SRHE Blog

The Society for Research into Higher Education


1 Comment

The blurred lines of higher education in South Korea: when colleges look like universities

by Edward Choi and Young Jae Kim

South Korea has become an attractive destination for international students, boasting a strong higher education system with internationally recognised universities. A complication, however, is emerging with some foreign students enrolling in what they believe are universities, only to later discover that they are attending junior colleges, Korea’s flagship vocational institutions.

This phenomenon may be linked to changes in institutional marketing (identity branding) and key organizational characteristics at junior colleges and universities alike. Many colleges have removed words like “technical” or “vocational” from their names and are now called universities in both Korean and English. They have also expanded their degree offerings to include bachelor’s and, in some cases, even graduate programs.

The blurring of identities (and institutional traits) and the implications thereof are a focus of our study, Confusion in the Marketplace: A Study of Institutional Isomorphism and Organisational Identity in South Korea (Choi and Kim, 2024). Through a national, statistical overview and the content analysis of select institutional websites, we examined the dimensions along which South Korean colleges and universities are organizationally isomorphic, a concept that describes how organizations begin to resemble each other as a result of external pressures (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Importantly, we discuss in our article the market implications for this type of institutional convergence.

Key changes or dimensions of likeness

Nearly all colleges (95%) have rebranded themselves with the term “university” in their Korean names, and 61% have done so in English. Colleges now offer bachelor’s-equivalent degrees, with 92% providing such programs, and some even offering graduate degrees (11%). Both colleges and universities emphasise similar disciplines, including Business Administration, Family & Social Welfare, and Mechanical Engineering, reflecting shared market demands.

Institutional websites suggest colleges and universities adopt similar marketing strategies, emphasising employment outcomes and industry-academic collaboration. Less selective universities resemble colleges in focusing on job-market relevance in research and academic programming. Both institution types operate in local, national, and international spheres with internationalisation efforts at both types.

There are key differences to note. Some universities, particularly elite ones, highlight intellectual growth and social development as a societal role in vision and other identity statements. Research at especially elite universities is both applied and humanities-focused, while this is not true in the case of colleges and lower-tier universities. Furthermore, internationalisation at universities is mostly about citizenship and cultural development while the same is less cultural but utilitarian at colleges (eg career development through international field placements).

Why are junior colleges becoming more like universities?

We discuss several key reasons behind the organisational sameness among Korea’s colleges and universities. One key factor is South Korea’s shrinking student population. With birth rates at record lows, the number of high school graduates has plummeted, creating a crisis for universities and junior colleges alike (Lee, 2024) and forcing these institutions to compete directly for a shrinking pool of students. The offering of baccalaureate degrees and graduate programming, among other organizational changes, may serve as primary examples of survival strategies amid the changing demographics. The same may be said of universities where there is a strong vocational dimension in academic offerings, much like what we see at colleges.

Government policies (both historical and contemporaneous) have also played a major role in the Korean case of institutional isomorphism. Such policy directions have pushed both universities and junior colleges to align their offerings with workforce demands (Ministry of Education, 2023d, 2024a). In 2008 the government approved bachelor’s-equivalent degrees for junior colleges, allowing them to offer advanced major courses. In 2022, junior colleges were even permitted to introduce graduate programs, further blurring the distinction between these institutions and universities.

Additionally, South Korea’s push for internationalisation amid globalisation has encouraged universities and junior colleges alike to aggressively market themselves to international students. The country has set ambitious national goals for attracting students from abroad (ICEF, 2023); as a result, both institutional types are using similar branding strategies. Words like “world-class,” “global,” and “innovative” appear frequently on websites, even in the case of junior colleges like Kyung-in Women’s University, an institution with virtually negligible global recognition or research excellence.

The risks of blurred identities

A key concern with blurred identities and institutional characteristics (including social roles) is that they can create confusion for international students who are increasingly looking to Korea as an attractive education destination. For students seeking a traditional university experience, this can lead to disappointment and even financial and academic setbacks, not to mention reputational damages to Korea and its higher education system.

There is also the issue of mission creep, where junior colleges in their efforts to emulate universities, risk losing sight of their normative societal function. Junior colleges have historically complemented universities in increasing access to education and providing job training for students who might not otherwise pursue higher education (see Brint and Karabel, 1989; Dougherty, 1994; Lee, 1992). This mission is at stake. The accretion and expansion of new and existing programs and services, respectively, require invariably additional resources, which might drive up educational costs. Many prospective students may not be able to afford these fee hikes.

What to make of institutional isomorphism?

At the end of the day, students want a quality education and meaningful career opportunities. It is important for them to clearly understand what they are signing up for – given how important higher education is to shaping their career trajectories. Policy discussions at the national level must now consider the global character of Korea’s junior colleges, whose cosmetic and organisational changes can impact international mobility patterns. Clearer differentiation from a policy perspective is needed in this regard.

We must not ignore the positive implications of institutional isomorphism, whose market advantages have not been fully explored by scholars. We argue that institutional isomorphism – particularly where college and university programs converge – can be strategically utilised as a policy lever to address market challenges. Rather than viewing institutional homogenization as inherently problematic, policymakers could use it to correct market inefficiencies like supply and demand challenges. The shortage of nurses in Korea (see Lee, 2023), for example, is likely being addressed through the joint efforts of colleges and universities in training and producing nurses with similar qualifications.

Unchecked isomorphism, however, has its challenges, as pointed out earlier (ie confusion in the international student marketplace). We are also concerned about a skills mismatch where colleges and universities are pumping out graduates with homogenised skillsets. This type of sub-optimisation can result in high youth unemployment rates and students working in careers unrelated to their academic majors, which are already concerns in Korea (see Sungmin and Lee, 2023).

To conclude, our study notes that institutional isomorphism is a global phenomenon, with similar trends observed in countries such as China, the US, and Australia (see Bae, Grimm, and Kim, 2023; Bük, Atakan-Duman, and Paşamehmetoğlu, 2017; Hartley and Morphew, 2008; Saichaie and Morphew, 2014; Taylor and Morphew, 2010). Further research is needed to assess whether isomorphism in higher education lends to competitive market advantages beyond Korea.

Edward Choi is an Assistant Professor at Underwood International College, Yonsei University. His research interests centre on a range of topics: Korean higher education, traditional Korean education, the internationalisation of higher education, and the global phenomenon of family-owned universities. 

Young Jae Kim was a student at Underwood International College, Yonsei University.

Image of Rob Cuthbert


1 Comment

What’s in a name? That which we call a university…

by Rob Cuthbert

In England the use of the title ‘university’ is regulated by law, a duty which now lies with the regulator, the Office for Students (OfS). When a new institution is created, or when an existing institution wishes to change its name, the OfS must consult on the proposed new name and may or may not approve it after consideration of responses to the consultation. The responsible agency for naming was once simply the Privy Council, a responsibility transferred to the OfS with the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. For existing older universities where legislative change is needed, the Privy Council must also still approve, but will only do so with a letter of support from the OfS. The arrangements were helpfully summarised in a blog by David Kernohan and Michael Salmon of Wonkhe on 8 April 2024, before most of the recent changes had been decided.

That which we call a university would probably not smell quite as sweet if it could not use the university title, and with its new power the OfS has made a series of decisions which risk putting it in bad odour. In July 2024 it allowed AECC University College to call itself the Health Sciences University. Although AECC University College was a perfectly respectable provider of health-related courses, this name change surely flew in the face of the many larger and prestigious universities which had an apparently greater claim to expertise in both teaching and research in health sciences. The criteria for name changes are set out by the OfS: “The OfS will assess whether the provider meets the criteria for university college or university title and will, in particular: …  Determine whether the provider’s chosen title may be, or may have the potential to be, confusing.” It is hard to see how that criterion was satisfied in the case of the Health Sciences University.

Even worse was to come. In 2024 Bolton University applied to use the title University of Greater Manchester, despite the large and looming presence of both Manchester University and Manchester Metropolitan University. And the OfS said yes. If you google the names Bolton or Greater Manchester University you may even find the University of Bolton Manchester, which is neither the University of Bolton nor the University of Manchester, but is “Partnered with the University of Bolton and situated within the centre of Manchester” – indeed, very near the Oxford Road heartland location of Manchester and Manchester Metropolitan universities.

This is rather more confusing and misleading than University Academy 92, founded by a group of famous football team-mates at Manchester United, formed in August 2017 and based near Old Trafford. Wikipedia says that “the approval by the Department of Education (DoE) to allow UA92 the use of ‘University Academy 92’ was questioned with critics claiming the decision to approve the use of the name makes it ‘too easy’ for new providers to use ‘university’ in a new institution’s name”. This criticism continues to have some merit, but a high-profile football-related initiative, now broadened, is perhaps less likely to cause any confusion in the minds of its potential students. It may be significant that it was created at the same time as the HERA legislation was enacted, with government perhaps relaxing its grip in the last exercise of university title approval powers before the Privy Council handed over to the OfS. UA92 was and continues to be a deliverer of degrees validated by Lancaster University. In 2024 the OfS the University of Central Lancashire applied to be renamed the University of Lancashire, despite the obvious potential confusion with Lancaster University. And the OfS said yes.

It was not ever thus. The Privy Council would consult and take serious account of responses to consultation, especially from existing universities, as it did after the Further and Higher Education 1992 when 30 or so polytechnics were granted university title. A massive renaming exercise was carefully managed under the Privy Council’s watchful eye. As someone centrally involved in one such exercise, at Bristol Polytechnic, I know that the Privy Council would not allow liberties to be taken. The renaming exercise naturally stretched over many months; the Polytechnic conducted its own consultations both among its staff and students, but also much more widely in schools and other agencies across the South West region. Throughout that period, in a longstanding joke, the Polytechnic Director playfully mocked the Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University by suggesting that the polytechnic might seek to become the ‘Greater Bristol University’. It was a joke because all parties knew that the Privy Council, quite properly, would never countenance such a confusing and misleading proposal.

How would that name change play out now? In the words (almost) of Cole Porter: “In olden days a glimpse of mocking was looked on as something shocking, now heaven knows, anything goes.”

Rob Cuthbert is the editor of SRHE News and Blog, and a partner in the Practical Academics consultancy. He was previously Deputy Vice-Chancellor and professor of higher education management at the University of the West of England.


Leave a comment

Free higher education in Syria and inequalities

by Oudai Tozan

HE and inequality

The debate over whether higher education (HE) serves as a vehicle for social mobility that nurtures meritocracy or as a mechanism for social reproduction that reinforces and exacerbates inequalities in society has persisted for some time. The first perspective regards HE as a meritocratic, achievement-based system of stratification that selects and allocates individuals to societal roles based solely on their merit (in line with Émile Durkheim’s theories). Conversely, the second viewpoint sees education as a means that perpetuates social stratification and the cultural hegemony of the elite (reflecting Bourdieu’s perspective). This phenomenon occurs because students’ socio-economic backgrounds significantly influence their access to, decisions regarding, and success within HE.

To mitigate the impact of socioeconomic background on individuals’ educational opportunities, a movement of research and activism spans from South America to Africa and the Far East, advocating for free HE. To investigate this claim, I examined the situation in Syria, which has consistently asserted that it possesses a meritocratic HE system aimed at fostering societal equality through the provision of free public HE for all since the 1970s. I analysed the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) database for 15 academic years, from 2001 to 2015. This dataset encompassed information on student access and graduation rates, categorised by type of education (public, private, higher institutes, and technical institutes), education level (undergraduate and postgraduate), gender (male and female), city, faculty, and specialisations. This analysis revealed various forms of inequality, specifically class-based inequalities, city-based inequalities, and gender-based inequalities.

Class-based inequalities

Although every citizen in Syria who finishes school can access free public HE, many students from high socio-economic backgrounds choose private HE to obtain better education or to pursue specific courses unavailable in the free public tracks. An analysis of the data reveals that the graduation rate in private institutions is almost double that of public institutions. One of the reasons behind this discrepancy in graduation rates between free public HE and private HE is the lack of funding for free public HE. Public university students suffer from a high student-teacher ratio (in some cases, 140 students per teacher) and poor infrastructure compared to the low student-teacher ratio (around 20 students per teacher) and better infrastructure in private universities. Furthermore, inadequate funding for free public universities has led qualified lecturers to prefer teaching at private institutions. This has widened the inequality between public and private HE institutions, as students with the financial capacity to access private HE learn from the most qualified teachers in Syria and receive the best knowledge available.

City-based inequalities

Although Syria has 14 cities, during the analysis period (2008–2013), it had only 5 free public universities located in 5 different cities. These universities have small branches or centres in all Syrian cities, offering limited course options. This design of the HE system has neglected some cities in Syria, leaving them without a proper educational framework. Having only one large university in select cities advantages students who reside in those areas, as they do not endure the added financial and mental pressures that students from other cities face to access education, such as paying for accommodation, living away from home, and travelling to see their families. Consequently, many students from cities without a university may encounter additional barriers to accessing HE, negatively affecting their academic, professional, and personal opportunities and choices. This could explain why cities like Damascus, Homs, and Latakia (where universities are located) are consistently overrepresented in HE, while students from Hama, al-Hasakeh, and al-Rakka (which lack universities) are consistently underrepresented.

In addition to the inequality of access to HE, city-based inequalities also encompass disparities in accessing the various specialisations and faculties offered by HE. This is further exacerbated by the sector’s design as not all faculties or specialisations are available at every university or branch. For instance, undergraduate media studies are solely taught in Damascus. Although Damascus constitutes only 8.75% of the Syrian population, students from Damascus account for 23.9% of the total number of media students. This representation is nearly three times their percentage of the overall population. This significant overrepresentation of students in certain courses occurs at the expense of those from other cities who are unable to access these courses and faculties because they are not available in their localities. This trend of unequal access to specialisations applies to numerous disciplines (eg Pharmacy, Dentistry, Medicine, Arts, IT, Mechanical Engineering, and Architecture). In each of these specialisations, students in the cities where the courses are taught have a distinct advantage over students from other cities in terms of access.

Gender-based inequalities

Officials in the Syrian HE sector have consistently celebrated the progress they have made, asserting that free HE has eliminated gender-based inequality by achieving near parity in enrolment rates. Although noticeable progress has indeed occurred, this claim does not hold up under scrutiny as it obscures other gender inequalities affecting certain groups within the population.

An analysis of the database reveals that, while there is no overarching gender gap in the sector, apart from in undergraduate public universities, disparities exist across all other educational tracks. Moreover, the higher the level of education (Master’s, PhD, etc), the more pronounced the gap becomes. The analysis further indicates that gender-based inequalities extend beyond females’ access to specific tracks and impact female academic representation within the sector. A 14-year average shows that female teachers constitute less than 25% of the total teaching staff in the sector. However, in lower-paid and less prestigious roles, such as technical and administrative positions, females occupy more jobs than their male counterparts (57%).

Conclusion

Simply offering free HE does not address the broader socio-economic inequalities that limit people’s opportunities in HE. Assuming that free HE will foster equality in society presumes that everyone has an equal capacity to access education. This paper demonstrates that HE, if not paired with an inclusive sectoral design, increased funding, and a comprehensive strategy to alleviate socioeconomic inequalities, will persist as a site of social reproduction that creates and exacerbates disparities within societies, even if provided at no cost.

Dr Oudai Tozan recently finished his PhD at the University of Cambridge, researching the potential role of exiled Syrian academics and researchers in rebuilding the higher education sector of Syria. This blog is based on an article published in Policy Reviews in Higher Education: Tozan, O. (2024) ‘Peeling the multiple layers of inequalities in free higher education policies’ (online 12 July 2024).  

https://www.syria-education.com/

https://www.linkedin.com/in/oudai-tozan/


Leave a comment

Educational expertise in a post-truth society

by Richard Davies

The inauguration ceremony for Donald Trump was interesting to watch for several reasons, but the Battle Hymn of the Republic caught my ear. Whilst the song has cultural connections for Americans, its explicit religiosity and commitment to truth seems at odds with modern sensibilities. Rather than truth, recent political history, eg Johnson, Trump, Brexit and Covid-19 (anti)vaccination, has shone a light on our post-truth society, where, as Illing (2018) notes, there is a disappearance of ‘shared standards of truth’. In such a society politics shifts from being the discussion of ideas or even ‘what works’ to a play for the emotions of the majority. A context within which Michael Gove, an early adopter, was able to label a raft of educational luminaries ‘the blob’ (see Garner, 2014).

Whilst this is/might be irritating and socially disabling, I want to argue that it is also both deleterious to educational research and that its roots lie some 250 years ago.

Pring (2015) argued that what makes educational research distinctly educational is its intention to improve educational practice. So, research about education is not sufficient to qualify as  educational research; educational research intends to change educational practice for the good of learners (and often wider society). This requires several activities including shared dialogues between researchers, practitioners and other stakeholders with common ways of talking about education and common standards of truth (see Davies, 2016). An environment of post-truth undermines such possibilities, as I hope will become clearer as I explore the roots of the present malaise.

The roots lie around 1744 or just before, signalled by Vico’s New Science, or at least in the 18th century, where MacIntyre (1987) places the last foothold of the ‘educated public’ – and it is in MacIntyre that I ground the argument here. MacIntyre (1985) presents a historically informed account of the decline of ethical discourse and, on a more positive note, what is required for its restoration. Here I fillet that account for the resources I need for my purposes (see Davies, 2003, Davies, 2013 for more detailed reviews). He argues that ethical discourse has undergone a series of transformations, led by philosophers but now part of the public zeitgeist, causing a situation in which people believed there was no reasonable basis on which to resolve ethical disagreements.

Here, I identify just three key elements of the argument. Firstly, naïve relativism, the (false) view that because people disagree on a matter then, necessarily, there must be no rational means to resolve the disagreement. Secondly, MacIntyre identifies three, non-rational approaches to decision making: (i) personal taste, (ii) achieving the goals of the system of which one is a part, or (iii) through interpersonal agreement. These are embedded, MacIntyre claims, in our social activities and institutions. Thirdly, that these give rise to a distinctive form of political engagement, protest. In protest different sides shout their differing views at each other knowing both that their views will not change the views of their opponents nor that their opponents’ views will change their views.

When we see ‘toddler’ behaviour from politicians, it is a focus on personal taste and the tantrums that emerge when these are frustrated. What reasons, they might say, do others have to frustrate what I want, for no such reasons can exist. When we see claims that the democratic process must be followed, we are seeing a commitment to achieving the goals of the system; what else can be done? We regularly see examples of protest, often mistakenly seen as ‘facing down’ a critique of one’s behaviour. The views of others only count if they have some reasons for their views that might be better than mine. But for those embracing the obviousness of naïve relativism this cannot happen, rather protests (against Johnson, Trump, and others) are just attempts to make them feel bad. Such attempts must be resisted through and because of bravado.

How do the politician and policymaker operate in such an environment? Bauman (2000) offers a couple of practical conceptions consistent with MacIntyre’s critique. Firstly, Bauman draws attention to the effect of having no rational basis for decision making: it is increasingly difficult to aggregate individual desires into political coherent movements. Traditional political groupings on class, gender and race are dissolving (which is certainly a feature of the 2024 US election analysis). It matters less why you want to achieve something; it is just that we can have interpersonal agreement on what we claim we want to achieve. Secondly, Bauman talks of decision making as reflecting the ‘script of shopping’, we buy into things – friendship groups, lifestyles, etc – and as suddenly no longer do so when they do not satisfy our personal desires. Whilst this may seem overly pessimistic, Bauman and MacIntyre are identifying the unavoidable direction of human societies towards this already emergent conclusion.

Politicians and policymakers play, therefore, in this world of seeking sufficient co-operation to build a political base – to get elected and to get policies through. They do this by getting individuals to buy into the value of specific outcomes (or more often to stop other awful outcomes). They are not interested why individuals buy in, nor do they try to develop a broader consensus. There are no rational foundations, and any persuasive tactic will do, with different tactics deployed to influence different people. This scattergun approach is more likely to hit the personal desires of the maximum number of people.

Where does this leave the educational researcher seeking to influence educational policy and practice based on their research endeavours? At best, we might become the chosen instrument of a policymaker to persuade others – but only if our research agrees with their pre-existing desires. Truth is not the desired feature, just the ability to be persuasive.

But what if truth does matter, and we want to take seriously our moral responsibilities to support educational endeavours that are in the interests of students? There are four things we can do.

  1. Understand the situation. It is not just that the political environment is hostile to research, it does not see facts as a feature of policy and practice development.
  2. Decide if we want to be educational researchers or policymakers. The former means potentially less engagement, impact, and status, perhaps walking away from policymaking as more ethically defensible than staying to persuade using simulacra of evidence.
  3. Get our own house in order. We have too many conferences which provide too little time to discuss fundamental differences between researchers, with so many papers that we are only speaking to people with whom we more or less agree. The debates are over minutiae rather than significant differences. Dissenting voices tend to go elsewhere and move on to different foci rather than try and get a foot in the door. Bluntly, our academic system is already shaped by the same post-truth structures that have given rise to Trump, Johnson, et al (and no doubt most of us could identify our equivalents of them). Although we will never speak with one voice and will, I hope, always embrace fallibility, getting the house in order will enable us to model what rational dialogue and truth seeking can achieve in identifying how educational policy and practice can be enhanced. Of course, we should value each other’s contributions, but not confuse value with valid (it is just another form of naïve relativism).
  4. Find some allies who accept a similar account of the decline of reason from amongst politicians and policymakers and work out how we start to make educational research not only relevant but influential.

Richard Davies leads the MA Education Framework programmes at the University of Hertfordshire. His research interests include philosophical issues in higher education. He is a co-convenor of the Academic Practice Network at SRHE.


Leave a comment

A new mission for higher education policy reviews

by Ellen Hazelkorn, Hamish Coates, Hans de Wit & Tessa Delaquil

Making research relevant to policy

In recent years there has been heightened attention being given to the importance of scholarly endeavour making a real impact on and for society. Yet, despite a five-fold increase in journal articles published on higher education in the last twenty years, the OECD warns of a serious “disconnect between education policy, research and practice”.

As higher education systems have grown and diversified, it appears with ever increasing frequency that policy is made on the slow, on the run, or not at all. Even in the most regulated systems, gone is the decades-long approach of lifetime civil servants advancing copperplate notes on papyrus through governmental machines designed to sustain flow and augment harmony. In the era of 24-hour deliberation, reporting and muddling through, it may seem that conceptually rooted analysis of policy and policymaking is on the nose or has been replaced by political expediency.

Nothing could be further from the truth. There has never been a more important time to analyse, design, evaluate, critique, integrate, compare and innovate higher education policy. Fast policy invokes a swift need for imaginative reflection. Light policy demands counterbalancing shovel loads of intellectual backfilling. Comparative analysis is solvent for parochial policy. Policy stasis, when it stalks, must be cured by ingenious, ironic, and incisive admonition.

Governments worldwide expect research to provide leaders and policymakers with evidence that will improve the quality of teaching and education, learning outcomes and skills development, regional innovation and knowledge diffusion, and help solve society’s problems. Yet, efforts to enhance the research-policy-practice nexus fall far short of this ambition.

Policy influencers are more likely to be ministerial advisory boards and commissioned reports than journal articles and monographs, exactly opposite to what incentivizes academics. Rankings haven’t helped, measuring ‘impact’ in terms of discredited citation scores despite lots of research and efforts to the contrary.

Academics continue to argue the purpose of academic research is to produce ‘pure’ fundamental research, rather than undertake public-funded research. And despite universities promoting impactful research of public value, scholars complain of many barriers to entry.

The policy reviews solution

Policy Reviews in Higher Education (PRiHE) aims to push out the boundaries and encourage scholars to explore a wide range of policy themes. Despite higher education sitting within a complex knowledge-research-innovation ecosystem, touching on all elements from macro-economic to foreign policy to environmental policy, our research lens and interests are far too narrow. We seem to be asking the same questions. But the policy and public lens is changing.

Concerns are less about elites and building ‘world-class universities’ for a tiny minority, and much more about pressing social issues such as: regional disparities and ‘left-behind communities’, technical and vocational education and training, non-university pathways, skills and skills mismatch, flexible learning opportunities given new demographies, sustainable regional development, funding and efficiency, and technological capability and artificial intelligence. Of course, all of this carries implications for governance and system design, an area in which much more evidence-based research is required.

As joint editors we are especially keen to encourage submissions which can help address such issues, and to draw on research to produce solutions rather than simply critique. We encourage potential authors to ask questions outside the box, and explore how these different issues play out in different countries, and accordingly discuss the experiences, the lessons, and the implications from which others can learn.

Solutions for policy reviews

Coming into its ninth year, PRiHE is platform for people in and around government to learn about the sector they govern, for professionals in the sector to keep abreast of genuinely relevant developments, and for interested people around the world to learn about what is often (including for insiders!) a genuinely opaque and complex and certainly sui generis environment.

As our above remarks contend, the nature of contemporary higher education politics, policy and practice cannot be simplified or taken for granted. Journal topics, contributions, and interlocutors must also change and keep pace. Indeed, the very idea of an ‘academic journal’ must itself be reconsidered within a truly global and fully online education and research environment. Rightly, therefore, PRiHE keeps moving.

With renewed vim and vigour, the Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE) has refreshed the Editorial Office and Editorial Board, and charged PRiHE to grow even more into a world-leading journal of mark and impact. Many further improvements have been made. For instance, the Editorial Office has worked with SRHE and the publisher Taylor and Francis to make several enhancements to editorial and journal processes and content.

We encourage people to submit research articles or proposals for an article – which will be reviewed by the Editors and feedback provided in return. We also encourage people to submit commentary and book reviews – where the authors have sought to interrogate and discuss a key issue through a policy-oriented lens. See the ‘instructions for authors’ for details.

Read, engage, and contribute

This second bumper 2024 issue provides six intellectual slices into ideas, data and practices relevant to higher education policy. We smartly and optimistically advise that you download and perhaps even print out all papers, power off computers and phones, and spend a few hours reading these wonderful contributions. We particularly recommend this to aspiring policy researchers, researchers and consultants in the midst of their careers, and perhaps most especially to civil servants and related experts embedded in the world of policy itself.

SRHE and the Editorial Office are looking ahead to a vibrant and strong future period of growth for PRiHE. A raft of direct and public promotion activities are planned. PRiHE is a journal designed to make a difference to policy and practice. The most important forms of academic engagement, of course, include reading, writing and reviewing. We welcome your contribution in these and other ways to the global PRiHE community.

This blog is based on the editorial published in Policy Reviews in Higher Education (online 16 November 2024) A new mission for higher education policy reviews

Professor Ellen Hazelkorn is Joint Managing Partner, BH Associates. She is Professor Emeritus, Technological University Dublin.

Hamish Coates is professor of public policy, director of the Higher Education Futures Lab, and global tertiary education expert.

Hans de Wit is Professor Emeritus and Distinguished Fellow of the Boston College Center for International Higher Education, Senior Fellow of the international Association of Universities.

Tessa DeLaquil is postdoctoral research fellow at the School of Education at University College Dublin.


1 Comment

Why are governments cancelling student debt?

by Héctor Ríos-Jara

Governments across the globe are increasingly adopting student debt cancellation or forgiveness policies. Recent proposals in the US, Chile, and Colombia have reignited discussions about the student loan crisis and the need for alternative funding solutions in higher education. But why are governments pursuing these policies, and what does it mean to cancel student debt?

The demand for student debt cancellation emerged in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a time of economic hardship for many households burdened by high-risk loans. While banks and financial institutions received massive bailout packages, ordinary citizens faced mounting debts with little relief. This stark disparity fuelled a movement for a general “jubilee” or widespread debt forgiveness. The logic was simple: if banks could be saved from their financial burdens, why not the people?

Cities like New York, London, Madrid, and Athens became centres of protest against government policies that seemed to protect the financial elite while ignoring the needs of ordinary citizens. In the US, the Occupy Wall Street movement became the focal point for debtors, calling for cancelling all debts, including student loans. Similar anti-austerity movements erupted worldwide, with student protests in countries like the UK, Chile, Colombia, Quebec, and South Africa challenging tuition hikes and market-driven education policies. These movements also pushed for free education and an end to student loans (Cini, 2021).

In this climate of widespread discontent, the call to cancel student debt became a symbol of resistance against the rising cost of education and overwhelming debts. Activists argue that student debt not only increases the financial burden of higher education but also undermines social mobility. For many, student loans trap them in a cycle of debt that limits their opportunities and financial freedom.

Initially, debt cancellation was seen as a radical proposal outside mainstream education policy. Even some progressive movements, such as Corbynism in the UK, hesitated to endorse full debt forgiveness, opting instead for free education and the restoration of grant systems[i]. However, the 2020s saw a dramatic shift, with countries like the US, Chile, and Colombia making debt forgiveness a central policy issue.

In the United States, President Joe Biden has introduced two major plans for student debt forgiveness. His latest proposal includes forgiving $10,000 in federal student loans for most borrowers and up to $20,000 for lower-income debtors (Rios-Jara, 2022). The plan also includes the SAVE plan, which ties repayments to borrowers’ incomes, marking the most significant reform to the American higher education system since Obama’s presidency. Despite legal challenges that have stalled these initiatives, the government has already forgiven $143.6 billion in student loans for nearly 4 million borrowers[ii].

In Chile, President Gabriel Boric, a former student leader, promised to introduce a comprehensive debt forgiveness policy. His government recently unveiled a plan to cancel a portion of student debt, ranging from $500 to $3,000 USD for all borrowers with government-backed loans, based on their academic success and if the are in default or not[iii]. This proposal aims to eliminate the participation of commercial banks in the student loan system and replace it with an income-based contribution system. This reform reduces overall debt and ensures education is more accessible. The plan expects to erase all debt for approximately 20% of borrowers. In total the plan will eliminate 65% of total loan debt, being biggest cancellation debt package ever probed.

Both governments have justified their debt cancellation efforts by highlighting the crippling effects of student debt on graduates. Many borrowers find themselves unable to pay off their loans due to stagnant wages and high monthly payments, preventing them from investing in long-term life goals. In the US, there are 45 million student debtors, holding a collective debt of $1.753 trillion[iv]. In Chile, 2 million borrowers owe a total of $12 billion[v], and it is one the countries with the biggest student debt in Latin America.

Debt also exacerbates social inequality. In both countries, graduates from low-quality institutions with predatory lending practices are often left with larger debts and lower earnings, making them more likely to default. In the US, advocates argue that student debt disproportionately affects students of colour, limiting their upward social mobility. In Chile, the government has emphasised the gender dimension of the issue, as women—who represent the largest group of debtors—face a significant wage gap, making it harder to repay their loans and fully benefit from higher education.

In Chile, the government has also framed debt cancellation and loan reform as a matter of efficiency, addressing the failure of the current system to improve repayment rates. Similar to the US, Chile’s loan system relies on government-backed loans involving commercial banks. However, the anticipated efficiency from bank involvement has not materialised, with only 55% of borrowers keeping up with payments. The proposed reforms will remove banks from the equation and return financial aid administration to public institutions, as the US did under Obama’s 2011 reforms to federal student loans.

Debt cancellation policies represent a relevant attempt to rectify these long-term challenges, but questions remain about their effectiveness and whether more comprehensive alternatives are needed to tackle the broader failures of market-driven higher education systems. For instance, activists have criticised Joe Biden’s plans for maintaining a loan-based system rather than pushing for a more transformative reform that includes free education. In this debate, one distinctive feature of President Boric’s proposal is the complete elimination of student loans, replacing them with an income contingent graduate contribution system.

Graduates’ contributions are calculated based on the length of their studies and their annual income. The approach combines the flexibility of income-contingent loans with an updated version of a short-term graduate tax. What each graduate contributes will be determined not by the cost of their degree but by their ability to contribute based on their income. Under this mechanism, individual debt will be erased, and loans will stop being issued, moving the higher education system into a new stage where free education and graduate contribution are the main columns of student financial aid. 

Whether debt cancellation will fully resolve these issues remains to be seen, but it marks a significant shift in how governments are addressing the unintended consequences of student loan systems. The push for debt forgiveness reflects not just an ideological critique of neoliberal policies but the frustrations of millions of graduates struggling under the weight of unmanageable debt. They feel betrayed by broken promises of social mobility and fearful of the financial uncertainty that student loans have brought into their lives. To face these issues, governments with a long history of student loans are looking for new ways of funding higher education, moving beyond market solutions and looking for new forms of higher education public funding policies that leave behind market instruments but also the traditional policies of public education.

Héctor Ríos-Jara has a PhD in Social Sciences from University College London (UCL). He works as a postdoctoral researcher at the Economic and Society Research Center (ESOC) of Universidad Central de Chile.


[i] Rios-Jara, H. (2022). Between Movements and the Party: Corbynism and the Limits of Left-Wing Populism in the UK. Populism, Protest, New Forms of Political Organisation. A. Eder-Ramsauer, S. Kim, A. Knott and M. Prentoulis, Nomos. 2: 130-149.

[ii] https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/biden-harris-administration-approves-additional-58-billion-student-debt

[iii] https://www.gob.cl/noticias/ley-fin-al-cae-presidente-presenta-principales-alcances-proyecto/

[iv] https://educationdata.org/student-loan-debt-statistics

[v] Subsecretaría de Educación Superior (2022). Primer Informe del Crédito con Aval del Estado (CAE): Características de la población deudora e impactos.


Leave a comment

Doing the dirty work of academia? Ancillary staff in higher education

by Marie-Pierre Moreau and Lucie Wheeler

Cleaning, catering and security staff fulfil an important function in maintaining and enhancing the social and material environment of higher education (HE). Yet this group has attracted limited considerations from researchers and policy-makers alike. Two notable exceptions, both in the US context, are Peter Magolda’s (2016) ethnography of cleaners on two university campuses, The Lives of Campus Custodians, and Verónica Caridad Rabelo and Ramaswami Mahalingam’s (2019) article, reporting on a mixed-method study of cleaners conducted in a single institution. Both pieces are concerned with cleaners’ perspectives, and both also comment on the invisibility of cleaners, which, they contend, goes at times hand in hand with their misrecognition.

A 2022 SRHE research award enabled us to conduct what is, to our knowledge, the first UK-wide study of HE-based ‘ancillary staff’ (a term we use to refer to cleaning, security and catering staff while acknowledging that this category is broader). Working in the evening on campus, I (Marie-Pierre) observed how cleaners would enter the building after most academics and professionals had gone home and worked diligently. I was struck by the contrast between the significance of their work and its relative absence from research and policy discourses. This absence is possibly even more surprising once one considers that ‘elementary occupations’ (under which catering, security and cleaning staff fall) represent 12% of the UK HE non-academic workforce (Wolf and Jenkins, 2020) – a percentage which does not take into account those on outsourced contracts who often experience high levels of precarity.

Against this background, our study sought to explore the experiences of ancillary staff working in UK universities and their contribution to the higher education sector. Of particular interest to the research team were the potential injustices faced by this group, Underpinned by a theoretical framework drawing on Nancy Fraser’s (1997) and Kathleen Lynch’s (2010) multi-level theories of social justice, we explored the economic (distributive), cultural (recognitional), political (representational) and affective in/justices experienced by this group.

The fieldwork for this project involved a search of the literature on ancillary staff in HE and other sectors and some observations of the working environment of ancillary staff. It also involved an online survey of UK HE institutions followed by Freedom of Information (FoI) requests. The original survey generated 24 replies in total, while 110 institutions responded to the FoI request. Finally, we conducted 20 interviews with ancillary staff, recruited through a diversity of routes and with a diversity of backgrounds and roles.

A first set of findings from the project relates to how organisational, administrative and scholarly processes work in ways which render this group invisible. On campus, they are rarely seen or heard, although this also varies based on the nature of their role. Cleaners appear particularly prone to invisibility. Many start their shift once academic and professional staff have left the premises. When ancillary staff have a dedicated workspace, it is often hidden from view. They are also often absent from staff directories, university websites and policy documents. Likewise, their exact numbers are often unknown, including, as we found out, to some universities. This invisibility is further compounded by the fact that, among ancillary staff, many are employed by private corporations. Finally, as noted above, this group is strikingly absent from the research literature, with very few exceptions.

Another set of findings relates to how ancillary staff experience the economic, cultural, political and affective in/justices theorised by Fraser and Lynch. In terms of economic or distributive justice, it is well known that cleaning, catering and security roles tend to attract low salaries compared with other categories of staff in the sector. Our study also highlights, inter alia, a lack of opportunities for career development. Interviewees employed in-house and those in catering and security roles were found to be more likely to be satisfied with their pay and working conditions. It was not unusual for outsourced staff in particular to go to work despite being ill due to being eligible for statutory sick pay only.

In terms of what Fraser refers to as cultural justice, some participants felt valued, while others shared feelings of misrecognition. Such feelings were found to be linked to economic justice. Porters, for example, reflected on how they enjoyed similar working conditions (eg paid leave) to other members of staff and were self-aware of the significance of their work in enabling their college or university to operate. They felt valued in ways many cleaning and outsourced staff did not. In comparison, one of the outsourced security staff we talked to explained how he felt like ‘a number’ to the contractor in charge of his placement, arguing that those employed in-house are ‘looked after’ better. While some participants felt respected by other staff and students, some, often cleaners, felt that some staff and students showed contempt for them. One commented on how ‘they [staff] sort of turn their noses up at people like us’ and on how they ‘look at you as if you’re a bit of muck on their shoe’.

In relation to political justice, the study generated two main findings. First, membership of unions and other professional organisations was rare. Many participants lacked awareness of unions (‘I’ve never heard of a union for the cleaning industry’, stated one). Others held negative views of unions. One participant explained how ‘I would never be a member of a union’, due to having seen them ‘use and abuse’ their power, while also stating, somewhat paradoxically, that they are ‘absolutely useless’. Second, also linked to political justice, the ancillary staff we talked to appeared to have limited input in decision-making at institutional level. Instead, they felt they had to comply with oft changing policies. One shared how they were told: ‘You don’t make decisions, you only follow process’.

Last, the research points to several injustices related to care relationships and what Lynch calls affective equality. In particular, the research shows that ancillary work can be, but is not always, compatible with caring responsibilities. For some, the ability to combine paid and care work had been a key factor in choosing their current job. One of the cleaning supervisors we spoke to, for example, explained how his early start enabled him to be back home in time to take his children to school. For some, their position had been made attractive by predictable working times (for example, one staff in a catering role would work from 7.30 to 3.30pm and then spend time with family). While security staff were overall more satisfied with other aspects of their work, this was different when it came to being able to combine paid work with caring responsibilities, with comments that ‘Security is not good hours, it’s too long’ or that ‘nights are hard’, and some describing their work-life balance as ‘pretty much non-existent’. In some cases, low salary meant that staff did not have any alternative but to work extra hours, which in turn led to limited work-life balance (‘it’s work-sleep-work-sleep basically’). The highest levels of work-life balance were found among those in catering role employed by the students’ union (so outsourced but with very different contractual conditions compared with staff outsourced via a private firm, with the former benefiting from a work timetable built around their teaching timetable). Also related to affective justice, interviews all highly valued collegiality among staff. This was often mentioned spontaneously by interviewees, in contrast with the research we have conducted on other categories of staff in the HE sector, including as part of a previous SRHE award (Moreau and Robertson, 2017, 2019).

Based on the findings from this project, the research report makes a number of recommendations for institutions, national stakeholders and researchers.  We hope that findings from this pilot project will raise awareness of this group, of the injustices they face and of their contribution to the sector.  

References (additional to those hyperlinked)

Fraser, N (1997) ‘After the family wage: A post-industrial thought experiment’ in Fraser, N (ed) Justice interruptus: critical reflections on the ‘post-socialist’ conditions New York: Routledge

Magolda, P (2016) The lives of campus’ custodians: Insights into corporatization and civic disengagement in the academy Sterling, VA: Stylus

Marie-Pierre Moreau is Professor in Sociology of Education, Work and Inequalities and Director of the Centre for Education Research on Identities and Inequalities at Anglia Ruskin University, United Kingdom. She blogs here.

Lucie Wheeler is a Research Assistant in education. They are both based in the School of Education, Faculty of Arts, Humanities, Education and Social Sciences, at Anglia Ruskin University, UK.


1 Comment

Teaching and research? Yes, but universities have another important job

by Paul Temple

The easy way to tell authoritarian (or worse) states from ones that are, broadly speaking, liberal democracies is that in the latter you will find a range of public institutions that are significantly independent of the central state: this is what creates a plural society. It is, when you consider it, pretty surprising that we can have institutions largely funded, one way or another, by taxation, yet not controlled by the state. Take the example of Britain’s national cultural institutions: these are mainly state-funded yet guard their independence fiercely. However, we have seen in recent years how government has tried to drag them – the BBC, several major museums – into ludicrous “culture wars” and seeking to appoint to their governing bodies individuals thought to be sympathetic to certain government agendas. It is a sign that we live in a functioning liberal democracy that government does not routinely get its own way in these struggles: under an authoritarian regime, it would not even be a matter for discussion. Liberal-minded people know, almost instinctively, that independent institutions matter.

Perhaps the most important non-state public institution, everywhere, is the judiciary. The outcomes of legal cases where the state is involved in Russia or China, say, are invariably foregone conclusions. A judge’s task in these situations requires presentational skills rather than forensic ones: to frame the predetermined outcome so that it seems as if legal norms were applied, thus allowing the government to claim that the decision was made by an independent judiciary. That show trials continue in Putin’s Russia and elsewhere (why not just throw dissidents into jail, or indeed execute them?) is an implicit recognition that the moral standing of liberal institutions is too high to be simply ignored.

But those of us fortunate enough to live in liberal societies – being, as the poet Douglas Dunn puts it, “on the pleasant side of history” – cannot be complacent: the institutional structures that we all-too-readily take for granted and which underpin pluralism and support our freedoms are, we have seen recently, desperately fragile. The “enemies of the people” assault on the judiciary by the tabloid press in November 2016 over, bizarrely, a legal determination that parliament needed to vote to trigger the process of leaving the EU, showed how a populist frenzy might be worked up. That the attack was not countered immediately and vigorously by the government, because it suited the government’s political purposes at the time, was deeply shameful and worrying.

In most authoritarian states, universities and colleges do not seem to carry the same weight as the judiciary: they are apparently mostly left to get on with their work in peace, providing, naturally, that they don’t cause trouble for the regime. Academics in the former Soviet bloc countries became expert in knowing how far they could push matters (normally, not very far) and still keep their jobs and privileges. The state was a constant – if to outsiders, hidden – presence in university affairs, and university rectors usually saw their jobs in terms of keeping their academics quiet and the secret police out. The Soviet academic observation that the most dangerous university subject was history – because while we could be certain that the future would be a socialist nirvana, the past was full of traps for the unwary – neatly delineated the scope of university work under authoritarian rule. A recent detailed account of governance in Chinese universities today (Liu, 2023) explains that each university has a Communist Party committee which is “the highest authority within the university”, a point not made, in my experience, when western visitors meet the university president. He or she is accountable to a political structure that outsiders do not usually see (and if they do, its role is glossed-over), and which determines how decisions made in Beijing will be applied within the university.

In Britain, by contrast, the state/university divide was once maintained with almost religious fervour. In the days of the University Grants Committee (UGC) – peak liberalism for higher education – I once found myself chatting over coffee in a conference break to an Education Department civil servant. When he learned that I worked in a university, he almost dropped his coffee cup in shock when he realised that he’d sinned against the arms-length principle that meant that the UGC was supposed to be the only means of contact between universities and government departments. Universities, like local authorities, were seen then as autonomous parts of the public realm, each with their own goals and methods, rather than as agencies delivering central government policies. “The department [for Education and Science] dispensed cheques to the University Grants Committee for the universities and to the local authorities for schools and polytechnics with guidelines sometimes attached but virtually nil powers of enforcement…In the 1980s [under the Thatcher government] all that changed” (Hennessey, 1989: 428).

That change meant that the sharp state/university divide has now largely vanished: the role of the OFS is of course utterly different to that of the UGC. The proposal put forward by the then government in the recent general election campaign (have we heard the last of it?), that there would be central direction on which degree courses universities would be allowed to offer – or, in the measured tones of the Department for Education press release, “Crackdown on rip-off university degrees” – would mean that universities should be considered for all practical purposes as central government agencies, just as in China.

Why does this matter? One not-insignificant reason is about effectiveness: largely autonomous institutions – self-governing universities, locally-elected councils, free trade unions, the Whitehaven Harbour Commissioners – responding variously to the needs of the groups they are aiming to serve will almost certainly lead to better outcomes than would be produced by a remote, centrally-directed operation. But the larger reason is that pluralism underpins the freedoms we value in liberal societies, creating the distributed decision-making which you and I might have a chance of influencing. When those decisions are not ones that central government finds to its taste, it is even more important that independent thinking might prevail. The regular attacks on universities by Ministers in the last government, as regularly chronicled in SRHE News, surely had the purpose of undermining autonomous institutions with a commitment to disinterested knowledge production, and so weakening a core element of a liberal society. If this isn’t a fight worth having, I don’t know what is.

Dr Paul Temple is Honorary Associate Professor in the Centre for Higher Education Studies, UCL Institute of Education.

References

Hennessy, P (1989) Whitehall London: Secker and Warburg

Liu, X (2023) The Development and Governance of Private Universities in China Singapore: Springer Nature

Image of Rob Cuthbert


Leave a comment

After the election: the end of season awards

by Rob Cuthbert

Within days of the UK’s General Election on 4 July the new Secretary of State for Education, Bridget Phillipson, had acknowledged that university finances need to be ‘stabilised’ as an immediate priority, saying – without further explanation – that there are some measures she could take, but not holding out much hope for a cash injection. London Economics analysed manifesto commitments on 25 June 2024, as did UUK, but, as anticipated, HE did not feature strongly. Universities UK, under the smart stewardship of Vivienne Stern, is focusing on what universities can do for government, launching a ‘blueprint’ on “the role universities can play in powering the new government’s growth strategy and in creating opportunities for millions all over the UK” – much more sensible than another ‘what we’d like the new government to do for higher education’ message. Meanwhile, at the end of every season, win or lose, must come the end of season awards, and SRHE News is happy to play its part in recognising the outstanding HE events of the last 14 years of the previous government.

The most washed-up former politician

There was strong competition in this category, with honourable mentions for Gavin Williamson, Michele Donelan and Gillian Keegan, but the clear winner was Lord Wharton, the chair of the Office for Students. He was ennobled in Boris Johnson’s 2020 Dissolution Honours, an honour said to be for running Johnson’s campaign to become Conservative Party leader. Having been Britain’s youngest MP at 26 when elected in 2010, he lost his very marginal seat in 2017, becoming at 36 the youngest male member of the House of Lords. Without any discernible experience of or interest in HE, except as a student at Durham and UCL, he was appointed OfS chair in 2021, and maintained the tradition of appointments based on connections by making Rachel Houchen, wife of his friend and colleague Teesside Mayor Lord Ben, a member of the OfS Board. Despite, for a time, being the Northern Powerhouse minister he rarely left London, a habit he maintained as OfS chair in visiting surprisingly few HE institutions. Beached when the tide of Johnsonism rushed out.

The most unsuccessful warrior in the culture wars

The clear winner was Michele Donelan, even though her prizewinning performance came after she had left the DfE, where she was HE minister and then, for a day, Secretary of State amid the chaos of ministerial desertions of Boris Johnson. She then not only became Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport under Liz Truss, but Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology under Rishi Sunak. No doubt emboldened by holding three different Cabinet positions in such a short time, she unwisely used a Policy Exchange report as the basis for attacking UKRI’s advisory group on equality, diversity and inclusion, in particular members Dr Kate Sang (Heriot Watt) and Dr Kamna Patel (UCL). Some thought UKRI was pusillanimous in response, suspending the group and mounting an investigation, which found no evidence that either Prof Sang or Dr Patel had breached their roles’ terms of reference or the Nolan principles. Sang sued the Secretary of State and won £15000 damages  – paid not by Donelan but by the government.

The Good Lord Award for the best HE Minister not ennobled by his brother

David Willetts.

The Good Lord! Award for the HE Minister ennobled by his brother

Jo Johnson.

The least successful attempt to give money to the electorate

The HE electorate has rarely been courted by any party, but Prime Minister Theresa May made an exception in 2017 when she raised the repayment threshold for student loans in an ill-conceived attempt at “putting money back into the pockets of graduates with high levels of debt”. The changes made the loan scheme much more expensive than before, and May got no political credit or benefit for it whatsoever; the changes were later reversed.

The most misguided belief in market forces

The Award goes to David Willetts, possibly the only person who thought that, when HE fees rose to £9000, universities would set fees in a range from £6000 to £9000 depending on their competitiveness, demonstrating a comprehensive misunderstanding of how the fierce competition in HE actually works. In the event a handful of universities did set some fees slightly below £9000, but those reductions soon evaporated. This also showed the absence of organisational memory in government (but not in universities): when fees were first introduced at £1000 some HEIs did indeed charge less than £1000, but quickly realised their error. When fees rose to £3000 it was possibly only Leeds Metropolitan University which set fees at £2000, linking this to their sponsorship of Leeds Rhinos Rugby League team with the slogan ‘low charging, high impact’ – a mistake which must have cost the university many £millions.

The least likeable HE Minister

A good number of HE ministers have in fact been fairly likeable; the startlingly unpleasant exception was Andrea Jenkyns, Minister for Skills for a mercifully brief period (just over three months) in 2022, notorious for this gesture.

The least likeable Secretary of State for Education

This Award has now been retired and is held in perpetuity by Sir Gavin Williamson.

The least successful research investment

Bolton VC George Holmes paid Andrea Jenkyns MP £55000 for two years’ work as director of the university-funded Research Institute for Social Mobility and Education, during which period it produced just two papers.

The least successful teaching investment

Buoyed by his experience with Andrea Jenkyns MP, Bolton VC George Holmes went on to pay John Hayes MP about £40000pa for two years helping to develop an online postgraduate politics course for the university, the MA Government, Opposition and Parliamentary Studies, launched in September 2023. Student numbers are unknown.

The most shameless U-turn

Now held in perpetuity by Nick Clegg and Vince Cable for their stance on the pledge by Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg before the 2010 general election to abolish student tuition fees.

Rob Cuthbert is editor of SRHE News and the SRHE Blog, Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics. Email rob.cuthbert@uwe.ac.uk. Twitter @RobCuthbert.

This editorial in the July 2024 issue of SRHE News was written before it was announced that Lord Wharton had resigned as chair of the OfS Board.


Leave a comment

Five challenges for policy research on higher education

by William Locke

Higher education research has grown in recent decades. For example, the number of journal articles published on higher education has increased five-fold in the last twenty years (Seeber, 2023). More is known about higher education than ever before, but there does not seem to be a corresponding growth in higher education policymaking being influenced by this expanding evidence base (Schendel and Knobel, 2024). Indeed, higher education seems to be more or less in crisis – and even under attack – in democratic as well as authoritarian systems, and in rich as well as middle- and low-income countries. Here, I offer five interrelated challenges for policy research on higher education. No doubt, there is more to be said about each of these, and there are other challenges that could be added. Perhaps readers might like to make suggestions in the comments.

1. How to expand international connection and collaboration in an increasingly fragmented and divided world?

Schendel and Knobel (2024) argue for greater collaboration among higher education scholars in different countries and regions, and between researchers and policymakers. They also argue for the translation of knowledge from academic discourse to more accessible forms and between languages, especially to and from the lingua franca of English. They call for connections to be made between different evidence bases, contexts and ways of understanding. These collaborations and connections should not just be among scholars from countries in the ‘West’, but arise from the formation of equitable partnerships between researchers based in the Global South and North, and among those based in expanding and emerging systems. These would allow an exchange of non-Western perspectives and indigenous knowledges within the higher education research and policy communities and “a more global, multi-national, transnational or cosmopolitan optic” (Brooks, 2023, Brooks & Waters, 2022).  Journal editors, for example, should be more sensitive to the location of researchers and the substantive focus of their research (Brooks, 2023).

2. How to place local and national research in regional and international contexts for a potentially global readership?

There is also evidence that higher education research has become more international in scope in recent years (Brooks, 2023; Daenekindt & Huisman, 2020; Kehm, 2015; Kwiek, 2021; Tight, 2021). However, it is important to distinguish between an increasing number of studies of the internationalisation of higher education – often limited to student mobility between nations – and an international or comparative perspective, which may focus on national, or even local, issues but place these within a broader context. Clearly, the collaboration of researchers from different countries and regions already mentioned can help this comparative and contextualised approach, provided there is a well-developed understanding of the differences between the objects of study as well as the similarities. Loosening the dominance of the English language in international higher education research networks will help to achieve this contextualised comparison.

3. How to encourage contributions from a wider range of disciplines and theoretical approaches?

Higher education is not just a topic of study for higher education researchers. As an ‘open access’ field (Harland, 2012), it is also a focus for disciplines such as sociology, economics, business studies, political science, psychology and even geography.  As in other porous areas of the social sciences, this is to be welcomed as a way of incorporating new perspectives, concepts, theories and methodologies into the field.  While this may have led to a certain lack of interaction and integration initially (Macfarlane, 2012; Tight, 2014), the trend towards interdisciplinary scholarship can bring these different perspectives together in creative ways. After all, it is likely that more holistic, multi-disciplinary and innovative approaches will be needed to understand and address current and future challenges, such as artificial intelligence, decolonising the curriculum, academic precarity and populist critiques of universities. Topic-based networks of scholars – where the focus of study rather than the discipline is prime – can encourage this. A major task, however, is to provide space for indigenous knowledges and new ways of knowing that may challenge traditional disciplinary hierarchies and ‘Western’ epistemologies.

4. How to focus on deeper, longer-term issues without losing immediate relevance for policymaking?

On the one hand, we might ask how evidence-based higher education research is? Some of what is submitted for publication is description, commentary, impressionistic interpretation and, even, polemic. We might also ask what form might an acceptable evidence base take? Policymakers tend to look for unambiguous findings that provide clear-cut guidance for decision-making – hard data of a quantitative rather than a qualitative kind. Yet, in education, meaningful quantitative studies are harder to accomplish than in some other areas of public policy. Systematic reviews of literature and randomised control trials do not work as well in education as in medicine, for example. Do we actively seek to build the evidence base? Or do we risk creating fragmented knowledge produced by a series of short-term, small-scale, barely connected projects, based on different and incompatible theoretical and conceptual foundations or employing methodologies that cannot be scaled up?

We should also acknowledge that higher education researchers are investigating their own world. They are interested parties in the object of their studies. Their research agendas are likely to be influenced by these ‘interests’. (Many readers will be familiar with doctoral students researching areas relating to their own experiences, for example, as students or higher education employees). Researchers are often on the receiving end of many of the policies and their impacts. As a result, too much research on higher education has been based on the assumption of a golden age which is being dismantled, rather than from a forward-looking perspective that seeks to meet broader, emerging societal needs.

So, we should recognise the limitations of this expanding higher education research. To date, much of it has been small scale, short-term and dependent on consultancy-style funding. It has had a fragmented and weak institutional base. It has tended to focus on the ‘public life’ of higher education, on strategic issues and their impact, rather than the ‘up close and personal’ issues that can be uncomfortable to investigate. Some of it is only just becoming “disinterested research on reasonably long timescales, with open agendas and based on reflective and critical intellectual values and practices” (Scott, 2000: 124).

On the other hand, how realistic (or idealised) are our conceptions of policymaking and implementation? It is rarely feasible simply to extrapolate the policy implications from a given set of findings, which may simply analyse a problem rather than propose a solution. “It is not a linear, rational-analytical process of examining all the evidence, ‘reading off’ the policy implications of this and then formulating well-designed interventions guaranteed to achieve the outcomes desired” (Locke, 2009: 124). If we are to understand policymaking, and the place of research evidence within it, we have to acknowledge “…the messy realities of influence, pressure, dogma, expediency, conflict, compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and pragmatism in the policy process” (Ball, 1990: 9). There are many other factors than research findings to take into account in the world of policymaking, not least politics and political expediency (for example, unifying the party, ideology, public opinion and budgets). “A better understanding of the policy-making process and the factors that facilitate or inhibit the take-up of research findings is needed, including the role of the commissioners of research and how findings are presented to, and understood by, policymakers” (Locke, 2009: 125). 

We should also be thinking about the relations between research, policy and practice.  After all, there are gaps between policy and practice: the infamous unintended consequences of policy implementation. However, there is also the danger of slipping into a utilitarian, ‘what works’ frame. The relations between research, policy and practice are empirical matters, themselves open to research and investigation. Studies of policymaking and implementation can enlighten us about the successes and failures of particular policies in specific contexts, and the factors that influence these.  Perhaps we should be aiming for policymaking that is influenced and informed, rather than driven, by evidence? 

5. How to explore the policy implications of research findings in ways that can be useful to policymakers?

The higher education research and policy communities are not always so separate. Research commissioned by policy bodies makes up quite a large proportion of funded higher education research. Most higher education researchers want their research to have impact, and policymakers (at least below ministerial level) want evidence on which to base their policymaking. There is some movement between these worlds, but there should be more and think tanks play a critical role in mediating between the worlds of research and policy. Finally, networked governance suggests we should be looking at audiences beyond government and parliament, to include wider public engagement with research findings, which is essential to democracies.

But how far should this constructive engagement go? It is naïve to think that educational research can solve problems on its own. The relationship between research and policy has been characterized as indirect and more about ‘sensitising’ policymakers to problems than solving them. Research might be seen more as a means of helping policymakers reconsider issues, think differently, reconceptualise what the problem is, and challenge old assumptions. This suggests a more serendipitous and loose relationship between research and policy. So, perhaps we need to be more modest in our aspirations for evidence-informed policy and practice and adopt a greater degree of realism about what can be achieved.

This is an abridged version of the editorial from the latest issue of Policy Reviews in Higher Education.

William Locke is a founding Joint Editor of the journal and a recovering academic. Recently retired, he is a former Director of the Centre for the Study of Higher Education (CSHE) at the University of Melbourne, Director of the Centre for Higher Education Studies (CHES) at the UCL Institute of Education and Deputy Director of the Centre for Global Higher Education (CGHE). He has also had senior policy roles at the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and Universities UK.