuinely independent and that it is failing to meet standards that we would expect from the Regulators’ Code.”
The concerns are not limited to people within the sector. Ian Mansfield, now at Policy Exchange, former special adviser in the DfE to Gavin Williamson and Michele Donelan, wrote for Times Higher Education on 16 February 2023 complaining that “The OfS has thus far failed to live up to the ambition of its creators to be light-touch and proportionate. … However, universities must take their share of responsibility. Despite being part of a mass participation system, receiving significant taxpayer funding, too many do not accept the basic fact that they should be regulated.” Lawyer Smita Jamdar of Shakespeare Martineau tweeted: “I come across v few institutions who resist being regulated. I come across more who are unhappy about the lack of pretty basic safeguards for procedural fairness. People like Mansfield who have egged the OfS on to rush to start investigations carry some (much?) of the blame.” She then wrote in Times Higher Education on 8 March 2023 that “the Office for Students’ published approach to monitoring the risk of breaches of registration conditions demonstrates that it lacks basic safeguards around transparency, fairness and accountability.” Sometimes if you are attacked from all sides you might be in the right place, but the OfS will struggle to argue that case: consider those three questions from the Lords Committee.
Are the OfS’ statutory duties clear and appropriate? How successful has the OfS been in performing these duties, and have some duties been prioritised over others?
This goes to the heart of the statute establishing the OfS, the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 (HERA). HERA explicitly aimed to institutionalise a market for higher education because former Universities Minister David Willetts believed that market competition would ‘drive up quality’. One of his successors Jo Johnson continued in that mistaken but fervently held belief as he steered HERA to become law. However the ‘disruptive’ innovators encouraged as new entrants have mostly created more problems than solutions, despite some small but distinctive successes like the Dyson Institute.
There is no space here to explore the failure of this kind of market, but one repeated motif in policy pronouncements before and since might be summarised as ‘Why won’t they do what we want?’. The answer is not that universities resist regulation (though some may do) but, more surprisingly, is that ‘You can’t buck the market’. There has always been intense competition between HE providers, for reputation and for the things which flow from that – students and research income – but often the competition is not overtly financial. Policymakers failed to understand institutional realities then, and even more so now. Policymakers introduced £9000 fees in the mistaken belief that a spectrum of fees would emerge reflecting quality differences. Anyone in any university could have told them, as many did, then that no self-respecting university would charge less than £9000, for the real reputational fear of declaring ‘low’ quality. The Higher Education Funding Council for England no doubt did advise just that, but HEFCE was of course abolished by HERA. Now we have a regulator which seems as ill-informed about institutional realities as policymakers continue to be.
Institutions actually respond rapidly to market forces and regulatory threats. At one end of the market, conditional unconditional offers by some universities were a predictable and rational response to accentuated competition for students. A combination of shame and regulatory threat forced their abandonment. At the other end, the declining real income from home undergraduate students drives expansion of international student numbers with higher fees at the same time as well-qualified home applicants are rejected – a saga which is yet to play out but may have toxic consequences for government. And there are growing lacunae of provision in some geographical areas and in some subjects, as market behaviour which makes sense for institutions delivers irrational distribution of provision across the country. This is market failure – because we have the wrong kind of legally-enacted market, and the wrong kind of regulation. The OfS’s duties may be clear, but they are not appropriate.
How closely does the OfS’ regulatory framework adhere to its statutory duties? How has this framework developed over time, and what impacts has this had on higher education providers?
Andrew Sentance (Cambridge Econometrics) argued in The Timeson 14 February 2023 that there has been a broad failure of regulation since privatisation and it was time for a complete overhaul. The OfS may be an example, but it is probably untypical because it was so likely to fail. The history of OfS deserves to be written as a case study in regulatory failure, and one chapter will surely start with former Director of Fair Access Les Ebdon’s accurate prediction that “I can tell you exactly what the OfS will do. It will do whatever the government of the day wants it to do.” OfS shortcomings were at first masked by the skills and knowledge of its first chair, Sir Michael Barber, and first CEO Nicola Dandridge. Barber had been in and around government and HE for many years, and though not popular in HE was deeply thoughtful and knowledgeable both about the sector’s performance and about the nature of regulation. Dandridge had been CEO of Universities UK with a broad appreciation of the contribution of the whole range of the HE sector. They were respected and trusted, or at least given the benefit of any doubt, as they sought to respond to the growing range of issues which the government laid at the door of the OfS, now including unexplained grade inflation, harassment and sexual misconduct, mental health and well-being, freedom of speech and increasing the diversity of provision.
The shortcomings of the OfS might even have been overcome through evolutionary change, but the government, with Gavin Williamson then still Secretary of State for Education, doubled down on its earlier mistakes when it replaced Barber and Dandridge (see below), destroying the relationship between the OfS and the sector as it struck entirely the wrong balance for a supposedly independent regulator.
What is the nature of the relationship between the OfS and the Government? Does this strike the right balance between providing guidance and maintaining regulatory independence?
The notes to the 2017 Act say: “This Act creates a new non-departmental public body, the Office for Students (OfS), as the main regulatory body, operating at arm’s length from Government, and with statutory powers to regulate providers of higher education in England.” (emphasis added). It was rumoured that Barber sought a second term as OfS chair but was denied. Former UUK chair Sir Ivor Crewe (former VC, Essex) was interviewed, as Sonia Sodha and James Tapper reported for The Observer on 14 February 2021: “Perhaps it was the long passage in Professor Sir Ivor Crewe’s book The Blunders of Our Governments about the way ministers’ mistakes never catch up with them that led Gavin Williamson to reject the expert as the new head of the Office for Students. Or maybe the education secretary was put off by the section of the 2013 book, written with the late Anthony King, dealing with how ministers put underqualified, inexperienced people in charge of public bodies. The job of independent regulator of higher education in England was instead handed to James Wharton, a 36-year-old former Tory MP with no experience in higher education who ran Boris Johnson’s leadership campaign.”
The Education Select Committee questioned Lord Wharton of Yarm on 5 February 2021 and endorsed his appointment, which was announced by OfS on 8 February 2021. Rob Merrick reported for The Independent on 2 February 2021 that Lord Wharton had been subject to ‘hard questioning’, in the course of which he said he didn’t see why he could not retain the whip, nor why his role as Boris Johnson’s campaign manager should raise any conflict of interest issues. So the ‘independent’ regulator was to have a partisan chair who would retain the government whip. Conflict of interest issues raised themselves almost immediately, as Lord Wharton was revealed to be a paid adviser to a company seeking to build a cable connection through land at the University of Portsmouth, which had also made donations to several Conservative MPs.
OfS, ‘having regard to ministers’ as statute demands, started to leave HE realities behind. DfE wrote frequent letters to the OfS and the OfS jumped to respond. An OfS consultation document issued on 26 March 2021 put into practice the ‘instructions’ received earlier from Secretary of State Gavin Williamson, proposing to steer more funds to STEM subjects and, among other things, halve additional funding for performing arts, media studies and archaeology courses. WonkHE’s David Kernohan gave his critical analysis on the same day. OfS announced on 30 March 2021 that after the first phase of a review of the NSS, commissioned by Universities Minister Michele Donelan, there would be ‘major changes’ including dropping all references to ‘student satisfaction’. Consistent reports that 85% or more of students in most universities are satisfied with their experience would be embarrassing for a government determined to prove otherwise.
Not a buffer, an irregulator
In the past funding councils were statutorily responsible for in effect providing a buffer between HE and government, to regulate excesses on either side. There is no danger of ‘provider capture’ now that the arm’s-length relationship with government has such short arms. However the limitations of the OfS are being increasingly exposed, not least by the remaining Lords Committee questions, especially No 4: Does the OfS have sufficient powers, resources and expertise to meet its duties? How has its expertise been affected by the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education’s decision not to continue as the OfS’ Designated Quality Body?
The QAA withdrew as DQB because the OfS expectations were incompatible with QAA’s broader remit and international roles and indeed the requirements of the European Association for Quality Assurance (ENQA) – which makes it unlikely that an international provider in Europe would agree to take its place as DQB. The OfS as ‘interim’ quality body has lived up to its threat to put ‘boots on the ground’; even though repeated tweaks of its Key Performance Measures have not yet produced any persuasive identification of ‘low quality courses’.
Nor has OfS shown that it will take any notice of widespread HE opinion, as UUK’s Charlotte Snelling reported in despair in her Wonkhe blog on 31 October 2022. On 9 March 2023 OfS announced a consultation on how it should have its investigations funded. The OfS has powers to make such charges following orders laid in Parliament only in December 2022, and “This consultation is not seeking views on the powers that the Regulations give the OfS or whether we should seek to recover the costs of our investigations. We are also not seeking views on matters relating to the OfS’s approach to monitoring registered providers, which may lead to us opening or conducting investigations.” The OfS plans to recover all staff and other costs attributable to the investigation, which it is entitled to do by those orders. It is a sham ‘consultation’, since it is clear what is intended and it is wholly predictable that the OfS will do almost exactly what is proposed.
The role of buffer was condemned as ‘backward-looking’ by Jo Johnson in his recent evidence to the Lords Committee; for good measure he also described QAA as a legacy from a previous era, even though he made clear the undesirability of OfS being more than an interim quality body. But we might at least expect the OfS to show some understanding and appreciation of the difficulties which institutions face, especially with rapidly declining levels of real income from tuition fees. Instead OfS put its fees up by 13%: Gloucestershire VC Stephen Marston, a former senior civil servant who also worked in HEFCE, said in Times Higher Education on 16 January 2023 that the increase was unacceptable. John Morgan reported in THE on the same day that the ‘shameful’ 13% rise would push the largest universities’ fees above £200,000. OfS chief executive Susan Lapworth blogged shamelessly on 26 January 2023 about how OfS plans to ‘refresh its engagement’ with universities and other providers.
“Overall, we have a situation in which the OfS has become more interventionist to protect ‘the student interest’, apparently as defined by ministers and certain sections of the media, while its expertise to understand what such interventions involve has fallen significantly. Moreover, it is very unclear what forms of intervention the OfS considers could be effective in changing university behaviours in the desired direction. Together, these points represent a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the OfS as a regulator.”
Effective regulation in higher education depends on the willing, or at least grudging, consent of the regulated, but that consent has been deliberately dismantled. Instead the Office for Students is collapsing in an orgy of partisanship and wilful disregard for the real interests of higher education and its students.
Rob Cuthbert is Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics rob.cuthbert@btinternet.com. Twitter @RobCuthbert
