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Weekend read: What you need to know to make sense of the row about student loans

by Rob Cuthbert

In January and February the mainstream media were full of stories about the unfairness of student loans and the burdens on graduates facing huge debts and effective tax rates of more than 50%. They cut through in a way that the long-running stories about universities’ financial problems had not, and even dominated Parliamentary questions to the Prime Minister (PMQs) on 25 February 2026. But student loan repayments and universities’ financial problems are two sides of the same coin – how to finance mass higher education. The political debate about student loans is a case study in how almost everyone who didn’t know enough got almost everything wrong at first, until more realism gradually emerged.

Under Labour governments from 1997 there was a heated but, by comparison, measured debate about the costs of higher education, and who should pay for it. As HE participation rates soared from 10% towards 40-50% the international consensus was that it was reasonable for students or graduates to bear some of the cost. Higher education benefited society but also individuals who enjoyed a ‘graduate premium’ of higher lifelong earnings. Nevertheless, when the £1000 undergraduate tuition fee was raised to £3000 in 2003 it nearly brought down the Labour government. That probably represented about half of the total cost at that time. Students were of course vehemently opposed to fees, but for some in HE it felt about right to share the costs equally between students and general taxation.

Demand for HE continued to rise but total costs were controlled because government still determined total student numbers. Then came the Coalition government of 2011 with its determination to make higher education a market. The Liberal Democrats reversed their pre-election pledge to abolish student fees, instead agreeing as part of the coalition to triple fees to £9000. And government abolished its control on total student numbers. Universities Minister David Willetts claimed that student choice would “drive up quality”, but he, almost alone, expected a spectrum of fees from £6000-9000 to emerge. Everyone else realised that price would be the loudest signal of quality, and almost every university went for £9000.

The £9000 fee probably covered most of the costs of undergraduate tuition, although some grant funding remained for specialist high-cost courses, and Oxbridge complained that for them £13000 was the break-even figure. £9000 became the highest nationwide tuition fee in the world, and England still enjoys that dubious world-leading position. To keep higher education accessible to all, in theory at least, new arrangements were needed to make HE affordable at the point of delivery, with the cost being partly paid by students after graduation.

Under the new student loan system graduates would start to make repayments once their salary was above a specified threshold. Their debt would increase at a specified rate additional to the Retail Prices Index (RPI). The total repayments each month were capped, so most graduates would never repay their total debt, but any remaining debt was wiped out after 30 years. The explicit intention was that both fees and salary thresholds would rise with inflation.

This means that student loans are not like commercial loans. The system was never designed to get all the money back. It was designed to be progressive, like income tax, so that among graduates “those with the broadest shoulders”, as the Prime Minister likes to say, should bear a greater share of the repayment burden. In 2012 it was intended that the system should deliver about 72% of the total cost in repayments. The unmet cost (government subsidy) was known as the Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) charge.

Almost immediately the RAB charge began to rise above its planned level, and the government soon found it necessary to restrict enrolments in many new ‘challenger’ institutions, which were providing courses of debatable quality, mostly in business and management, mostly in London. Far from driving up quality, student choice seemed to be driving it down. But these problems paled into insignificance as the economy continued on its path of sluggish low growth. To make things worse, government had to abandon a “fiscal illusion” in government accounting, as the Office for National Statistics forced a justified change which put more costs onto current balance sheets rather than allowing them to be deferred for many years. For a while, the fact that interest rates were near zero concealed the punitive possibilities of debt levels and loan repayments, but then government – facing budgetary pressure – decided to freeze thresholds and change repayment terms. (Jim Dickinson’s Wonkhe blog on 2 February 2026 was a detailed explanation of how we got to where we are). Interest rates rose to 3-4% but government persisted with the use of RPI + 3% as the loan interest rate, even though for almost every other purpose it used the lower figure of CPI (consumer prices index). The current outcry on loans became inevitable; indeed, it had even been predicted by Nick Hillman, one of the architects of the loan system, who wrote in a 2014 Guardian article: “… come with me to the election of 2030. Those who began university when fees went up to £9,000 in 2012 will be in their mid-thirties by then. That is the average age of a first-time homebuyer and the typical age for female graduates to have their first child. By then, there will be millions of voters who owe large sums to the Student Loans Company but who need money for nappies and toys, not to mention childcare and mortgages. So, however reasonable student loans look on paper now, the graduates of tomorrow could end up a powerful electoral force.”

Meanwhile, some of the graduates of yesterday were quick to ride the coat-tails of the loans debate and cry “more means worse”, even as all the more successful world economies continue in the opposite direction. Often mentioned but never identified, ‘Mickey Mouse courses’ also took a supposed share of the blame, despite expert commentators like David Kernohan of Wonkhe pointing out the extreme difficulty of identifying them in ways that government or the regulator could operationalise. The Labour government adjusted its stance on exactly what the country needs with some vaguely quantified assertions about skills in its White Paper, and former Skills Minister Robert Halfon popped up on Times Radio on 14 February 2026 to argue, as he always did, for more apprenticeships. Acknowledging employers’ decades-long unwillingness to pay for training, he suggested they should be ‘incentivised’ with £1billion of public money. But even with public funding for employers’ costs, vocational training apprenticeships will mostly remain a great idea ‘for other people’s children’, as Alison Wolf once witheringly put it. Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch got the kind of publicity she probably hoped for as she proposed in an ITV interview to help Plan 2 graduates by reducing interest rates, even as personal finance guru Martin Lewis pointed out this would only help the richest graduates, and the way to help people was by unfreezing the salary thresholds at which the higher repayments kicked in. He apologised for gatecrashing the interview, but he was quite right, and understandably frustrated. Badenoch said this could be afforded by removing 100,000 students on ‘low quality’ courses and using the consequent savings. Shadow Education Secretary Laura Trott, under pressure from the BBC’s Laura Kuenssberg, waxed lyrical about LEO data on graduate salaries and suggested that Creative Arts courses were low quality and should feature in the 100,000 reduction. She refused to say that university closures could be ruled out, but there was, of course, no coherent plan for the supposed reductions and their effects on local economies, especially in regions where salaries are lower.

Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch was unabashed and led with the topic at PMQs on 25 February 2026 and Jim Dickinson blogged the same day for Wonkhe, pointing out the problems with most of the interventions from backbenchers of all parties, and noting that things will soon get worse with barely-noticed measures affecting postgraduate student support in the previous budget. Prime Minister Keir Starmer committed to a review of the loans problem, but in Times Higher Education on 27 February 2026 Helen Packer had experts queueing up to point out that: “Quick tweaks to the terms of English student loans are unlikely to satisfy disgruntled graduates and may conflict with wider plans to reform post-16 education.”

The major problems with HE finance have still not yet had equivalent mainstream recognition. In recent years the tuition fee income of universities fell from £12billion to £10billion simply through inflation and the freezing of tuition fees. 40 % of universities are reporting deficits and the majority are making staff redundant. Government has unfrozen tuition fees but then hit universities with a levy on international student fees which more than wiped out the extra income from fee increases. Visa restrictions have also hit international student enrolment and severely reduced some universities’ opportunity to compensate for the losses on home students. In 2011 Universities UK hoped that accepting the £9000 fee would rescue the HE sector from the coming austerity, but the rescue was short-lived, as fees failed to rise with inflation. Now another government faces the challenge of finding a long-term sustainable solution to the problem of funding higher education. It seems far from the top of the agenda for the embattled Starmer administration, but the media outrage over student loans might push it higher.

Successive cohorts of students have experienced various Plans for repayment. The main problem is Plan 2, affecting students who started their courses from 2012-2013 to 2022-2023. The numbers rapidly become hugely confusing, and some commentators fail to recognise even such basic issues as the need to ensure that all costs and prices are on the same base. But almost all agree that Plan 2 is unfair and should be changed.

American students have more orthodox commercial loans to pay for their tuition and in the USA the growing scale of student debt also became a major political problem. However Americans are much more accustomed to the high costs of HE: the culture encourages parents to save from birth to pay for tuition, and the taxation system rewards both savings and loan repayments. In addition, a ‘borrower defense’ program, created in 1994, allows students to get loans cancelled if they are misled by their colleges about their future employment prospects. The Obama administration began to penalise institutions, mostly for-profit institutions, which did not adequately prepare students for gainful employment which would enable them to repay their loans. Student debt rose to about $1.6trillion; by January 2025 President Biden had forgiven $183.6billion of debt, before President Trump set out to turn the clock back. In the USA the ‘graduate premium’, the advantage for graduates who earn on average higher pay than non-graduates, has continued to rise despite continuing HE expansion, whereas in the UK, almost uniquely, the premium has declined. This suggests, as Jim Dickinson has argued on Wonkhe, that the problem is one of supply rather than demand – employers will not or cannot pay more in the sluggish UK economy. Graeme Atherton (West London) pointed out in Times Higher Education on 26 February 2026 that despite Trump’s changes the US system is still more progressive than Plan 2. John Burn-Murdoch had a telling chart in his Financial Times article on 16 February 2026, ‘Is higher education still worth it is the wrong question’, showing that in the UK the graduate premium had decreased from 1997-2022 as HE numbers increased, contrary to the trends in the USA, Canada, Netherlands, France and Spain.

The problem of financing UK HE remains unsolved and the clamour of vested interests has become almost deafening. The main architect of the fees regime, David Willetts, who wrote a book about intergenerational unfairness, tried hard on Conservative Home to blame someone else while defending progressive expansion rather than reduction in HE student numbers. Alternative solutions abound, but have not yet penetrated the mainstream media debate about HE policy. Nick Barr (LSE), a longstanding expert commentator on HE finance, wrote in July 2023 about ‘A fairer way to finance tertiary education’.  There was detailed and expert analysis in Financial modelling by London Economics in March 2024. In September 2024 Tim Leunig, a former Chief Analyst at the Department for Education wrote a HEPI blog on ‘Undergraduate fees revisited’ alongside his HEPI debate paper, which promised that “Highest earners would pay the most, as is appropriate in a social insurance scheme”. The Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI) in April 2025 published a report asking ‘How should undergraduate degrees be funded? A collection of essays’. Mike Larkin (emeritus, Queen’s University Belfast) posted on his Total Equality for Students blog on 13 January 2025 a detailed and plausible set of proposals for reform of the present system, summarising many of the attempts to initiate debate.

Yet it is only now that the financing of HE might creep into the mainstream debate, entering through the back door of unfair student loan repayments and threatening to deliver results that may help some graduates but damage higher education even more. Nick Hillman has argued persuasively that of the three main proposed solutions to the student loans furore, one is unwise, one unaffordable, one unpalatable, and all are unfair. Nevertheless, something must be done. Former Director of Fair Access John Blake, interviewed by Nicola Woolcock in The Times on 4 February 2026, said;“…  a system that feels so suffocating to so many is fundamentally broken, no matter how many graphs about average graduate salaries we make…. I think we may need to move to a formal graduate tax. There are no popular options here, it’s not just people saying I’m in debt and it’s going up every year. Even if the system computes, it has a sense of being ridiculous when you’re in it. This system has run out of road.” Blake is Director of the new think tank The Post-18 Project. ‘The walls are closing in on our doomed student loans system’, as Jim Dickinson wrote for Wonkhe on 11 February 2026.

When it started, the student loan system was perhaps financially logical, if you accepted its progressive premise of redistribution. Repeated government tinkering in the face of extreme budgetary pressure, especially the freezing of thresholds, made it successively more and more unfair, and has now exposed the underlying psychological and emotional illogicality. The oppressive psychological impact of the loan system on graduates facing a difficult job market makes it unsustainable. So what is to be done?

If  higher education is free, poor people who don’t go to university pay for the education of rich people who do. If students pay all the cost of their higher education, as is now being widely proposed, then everyone suffers because economic growth and incentives are diminished. We need to find a halfway house which shares the cost of higher education between graduates and the wider society which benefits from HE. The immediate challenge is to find a sustainable way to preserve the progressive and redistributive nature of student finance, which is not experienced by successive cohorts of graduates as oppressive and demotivating.

The Labour government has accepted the need for a comprehensive review of how HE should be financed, but it remains a work in progress, promised but not near the top of the agenda. Short-term budget fixes like the international students’ fees levy suggest that there is limited sympathy in government for the financial plight of many universities. Previous governments of various stripes have resorted to bipartisan national inquiries (Dearing, Browne) which straddle general elections to reduce their electoral risk, and such a device cannot be ruled out this time. The danger is that, under the short-term pressure of finding a fix for the student loans problem, government will lurch into a ‘solution’ with possibly massive collateral damage to the whole HE sector, and to local economies. Government is desperate not to increase its spending and borrowing any further, and in any case has other higher priorities than HE. But a solution to student loan repayments which requires HE to contain the cost of improving the system may force the closure of a significant number of universities, with long-term and possibly irreparable damage to their local communities and economies – probably mostly in the Midlands and the North, not London and the South East. Brian Bell (King’s College London) has just been appointed principal adviser to both the PM and the Chancellor on macroeconomics and fiscal policy. He spoke at an LSE event in February about migration, where he said, discouragingly: “I’m sure we’d all like for there to be a complete rethinking of university financing, and perhaps even the university model across the UK – perhaps we shouldn’t all be teaching three-year degrees in X and Y – perhaps we should have different universities doing different things. But I see no realistic prospect of that happening.” These are hard questions with no easy answers, but too many people are getting too many things wrong about both the costs and the benefits of higher education. Let us at least start by understanding what the problem is.

Rob Cuthbert is editor of SRHE News and the SRHE Blog, Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics. Email rob.cuthbert@uwe.ac.uk. Twitter/X @RobCuthbert. Bluesky @robcuthbert22.bsky.social.


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Pragmatic problem-solving for inclusive doctoral admission

by Bing Lu, Rebekah Smith McGloin and Scott Foster

This blog post reflects on ongoing collaborative efforts to advance more equitable doctoral admissions between a group of UK institutions. It argues that transforming graduate admissions is not simply driven by competitive logic, nor by a search for a single, universal framework that can be applied across the sector. Instead, sector-level change emerges through collective, interactional, and often emotional work.

Inclusive postgraduate research (PGR) admission and recruitment have become an increasing global concern (Posselt, 2016; Bastedo, 2026; Boghdady, 2025). Drawing on ongoing collaborative work between a group of UK institutions, this blog post reflects on collective efforts to advance more equitable doctoral admissions. We argue that inclusive doctoral admission is not a competition to produce an exhaustive, finished framework, but an ongoing process of collective problem solving, one that requires humility, openness, and sustained commitment across institutional boundaries.

PGR students are strategically vital to the UK’s research capacity, innovation and future academic workforce. PhD programmes increasingly function as the primary entry route into academic careers and shape who is able to imagine themselves, and be recognised, as future researchers. Within the doctoral lifecycle, admission is a particularly critical intervention point. Yet, compared with undergraduate or taught postgraduate recruitment, the mechanisms shaping PGR admissions have historically received less sustained scrutiny.

A report commissioned by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) in 2014 highlighted that UK institutions primarily value academic attainment, the quality of research proposals, and evidence of prior research skills when selecting candidates (Mellors-Bourne et al, 2014). Since 2020, a growing body of UK-based scholarship has begun to highlight equity issues in doctoral selection (McGloin & Wynne, 2022; Oyinloye & Wakeling 2023; Mateos‑González & Wakeling, 2022; Britton et al, 2020), and has sought to explore the ascriptive nature of systems and processes that underpin doctoral recruitment and admission.  Together, these studies identify a range of barriers. These include the persistence of ‘elite pipelines’, whereby attending a Russell Group university at undergraduate level strongly predicts access to elite postgraduate education, as well as the significant under-representation of British candidates from minoritised backgrounds at doctoral level, particularly within funded studentships. These patterns underscore the need to interrogate how merit, potential, and excellence are operationalised in practice.

The initiatives and the community of practice

Initiatives funded by Research England and Office for Students, including the Equity in Doctoral Education through Partnership and Innovation (EDEPI) programme, represent important attempts to push forward the agenda of inclusive PGR admissions in English Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). In 2022, EDEPI conducted a national survey on PGR admissions practices in UK HEIs. The study identified ten key barriers to inclusive admission in its final report EDEPI Postgraduate Researcher Admission Framework and led to the development of the Postgraduate Researcher Competency-Based Admission Framework. This framework deliberately shifts focus away from previous institutional prestige and historical academic attainment towards the specific skills, experiences and competencies which demonstrate future potential for doctoral research.

From 2024, EDEPI has fostered an inter-institutional Community of Practice involving a group of international and UK institutions to explore approaches for enhancing inclusive PGR admissions collectively. Within this community, three institutions engaged as case studies to trial new approaches to evaluating applicants beyond conventional academic metrics, building on the Competency Framework. Through regular facilitated discussions, shared reflective practices, collaborative webinars and a jointly organised symposium on Fostering inclusive doctoral admission, participating institutions work alongside the EDEPI team to explore challenges and embed equity-driven principles into their PGR admissions processes.

Key learning from collective work

One of the most important lessons drawn from this collective institutional effort is that, while institutions hold different conceptions of fairness and merit shaped by their unique contexts, they nonetheless share a commitment to addressing persistent equity issues. This aligns with the findings of the sector survey (Smith McGloin et al, 2024) which found an overwhelming commitment to inclusive practice, an awareness of the need for change and huge complexity in existing processes with multiple stakeholders and drivers. This work is neither straightforward nor purely normative; it is complex, negotiated, and deeply pragmatic.

For example, in staff training workshops, academic colleagues described their deliberate efforts to apply equity principles when making departmental admissions decisions. Professional services staff, meanwhile, highlighted their role in carefully matching applicants’ proposals and disciplinary backgrounds to appropriate departments, ensuring that applications reach the review stage rather than being filtered out prematurely. Where resistance or hesitation arose around the introduction of yet another ‘framework’, this was less about rejecting equity goals and more about uncertainty regarding feasible, appropriate, and sustainable implementation.

Debates around distributive fairness versus procedural fairness illustrate this tension clearly (Boliver et al, 2022). Graduate admissions are not objective measurements of worth but sites of intense organisational boundary work, where judgements about potential, fit, and excellence are continuously negotiated. These discussions echo longstanding sociological insights into academic evaluation. Lamont (2009), for instance, argues that in real-world academic review, excellence and diversity are not alternative principles but additive ones. Staff involved in PGR admissions are often guided by pragmatic, problem-solving considerations, caught between institutional principles, personal commitments, and procedural constraints. Panels are typically required to reach consensus on a limited number of candidates within tight timeframes, and these practical pressures shape how fairness is understood and enacted.

Within this ‘black box’ of academic decision-making, Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus is frequently cited to explain how scholars’ legitimate visions of high-quality research and defend disciplinary boundaries, with conflicts often most pronounced among those occupying similar positions. Our collective work over the past 12 months, however, suggests a more nuanced picture. Admissions staff, both academic and professional, are motivated not only by positional interests but also by a shared, pragmatic curiosity about how to solve persistent problems together. The Community of Practice created space for dialogue, uncertainty, and learning, enabling participants to reflect on their own assumptions while engaging with others’ institutional constraints.  Transforming graduate admissions, then, is not simply driven by competitive logic, nor by a search for a single, universal framework that can be applied across the sector. Instead, sector-level change emerges through collective, interactional, and often emotional work. A recent WonkHE article, How to level the PhD playing field, posed a critical question: does the sector have the collective will to move beyond well-intentioned initiatives towards the structural changes required to address inequities among PGRs?

The experiences emerging from EDEPI offer cautious but promising evidence. They demonstrate how institutions with differing histories, resources, and institutional affordances can nonetheless work together pragmatically to enhance admissions practices. Inclusive doctoral admission, in this sense, is not a finished model to be adopted but an ongoing process of collective problem solving, one that requires humility, openness, and sustained commitment across institutional boundaries. Through the established Community of Practice, the EDEPI framework has also begun to attract interest from institutions in international contexts, despite differing governance structures, as a means of collectively developing equity-oriented approaches to PGR admissions through shared learning.

Closing summary

Inclusive PGR admissions require ongoing, collaborative work, as shown through EDEPI’s efforts to help institutions rethink how fairness, potential, and merit are assessed. Colleagues across academic and professional roles demonstrate that excellence and diversity can be mutually reinforcing when supported by reflective practice and shared experimentation. Future progress depends on refining competency-based approaches, tracking applicant journeys, expanding training and co-creation, and translating these insights into clearer sector guidance and policy.

Dr Bing Lu is a higher education scholar based at Nottingham Trent University and University of Warwick. Bing’s research critically engages with access, equity, and sustainability in postgraduate education, focusing particularly on underrepresented groups and the global flows of academic labour. Bing is currently guest editing a Special Issue on Taboos in Doctoral Education Across Cultures hosted by Higher Education Quarterly.

Dr Rebekah Smith McGloin is Director of Research Culture and Environment at Nottingham Trent University and Chair of the UK Council for Graduate Education. Her focus is on innovations in practice and national policy work related to new and emerging forms of doctorate that align with the changing research, innovation and skills policy landscape; including research culture reform, civic-engaged and inclusive doctoral education and equity-focused admissions.

Scott Foster is a professor specialising in postgraduate research culture and academic leadership. He has published extensively on equity, well-being, and innovation in doctoral education. Through influential articles and forthcoming book projects, he advances global research culture while supporting institutions to strengthen policy, supervision, and the doctoral experience.


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Walk on by: the dilemma of the blind eye

by Dennis Sherwood

Forty years on…

I don’t remember much about my experiences at work some forty-odd years ago, but one event I recall vividly is the discussion provoked by a case study at a training event. The case was simple, just a few lines:

Sam was working late one evening, and happened to walk past Pat’s office. The door was closed, but Sam could hear Pat being very abusive to Alex. Some ten minutes later, Sam saw Alex sobbing.

What might Sam do?

What should Sam do?

Quite a few in the group said “nothing”, on the grounds that whatever was going on was none of Sam’s business. Maybe Pat had good grounds to be angry with Alex and if the local culture was, let’s say, harsh, what’s the problem? Nor was there any evidence that Alex’s sobbing was connected with Pat – perhaps something else had happened in the intervening time.

Others thought that the least could Sam do was to ask if Alex was OK, and offer some comfort – a suggestion countered by the “it’s a tough world” brigade.

The central theme of the conversation was then all about culture. Suppose the culture was supportive and caring. Pat’s behaviour would be out of order, even if Pat was angry, and even if Alex had done something Pat had regarded as wrong.

So what might – and indeed should – Sam do?

Should Sam should confront Pat? Or inform Pat’s boss?

What if Sam is Pat’s boss? In that case then, yes, Sam should confront Pat: failure to do so would condone bad behaviour, which in this culture, would be a ‘bad thing’.

But if Sam is not Pat’s boss, things are much more tricky. If Sam is subordinate to Pat, confrontation is hardly possible. And informing Pat’s boss could be interpreted as snitching or trouble-making. Another possibility is that Sam and Pat are peers, giving Sam ‘the right’ to confront Pat – but only if peer-to-peer honesty and mutual pressure is ‘allowed’. Which it might not be, for many, even benign, cultures are in reality networks of mutual ‘non-aggression treaties’, in which ‘peers’ are monarchs in their own realms – so Sam might deliberately choose to turn a blind eye to whatever Pat might be doing, for fear of setting a precedent that would allow Pat, or indeed Ali or Chris, to poke their noses into Sam’s own domain.

And if Sam is in a different part of the organisation – or indeed from another organisation altogether – then maybe Sam’s safest action is back where we started. To do nothing. To walk on by.

Sam is a witness to Pat’s bad behaviour. Does the choice to ‘walk on by’ make Sam complicit too, albeit at arm’s length?

I’ve always thought that this case study, and its implications, are powerful – which is probably why I’ve remembered it over so long a time.

The truth about GCSE, AS and A level grades in England

I mention it here because it is relevant to the main theme of this blog – a theme that, if you read it, makes you a witness too. Not, of course, to ‘Pat’s’ bad behaviour, but to another circumstance which, in my opinion, is a great injustice doing harm to many people – an injustice that ‘Pat’ has got away with for many years now, not only because ‘Pat’s peers’ have turned a blind eye – and a deaf ear too – but also because all others who have known about it have chosen to ‘walk on by’.

The injustice of which I speak is the fact that about one GCSE, AS and A level grade in every four, as awarded in England, is wrong, and has been wrong for years. Not only that: in addition, the rules for appeals do not allow these wrong grades to be discovered and corrected. So the wrong grades last for ever, as does the damage they do.

To make that real, in August 2025, some 6.5 million grades were awarded, of which around 1.6 million were wrong, with no appeal. That’s an average of about one wrong grade ‘awarded’ to every candidate in the land.

Perhaps you already knew all that. But if you didn’t, you do now. As a consequence, like Sam in that case study, you are a witness to wrong-doing.

It’s important, of course, that you trust the evidence. The prime source is Ofqual’s November 2018 report, Marking Consistency Metrics – An update, which presents the results of an extensive research project in which very large numbers of GCSE, AS and A level scripts were in essence marked twice – once by an ‘assistant’ examiner (as happens in ‘ordinary’ marking each year), and again by a subject senior examiner, whose academic judgement is the ultimate authority, and whose mark, and hence grade, is deemed ‘definitive’, the arbiter of ‘right’.

Each script therefore had two marks and two grades, enabling those grades to be compared. If they were the same, then the ‘assistant’ examiner’s grade – the grade that is on the candidate’s certificate – corresponds to the senior examiner’s ‘definitive’ grade, and is therefore ‘right’; if the two grades are different, then the assistant examiner’s grade is necessarily ‘non-definitive’, or, in plain English, wrong.

You might have thought that the number of ‘non-definitive’/wrong grades would be small and randomly distributed across subjects. In fact, the key results are shown on page 21 of Ofqual’s report as Figure 12, reproduced here:

Figure 1: Reproduction of Ofqual’s evidence concerning the reliability of school exam grades

To interpret this chart, I refer to this extract from the report’s Executive Summary:

The probability of receiving the ‘definitive’ qualification grade varies by qualification and subject, from 0.96 (a mathematics qualification) to 0.52 (an English language and literature qualification).

This states that 96% of Maths grades (all varieties, at all levels), as awarded, are ‘definitive’/right, as are 52% of those for Combined English Language and Literature (a subject available only at A level). Accordingly, by implication, 4% of Maths grades, and 48% of English Language and Literature grades, are ‘non-definitive’/wrong. Maths grades, as awarded, can therefore be regarded as 96% reliable; English Language and Literature grades as 52% reliable.

Scrutiny of the chart will show that the heavy black line in the upper blue box for Maths maps onto about 0.96 on the horizontal axis; the equivalent line for English Language and Literature maps onto 0.56. The measures of the reliability of the grades for each of the other subjects are designated similarly. Ofqual’s report does not give any further numbers, but Table 1 shows my estimates from Ofqual’s Figure 12:

 Probability of
 ‘Definitive’ grade‘Non-definitive’ grade
Maths (all varieties)96%4%
Chemistry92%8%
Physics88%12%
Biology85%15%
Psychology78%22%
Economics74%26%
Religious Studies66%34%
Business Studies66%34%
Geography65%35%
Sociology63%37%
English Language61%39%
English Literature58%42%
History56%44%
Combined English Language and Literature (A level only)52%48%

Table 1: My estimates of the reliability of school exam grades, as inferred from measurements of Ofqual’s Figure 12.

Ofqual’s report does not present any corresponding information for each of GCSE, AS or A level separately, nor any analysis by exam board. Also absent is a measure of the all-subject overall average. Given, however, the maximum value of 96%, and the minimum of 52%, the average is likely to be somewhere in the middle, say, in the seventies; in fact, if each subject is weighted by its cohort, the resulting average over the 14 subjects shown is about 74%. Furthermore, if other subjects – such as French, Spanish, Computing, Art… – are taken into consideration, the overall average is most unlikely to be greater than 82% or less than 66%, suggesting that an overall average reliability of 75% for all subjects is a reasonable estimate.

That’s the evidence that, across all subjects and levels, about 75% of grades, as awarded, are ‘definitive’/right and 25% – one in four – are ‘non-definitive’/wrong – evidence that has been in the public domain since 2018. But evidence that has been much disputed by those with vested interests.

Ofqual’s results are readily explained. We all know that different examiners can, legitimately, give the same answer (slightly) different marks. As a result, the script’s total mark might lie on different sides of a grade boundary, depending on who did the marking. Only one grade, however, is ‘definitive’.

Importantly, there are no errors in the marking studied by Ofqual – in fact, Ofqual’s report mentions ‘marking error’ just once, and then in a rather different context. All the grading discrepancies measured in Ofqual’s research are therefore attributable solely to legitimate differences in academic opinion. And since the range of legitimate marks is far narrower in subjects such as Maths and Physics, as compared to English Literature and History, then the probability that an ‘assistant’ examiner’s legitimate mark might result in a ‘non-definitive’ grade will be much higher for, say, History as compared to Physics. Hence the sequence of subjects in Ofqual’s Figure 12.

As regards appeals, in 2016, Ofqual – in full knowledge of the results of this research (see paragraph 28 of this Ofqual Board Paper, dated 18 November 2015) – changed the rules, requiring that a grade can be changed only if a ‘review of marking’ discovers a ‘marking error’. To quote an Ofqual ‘news item’ of 26 May 2016:

Exam boards must tell examiners who review results that they should not change marks unless there is a clear marking error. …It is not fair to allow some students to have a second bite of the cherry by giving them a higher mark on review, when the first mark was perfectly appropriate. This undermines the hard work and professionalism of markers, most of whom are teachers themselves. These changes will mean a level-playing field for all students and help to improve public confidence in the marking system.

This assumes that the legitimate marks given by different examiners are all equally “appropriate”, and identical in every way.

This assumption. however, is false: if one of those marks corresponds to the ‘definitive’ grade, and another to a ‘non-definitive’ grade, they are not identical at all. Furthermore, as already mentioned, there is hardly any mention of marking errors in Ofqual’s November 2018 report. All the grade discrepancies they identified can therefore only be attributable to legitimate differences in academic opinion, and so cannot be discovered and corrected by the rules that have been in place since 2016.

Over to you…

So, back to that case study.

Having read this far, like Sam, you have knowledge of wrong-doing – not Pat tearing a strip off Alex, but Ofqual awarding some 1.5 million wrong grades every year. All with no right of appeal.

What are you going to do?

You’re probably thinking something like, “Nothing”, “It’s not my job”, “It’s not my problem”, “I’m in no position to do anything, even if I wanted to”.

All of which I understand. No, it’s certainly not your job. And it’s not your problem directly, in that it’s not you being awarded the wrong grade. But it might be your problem indirectly – if you are involved with admissions, and if grades play a material role, you may be accepting a student who is not fully qualified (in that the grade on the certificate might be too high), or – perhaps worse – rejecting a student who is (in that the grade on the certificate is too low). Just to make that last point real, about one candidate in every six with a certificate showing AAA for A level Physics, Chemistry and Biology in fact truly merited at least one B. If such a candidate took a place at Med School, for example, not only is that candidate under-qualified, but a place has also been denied to a candidate with a certificate showing AAB but who merited AAA.

And although you, as an individual, are indeed not is a position to do anything about it, you, collectively, surely are.

HE is, by far, the largest and most important user of A levels. And relying on a ‘product’ that is only about 75% reliable. HE, collectively, could put significant pressure on Ofqual to fix this, if only by printing “OFQUAL WARNING: THE GRADES ON THIS CERTIFICATE ARE ONLY RELIABLE, AT BEST, TO ONE GRADE EITHER WAY” on every certificate – not my statement, but one made by Ofqual’s then Chief Regulator, Dame Glenys Stacey, in evidence to the 2 September 2020 hearing of the Education Select Committee, and in essence equivalent to the fact that about one grade in four is wrong. That would ensure that everyone is aware of the fact that any decision, based on a grade as shown on a certificate, is intrinsically unsafe.

But this – or some other solution – can happen only if your institution, along with others, were to act accordingly. And that can happen only if you, and your colleagues, band together to influence your department, your faculty, your institution.

Yes, that is a bother. Yes, you do have other urgent things to do.

If you do nothing, nothing will happen.

But if you take action, you can make a difference.

Don’t just walk on by.

Dennis Sherwood is a management consultant with a particular interest in organisational cultures, creativity and systems thinking. Over the last several years, Dennis has also been an active campaigner for the delivery of reliable GCSE, AS and A level grades. If you enjoyed this, you might also like https://srheblog.com/tag/sherwood/.

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Policy and funding in the USA

by Rob Cuthbert

SRHE News is published quarterly as one of the benefits of SRHE membership. The 40-page July 2025 issue included this summary of some recent developments in US HE. To join SRHE go to https://srhe.ac.uk/individual-membership-benefits/.

Abolishing the Education Department may be illegal

It seems that many Education Department functions are codified in federal law, so may need Congressional approval or new legislation before they can be abolished, as Jessica Blake reported for insidehighered.com on 31 March 2025.

The ignorance of Linda McMahon

Shaun Harper reported for insidehighered.com on 9 June 2025 on the way US Education Secretary Linda McMahon had been unprepared and unbriefed on so many questions in a US Senate subcommittee hearing in the previous week, probably because of the massive staff cuts she had made in her department.

Trump promised ‘gold standard science’; Make America Healthy Again uses fake citations

Shaun Harper (Southern California) blogged for insidehighered.com on 2 June 2025 in disgust and despair about the US Department of Health and Human Services Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) report. And then they did it again with a report on chronic diseases in child health, as Kathryn Palmer reported for insidehighered.com on 2 June 2025. This was the climate change-denying, anti-DEI Executive Order, 23 May 2025.

Will Columbia get its $400million back?

Columbia University folded under Trump’s objections to its alleged anti-semitism, and acceded to multiple demands in the face of cuts to $400million of public funding. Discussions started about how to restore the cuts, but in internal discussions interim President Katrina Armstrong seemed to deny that some of the demands would ever be implemented. Now Armstrong has stepped down, replaced by a new interim President, Claire Shipman, the co-chair of Columbia’s board of trustees. Johanna Alonso reported for insidehighered.com on 29 March 2025.

Steven Mintz (Texas at Austin), a former Columbia academic, blogged for insidehighered.com on 31 March 2025 arguing that the roots of current campus disputes go right to the heart of the university’s mission and purpose: “The Gaza-Israel conflict became a flashpoint not simply because of its geopolitics, but because it sits at the crossroads of the deepest fissures in campus life: between liberalism and radicalism, identity and ideology, tradition and transformation.” The story of Columbia University in New York and its alleged failure to resist then depredations of the Trump administration was told by Andrew Gumbel for The Observer on 28 April 2025 in his article “Destroying higher education with the veneer of going after antisemitism”. Max Matza reported for the BBC on 4 June 2025 that: “The Trump administration is looking to strip Columbia University of its accreditation over claims it violated the rights of its Jewish students.” A letter from Linda McMahon, US Education Secretary, told accreditor the Middle States Commission on Higher Education that “Columbia “no longer appears to meet the Commission’s accreditation standards” by its alleged violation of anti-discrimination laws.

The appeasement strategy didn’t work, then.

Trump goes after Harvard

Brock Read reported for The Chronicle of Higher Education on 31 March 2025 that the Trump administration would review $255million of current federal contracts and $8.7billion of multi-year contracts as part of its move “to reprove colleges it portrays as hotbeds of antisemitism.” A Trump official said the 18 April letter making extensive demands of Harvard about hiring, admissions and curriculum had been sent by mistake, according to Michael S Schmidt and Michael C Bender in their report for the New York Times on 18 April 2025. Jessica Blake reported for insidehighered.com on 18 April 2025 that “… Trump has made it clear that he’ll use billions of dollars in federal grants and contracts, primarily for research, as a lever to force colleges and universities to bow to his agenda and increase the representation of conservative ideology on their campuses.”

US Education Secretary Linda McMahon sent a badly-written Trump-style threatening letter to Harvard, purporting to freeze all future federal grants, as Gram Slattery and Jarrett Renshaw reported for Reuters on 6 May 2025. Nathan M Greenfield wrote for University World News on 9 May 2025: “In a robust statement in response, Harvard University accused the United States government of making “new threats to illegally withhold funding for lifesaving research and innovation in retaliation against Harvard for filing its lawsuit on April 21”.”

The next round of bullying of Harvard in an effort to make it do what Donald Trump decrees came in the move by the Department of Homeland Security under the notorious Kristi Noem to revoke Harvard’s ability to enrol international students, as Karin Fischer reported for the Chronicle of Higher Education on 22 May 2025.

Then Trump interfered in Fulbright scholar selection, by vetoing about 20% of Fulbright nominations for 2025-2026 on “clearly political” grounds, ruling out applicants with proposals on diversity or climate change, as Liam Knox reported for insidehighered.com on 29 May 2025. Liam Knox reported for insidehighered.com on 11 June 2025 that 11 of 12 members of the Fulbright Scholarship Board resigned on 11 June 2025 “… in protest of the Trump administration’s intervention in the selection process, which they say was politically motivated and illegal.”

The Harvard experience: could it happen here? by GR Evans

On 1 May 2025 The Guardian headline read: ‘Trump administration exploits landmark civil rights act to fight universities’ diversity initiatives‘. What prevents a British King or Prime Minister from attempting to impose sanctions on universities?

US higher education is exposed both to presidential and to state interference. Government powers to intervene in US HE reside in presidential control of federal funding, which may come with conditions. Trump cannot simply shut down the Department of Education by executive order but it seems he can direct that the Department’s grant- and loan-giving functions are taken on by another government department. … read the full blog here.

Politicians rule in Florida

Two weeks after the Florida Board of Governors rejected Santa Ono they approved three new presidents, none having led a university before. On 18 June 2025 they confirmed Jeanette Nuñez as president of Florida International University, Marva Johnson at Florida A&M University, and Manny Diaz Jr at the University of West Florida. Nuñez had been interim President after leaving her job as state lieutenant governor; Diaz is currently Florida commissioner of education; Johnson is a lobbyist whom State Governor Ron DeSantis appointed to the Florida State Board of Education. Josh Moody reported for insidehighered.com on 23 June 2025.

Indiana wants to take over HE

JD Vance said in 2021 that “universities are the enemy” and Iris Sentner for Politico said that in March 2025 ” “… the White House declared war against them”. Ryan Quinn reported for insidehighered.com on 30 April 2025 that Indiana’s state budget bill would “… require faculty at public colleges and universities to post their syllabi online and undergo “productivity” reviews … prohibit faculty emeriti from voting in faculty governance organizations, place low-enrolled degree programs at risk of elimination by the Indiana Commission for Higher Education and end alumni elections for three Indiana University Board of Trustees seats by filling them with gubernatorial appointees. In addition, it has a provision that would let [State Governor] Braun remove the currently elected board members before their terms expire. “I think overreach doesn’t begin to describe the actions of the Legislature,” said Russ Skiba, a professor emeritus of education at IU Bloomington. “This is really a sweeping takeover of higher education in Indiana.”

Why aren’t students protesting against Trump’s university attacks?

Patrick Jack posed the question for Times Higher Education on 1 May 2025. Why indeed?

Endowment tax will penalise rich US universities

A bill which passed the House of Representatives in late May proposes to increase the tax on endowments from 1.4% to 21% for private colleges with an endowment of $2 million or more per student, as Patrick Jack reported for Times Higher Education on 2 June 2025. It would affect only the 35 or so richest institutions in the USA.

Is college worth it?

Yes, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the NY Fed), as reported by Phil Hill of OnEdTech on 3 June 2025.

A graph showing the return to college remains significant AI-generated content may be incorrect.

But not for everyone: Jaison R Abel and Richard Deitz blogged for the NY Fed’s Liberty Street Economics on 16 April 2025: “In our last post, we showed that the economic benefits of a college degree still far outweigh the costs for the typical graduate, with a healthy and consistent return of 12 to 13 percent over the past few decades. But there are many circumstances under which college graduates do not earn such a high return. Some colleges are much more expensive than average, and financial aid is not guaranteed no matter which college a student attends. In addition, the potentially high cost of living on campus was not factored into our estimates. Some students also may take five or six years to finish their degrees, which can significantly increase costs. Further, our calculations were based on median wages over a working life, but half of college graduates earn less than the median. Indeed, even when paying average costs, we find that a college degree does not appear to have paid off for at least a quarter of college graduates in recent decades.”

Santa Ono not for Florida

After the embarrassment of Ben Sasse, the not-very-well-known Republican politician with little HE experience but with a large spending habit, the University of Florida seemed to be playing safe by naming Santa Ono as the only preferred candidate to replace Sasse. Ono was President at Michigan and previously headed the universities of British Columbia and Cincinnatti. He might have become the highest paid university leader in the US, as Chris Havergal reported for Times Higher Education on 6 May 2025. One of his current colleagues, Silke-Maria Weineck, thought after his controversial Michigan tenure he might be better suited to red-state (Republican) politics, in her opinion piece on 5 May 2025 for the Chronicle of Higher Education. Ono’s salary would have been $3million a year: he was unanimously approved by the University of Florida Board, but on 3 June 2025 in an anti-DEI move the State University System of Florida Board of Governors voted not to approve his appointment, as David Jesse reported for the Chronicle of Higher Education. There was more detail from Josh Moody of insidehighered.com on 3 June 2025: “That process included a no vote from Paul Renner, a former Republican lawmaker in the state who had previously angled for the UF presidency …”. Patrick Jack reported for Times Higher Education on 9 June 2025 that after the Santa Ono brouhaha many commentators had said the only people willing to lead Florida institutions would be right wing ideologues.

Rob Cuthbert is editor of SRHE News and the SRHE Blog, Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics. Email rob.cuthbert@uwe.ac.uk. Twitter/X @RobCuthbert. Bluesky @robcuthbert22.bsky.social.


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Branch campuses and the mirage of demand

by Kyuseok Kim

As US universities confront declining domestic enrolments, political instability, and intensified scrutiny over their financial and ideological foundations, a growing number are once again looking outward. International branch campuses (IBCs), once celebrated as symbols of academic globalism and later scrutinized as costly misadventures, seem to be returning to the strategic conversation, not only as diversification mechanisms but also as protective pivots in an era of unpredictability.

Georgetown University’s decision to extend its Qatar campus for another decade and the Illinois Institute of Technology’s plan to launch a new campus in Mumbai are recent examples. Behind such moves lies a quiet but growing calculus: that global presence may serve as both brand amplifier and institutional hedge, especially in the face of resurging nationalism, culture wars, and regulatory constraints at home.

South Korea’s Incheon Global Campus (IGC), a government-backed transnational education hub, is now preparing to welcome two additional foreign universities and one of them is American. But as the IGC experiment has already entered its second decade, its mixed results offer not a template but a cautionary tale. For any U.S. institution considering overseas expansion, IGC reminds us that expectations of seamless demand, regional magnetism, and reputational uplift often collide with complex realities.

The pitfall of assuming “If you build it, they will come”

At the heart of many US institutions’ international ventures lies a persistent assumption: that placing an American university within geographic proximity to large student markets will organically generate demand. IGC was envisioned as a Northeast Asian education magnet, ideally situated to recruit from China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and beyond. The notion was that Korea’s infrastructure, safety, and proximity, combined with US academic credentials, would make IGC highly attractive.

But the numbers tell a different story. As of 2024, IGC’s five institutions, SUNY Korea (Home of Stony Brook University, Fashion Institute of Technology), George Mason University Korea (GMUK), University of Utah Asia Campus (UAC), Ghent University Global Campus (GUGC), enrol about 4,300 students, far short of the original 10,000 target. Among them, only 400 are international students, accounting for 9%. And of those, just around 20 are from China, the very country that was expected to be a key source of enrolments.

This dearth is not for lack of infrastructure or academic rigor. Rather, it illustrates the limitations of relying on passive geographic logic. In an age where students and parents are increasingly sophisticated consumers of education, recruitment requires far more than proximity or even prestige. It demands clarity of value, strong brand presence, affordability, cultural alignment, and a persuasive post-graduation pathway.

English-medium instruction as a double-edged sword

US institutions often assume that English-medium instruction (EMI) automatically confers competitive advantage in Asia. At IGC, all programs are delivered entirely in English, and faculty are predominantly international; 188 of the 304 faculty members across the five campuses are foreign nationals. On paper, this aligns with global academic norms and affirms a commitment to international standards.

However, EMI can paradoxically limit access. While affluent Korean students may see EMI as an elite advantage, students from Vietnam, China, and Indonesia often seek local cultural immersion, language acquisition, and regional relevance. For many Chinese students in particular, one of the draws of studying in Korea is precisely to learn Korean and gain access to Korean labour markets. EMI-only models thus alienate both local integration seekers and English-language learners.

Moreover, when EMI is not paired with robust academic support services, such as English-language tutoring, multilingual advising, or transitional curriculum tracks, it can undermine retention and student success. IGC’s high leave-of-absence rate (26% of total enrolment) may in part reflect this challenge. The EMI strategy, while noble in intent, must therefore be contextualised. In transnational campuses, language policy is not just a delivery decision, it is a recruitment strategy.

Misplaced confidence in institutional brand recognition

American universities often overestimate their brand power abroad. SUNY Korea, anchored by Stony Brook University, and GMUK both represent reputable public institutions in the US academic ecosystem. Yet in East Asia, brand equity does not always travel well. Many students and parents in China, Southeast Asia, and even Korea struggle to distinguish among US institutions unless they are among the globally top-ranked or highly visible.

In contrast, joint-venture universities such as NYU Shanghai or Duke Kunshan benefit from stronger recognition, thanks in part to the halo effect of globally prestigious parent institutions and active marketing within China. These institutions also benefit from location-based credibility; being within China, their offerings align more naturally with Chinese career and immigration aspirations.

Geopolitical frictions and the fragility of demand

US institutions frequently see international branch campuses as safe havens from domestic politics. Yet international expansion brings its own geopolitical risks. IGC’s failure to attract Chinese students cannot be separated from the lingering effects of the 2017 THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) dispute – a regional conflict that emerged when South Korea agreed to deploy a US missile defense system on its soil. China strongly opposed it, viewing the system as a threat to its own strategic interests. In response, China imposed strong sanctions on South Korea, which led to the challenges in  educational diplomacy between two countries. Nor can it be divorced from the broader geopolitics of US-China relations, which makes Chinese families wary of American degrees, especially those delivered from politically allied countries like Korea.

There is also the perception gap between a degree “from a U.S. university” and a degree “earned in Korea.” Even when academic standards and credentials are identical, students and employers may view transnational degrees as second-tier or less prestigious. For example, in Korea, IGC campuses are often viewed as a second choice in the stratified higher education structure locally. The reputational buffer that a US degree once offered is increasingly interrogated, especially in environments where political affiliations, social conditions, and post-graduation options matter more than branding. In this sense, branch campuses are not outside the storm; they are situated in a different part of it.

A US-oriented reality check within the local contexts

For US universities, the decision to open a branch campus abroad is no longer a question of academic vision alone; it is a financial and reputational calculation. The domestic context is sobering: declining birth rates are shrinking the college-aged population, public trust in higher education is waning, and federal support for research and student aid is increasingly politicised. Internationalisation is no longer just an opportunity; it is increasingly seen as a survival strategy.

But survival strategies must be strategic, not reactionary. IGC’s challenges illustrate what happens when institutions pursue global expansion without first understanding the local education marketplace. Without granular market research, locally embedded partnerships, and nuanced branding strategies, even well-intentioned ventures become “white elephants”, costly and underutilized. A forthcoming US institution entering IGC would have an opportunity to learn from these lessons and chart a different path. But it must begin with humility and cross-cultural understanding.

This concern is heightened by structural reforms driven by demographic decline and the growing uncertainly embedded in Korea’s higher education system. As competition for enrolment intensifies, some struggling institutions see IGC’s local recruitment as a threat, even calling it a “brain drain within Korean territory,” since most IGC students are Korean. While IGC claims it draws students who would have studied abroad, offering a net economic benefit, that argument may fall flat for universities fighting to stay afloat.

Conclusion: toward a more grounded globalism

The story of Incheon Global Campus is not one of failure, but rather a valuable case study. It reflects a potential disconnection between institutional ambition and market behaviour; between the idea of internationalisation and its on-the-ground execution. It reminds us that proximity to students is not the same as access, and that transnational education requires more than exporting curricula across borders, it demands building relevance across cultures.

For US universities hoping to extend their reach, the time for romantic notions of global campuses has passed. What is needed now is realism. That means conducting rigorous market analysis. It means understanding the competitive landscape; not just in Seoul or Shanghai, but in second-tier cities where price sensitivity and post-graduation pathways determine enrolment decisions. It means creating flexible programs that can respond to local aspirations and global uncertainties. It means designing campuses that feel anchored, not transplanted.

The myth that a US branch campus in South Korea will become a magnet for students across Asia, particularly from China, has not materialised. With only a handful of Chinese students across IGC’s entire enrolment, it is clear that assumptions must be rethought. Transnational education remains a worthy goal. But if the next generation of branch campuses is to thrive, especially in East Asia, it must be forged not in the image of prestige, but in the crucible of strategy. It must be attentive, adaptive, and above all, aware.

Kyuseok Kim (KS) is the inaugural Center Director of IES Abroad Seoul, where he leads strategic, academic, and operational initiatives while building partnerships with local institutions. He brings extensive experience in student recruitment, international relations, and business development, with prior roles at UWAY, M Square Media, SUNY Korea, and Sungkyunkwan University. KS is a Fulbright Scholar and a doctoral candidate in Educational Administration and Higher Education at Korea University. He holds an MBA from Sungkyunkwan University and a BA in English Language Education from Korea University. As a scholar-practitioner, he contributes regularly to both international and South Korean publications on global education topics. ks.kyuseok.kim@gmail.com  www.linkedin.com/in/ks-kim-intled


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The Harvard experience: could it happen here?

by GR Evans

On 1 May 2025 The Guardian headline read: ‘Trump administration exploits landmark civil rights act to fight universities’ diversity initiatives‘. What prevents a British King or Prime Minister from attempting to impose sanctions on universities?

US higher education is exposed both to presidential and to state interference. Government powers to intervene in US HE reside in presidential control of federal funding, which may come with conditions. Trump cannot simply shut down the Department of Education by executive order but it seems he can direct that the Department’s grant- and loan-giving functions are taken on by another government department.

As early as 2023 Donald Trump had said ‘We are going to choke off the money to schools that aid the Marxist assault on our American heritage and on Western civilization itself’. In response to campus protest he removed $400m of Columbia’s federal funding in March 2025 on the grounds that the University had failed to address the alleged ‘persistent harassment of Jewish students’. In April 2025 he gave orders to Ivy League universities, threatening withdrawal of funding if their teaching and research did not comply with Government policy as the President defined it and that their appointments should have regard to those expectations.

On 8 April the Washington Examiner reported a planned attempt to counter such action by legislation, that is to prevent Trump’s directives taking effect by amending the Higher Education Act of 1965 ‘to prohibit political litmus tests in accreditation of institutions of higher education and for other purposes.  On 10 April the Chronicle of Higher Education foresaw an Executive Order.

A letter to Harvard dated 11 April signed on behalf of the Department of Education and other federal agencies asserted that the United States had ‘invested in Harvard University’s operations’ because of ‘the value to the country’ of its work, but warned that ‘an investment is not an entitlement.’ This letter, if accepted, was to constitute ‘an agreement in principle’. Governance was to be ‘exclusively’ in the hands of those ‘tenured professors’ and ‘senior leadership’ who were ‘committed to the ‘changes indicated in this letter’. Its ‘hiring and related data’ and its student ‘admissions data’ were to be ‘shared with the federal Government’. International students ‘hostile to American values’ were not to be admitted and those already admitted  were to be reported to federal authorities. Policies on diversity, equity and inclusion were to end and student protest restricted.

Harvard and other Ivy League Universities were indignant. Harvard in particular rode the headlines for some days, objecting to the Government demand that it immediately agree:

to implement the Trump administration’s demands to overhaul the University’s governance and leadership, academic programs, admissions system, hiring process, and discipline system—with the promise of more demands to come

and thus ‘overtly seek to impose on Harvard University political views and policy preferences advanced by the Trump administration and commit the University to punishing disfavored speech’. There were reports that US academics were seeking to escape to employment in Canada,  the UK or Europe.

The American Association of Colleges and Universities(AACU), founded in 1915 as the Association of American Colleges, now has a wide-ranging  and international membership. It is a loose counterpart to the British Universities UK which also has a membership including an extensive range of higher education providers. The AACU issued a Call for Constructive Engagement on 22 April, 2025, but litigation was already in hand, with the President and Fellows of Harvard seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on 21 April. Harvard is listed as the plaintiff with a considerable list of defendants identified (paras 15-30). In its submission Harvard argued that:

American institutions of higher learning have in common the essential freedom to determine, on academic grounds, whom to admit and what is taught, how, and by whom

and that such ‘American institutions of higher learning’ were ‘essential to American prosperity’.

It stressed a ‘longstanding collaboration between universities such as Harvard and the federal government dating back to the Second World War’. It pointed to Harvard’s success in using federal funding to achieving significant research outcomes. The recent ‘broad attack of Government’ on ‘universities across America’, not only on Harvard and the other Ivy League Universities listed, had affected the ‘critical funding partnerships’ that made this invaluable research possible.

This case was being brought because, it was argued, the Government had been using ‘the withholding of federal funding as leverage to gain control of academic decision making at Harvard’. Harvard cited the Government’s letter of 11 April as demanding governance reform and a ‘third-party’ audit ‘of the viewpoints of Harvard’s student body, faculty, and staff’, followed by the hiring of new Faculty and admission of students whose views were satisfactory to the Government. It had asserted that teaching should be ‘to the Government’s satisfaction as determined in the Government’s sole discretion’ and to that end Harvard  should ‘terminate or reform its academic “programs” to the Government’s liking’. The Government had since ‘launched multiple investigations and other actions against Harvard’.  

The Government had ‘within hours of the Freeze Order ‘ended ‘$2.2 billion in multiyear grants and $60M in multiyear contract value to Harvard University’ and Harvard began receiving ‘stop work orders’. In order to bring a case against the Government it was essential for Harvard to establish that the Government’s action constituted a breach of public law. To that end it stated that the ‘Court has jurisdiction over Harvard’s claims’ because the University did not ‘seek money damages or an order mandating specific performance of any contract’, but:

an order declaring unlawful and setting aside sweeping agency action taken in violation of Harvard’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and its rights guaranteed by statute and regulation.

Harvard stressed that even though it is a private university its research is federally funded ‘through a grant process administered by federal agencies’. It cited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which requires ‘a detailed and mandatory statutory framework’ of procedures to be followed. Harvard had its own procedures, added to or created in August, September and November 2024. Specifically in March 2025, Harvard released updated “Frequently Asked Questions” clarifying that both Jewish and Israeli identities are covered by the University’s Non-Discrimination Policy.

Harvard explained that it had attempted ‘collaboration’ in the weeks following the government letter and the Federal Task Force’s press release announcing campus visits. It had sought to arrange a meeting on the campus and that was scheduled for late April 2025, yet on April 20 it was reported that the ‘Trump administration has grown so furious with Harvard University’ that ‘it is planning to pull an additional $1 billion of the school’s funding for health research.’

Trump’s threatened sanctions concerned the future of Harvard’s funding. Harvard has endowments  of c$53 billion so any threat from Trump to reduce federal funding posed a limited risk to its future. However he made a further proposal on 18 April to remove Harvard’s exemption from Government tax on its income, which could have hit its normal operation harder.

The US counterpart to HMRC is its Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS may grant tax-exempt status to a charitable, religious, scientific or literary organization, on condition that it refrains from campaigning or seeking to modify legislation. However, the President is not permitted to direct the IRS to conduct an investigation or audit. To that extent the counterbalancing of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the US seems to be holding.

Harvard was making its challenge at a time when the balance between the executive and the judiciary in the US had come into question in a number of cases where Trump’s executive orders sought to override the courts. It claimed that ‘the Freeze Order is part of a broader effort by the Government to punish Harvard for protecting its constitutional rights. … multiple news outlets have reported that the Internal Revenue Service is considering revoking its recognition of Harvard’s tax exempt status’. Representing 86 universities, the Presidents’ Alliance has filed an Amicus brief supporting the litigation.

Harvard sought in its litigation to have the Freeze Order declared unconstitutional and also the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ sought to be imposed  in the April 3 and April 11 and any action taken under it so far, also banning any future orders in the same vein. It pleaded six Counts, first a violation of the First Amendment in that the letters had targeted the ‘academic content that Harvard professors “teach students”’. Count 2 was that ‘even if the prerequisites of review under the Administrative Procedure Act were not satisfied, federal courts have the “equitable power” to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers.”’ Count 3 was that Title VI does not permit wholesale freezing of a recipient’s federal financial assistance. Instead, it requires that a “refusal to grant or to continue assistance” be “limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been so found.” Count 4 was the Government’s failure to ‘comply with their own regulations before freezing Harvard’s federal financial assistance’. Count 5 alleged that the action had been arbitrary and capricious and Count 6 that it had been ultra vires.

At Indiana University a professor of Germanic studies was recently investigated under a state law after a student accused him of speech in support of Palestine.

Could this happen in the UK?

English higher education providers have their autonomy protected by the Higher Education and Research Act (2017)s.2 [HERA]. This legislation created the Office for Students, a non-departmental public body, whose nearest US counterpart is the Higher Learning Commission, an independent agency founded in 1895 which accredits higher education institutions. The University of Michigan, for example seeks, renewal of its accreditation from the Higher Learning Commission every ten years.

The Office for Students is both regulator and funder, and distributes Government funding to higher education providers. This may take into account ‘particular policy areas and government priorities. Yet HERA outlaws any attempt by the OfS to impose the restrictions Trump sought to impose on the universities of the USA.  English higher education providers must be free:

(i) to determine the content of particular courses and the manner in which they are taught, supervised and assessed,

(ii) to determine the criteria for the selection, appointment and dismissal of academic staff and apply those criteria in particular cases, and

(iii) to determine the criteria for the admission of students and apply those criteria in particular cases.

Academic staff in England also enjoy ‘freedom within the law’:

(i) to question and test received wisdom, and

(ii) to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions,

without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at the providers.

There is some Government oversight. In protecting ‘the institutional autonomy of English higher e providers’, the Office for Students is subject to the ‘guidance’ of the Secretary of State, though Government requirements are held off by the legislative fencing.  The guidance of a higher education provider by the Office for Students:

must not relate to—

(a) particular parts of courses of study,

(b) the content of such courses,

(c) the manner in which they are taught, supervised or assessed,

(d) the criteria for the selection, appointment or dismissal of academic staff, or how they are applied, or

(e) the criteria for the admission of students, or how they are applied.

The legislation adds that:

guidance framed by reference to a particular course of study must not guide the OfS to perform a function in a way which prohibits or requires the provision of a particular course of study.

This seems to place universities safely out of reach of the kind of restrictions Trump sought to impose on Harvard and other Ivy League Universities, but the Office for Students is potentially able not only to set its Government funding levels but also affect its students’ access to loans from the Student Loans Company. That can certainly be at risk, for example in the case of the Oxford Business College, whose funding (via franchise arrangements) was blocked in April 2025 when it was found to have abused the student loan system by admitting unqualified students. (US accreditors do hold a lot of power, because universities must be accredited by a federally recognized agency in order to access federal student aid.)

Access to Government funding through the OfS requires listing by the Office for Students on its Register as an approved provider. The Office for Students did not impose its Conditions of Registration on pre-existing universities before including them in 2018 on its first Register under HERA. It simply treated them as proven acceptable providers of higher education. Each university duly publishes an account of its compliance (eg at Oxford) with the requirements which enable it to remain on the Office for Students Register. What might happen if they were found not to have done so? Short of removal from its Register the OfS has been known to impose fines, notably of more than £500,000 in the recent case of the University of Sussex when it was alleged to have failed to follow its own procedures designed to protect academic freedom.

Government oversight of the work of HE providers may overlap with or sit uneasily beside forms of ‘accreditation’ and ’qualification’. The accreditation of qualifications in the UK may be the responsibility of a number of ‘agencies’ external to HE providers, some of which are bodies offering professional qualifications. For example the Solicitors Regulation Authority keeps its own register of qualified solicitors. A university degree may not constitute a ‘qualification’ without the completion of further recognised study, some of which may be provided by the university itself, for example the Postgraduate Certificate in Education.

An area of ‘accreditation’ undergoing significant reform and expansion in the UK covers ‘skills’, including  apprenticeships. Not all universities offer their own apprenticeships, though they may recognise some of those available from other providers at Levels 4 and 5. Nevertheless ‘skills’ are potentially at risk of Government intervention. At the beginning of March 2025, the House of Lords was debating whether  ‘skills’ might benefit from the establishment of a ‘new executive agency’.

It was recognised that there would need to be a report from the Secretary of State  ‘containing draft proposals’ for an agency, ‘to be known as “Skills England”. Ian Sollom MPobjected that that that would represent ‘a significant centralising of power in the hands of the Secretary of State, without providing proper mechanisms for parliamentary oversight or accountability.’ A ‘statutory, departmental body would have more clout’, he argued.

An Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (IfATE) already existed, but it was concerned with qualifications up to Level 5, short of degree-level 6. ‘Skills England’ was intended to begin work in April 2025. ‘When Skills England calls, will anybody answer the phone?’ asked HEPI, pointing to ‘limited autonomy, complex cross-departmental coordination, tensions between national and local priorities, and competing objectives between foundational and higher-level skills need’. Its ‘cross-departmental working’ with Government was unclear.

It looks as though some universities, at least, are safe from any initiative to interfere from above with the right to self-government and to determine what to teach and research. Harvard records a ‘revenue base’ of $65billion, with ‘federal funding ‘ as its largest source of support for research. The research income of Oxford, for example, is £778m, with commercial research income of £148m. That cannot compare with Harvard, but at least Oxford and some others will remain free to choose how to use that income for its academic purposes.

This is a modified version of an article first published by the Oxford Magazine No 477 in May 2025, republished with the permission of the editor and author.

SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.


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Restoring academic values: a key for university effectiveness

by John Kenny

This blog post is based on research into the effectiveness of higher education policy, published in Policy Reviews in Higher Education. The article, ‘Effectiveness in higher education: What lessons can be learned after 40 years of neoliberal reform?’, takes a systemic perspective to consider a range of roles needed for HE to function effectively in the more accountable HE environment of today (Kenny, 2025).

It focusses on three key stakeholder groups arguably most pertinent to effectiveness: government policy makers, university corporate leaders and the academic profession, with a particular focus on the academic role, as this is typically overlooked in much of the research into higher education policy, yet we argue critical to the effectiveness of the system.

A systemic approach to HE policy assumes that reform in educational systems is complex and unpredictable. It also accepts that different stakeholders may experience change differently, there needs to be an understanding of the different roles played within the system and how they interact. Of particular concern in this article is how the academic role interacts with other stakeholders, especially the government regulators and university corporate leaders.

For over 40 years, a top-down ‘command and control’ approach to change has been adopted in HE. Typically, when this mind-set drives change, the inherent complexities of systemic change are disregarded, and it is assumed the outcomes of a reform can be pre-determined. It largely ignores the relationships, values and experiences of other stakeholder groups, which systems theory suggests is not appropriate for effective educational reform (Checkland, 2012; OECD, 2017).

By contrast, this article points to research into effective organisations that identified four ‘culture groups’ as present in any organisation: the Academic, the Corporate, the Bureaucratic and the Entrepreneurial. Each of these has a unique values perspective from which it approaches the decision-making process. These ‘competing values’ determine the organisational values, but with the values of the dominant group tending to prevail. The research linked organisational effectiveness (or performance) to a “strong culture” defined as one in which the practices and processes are in alignment with the espoused values position of the organisation (Smart & St John, 1996; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981).

For academic institutions such as universities, HE policy specifically identifies both Corporate and Academic governance as the two most important (Gerber, 2010; MCU, 2020; TEQSA, 2019a; 2019b; 2023). It follows that, in an effective organisation, a “strong culture” would be based on both the corporate and academic values having a more equal influence over decision-making.

Many of the current problems have arisen because, under the neoliberal reform agenda, with government policymakers aligned with corporate values, a corporate culture has dominated for the last 40 years. This has led to a situation in universities where corporate leadership dominates and academic leadership has been diminished (Gerber, 2010; Magney, 2006; Yeatman & Costea (eds), 2018).

The intention of this work is not to demonise any culture group nor argue for a return to a ‘Golden Age’ where academics tended to dominate. It proposes that, in the more accountable HE environment of today, from a systemic perspective the unique nature and purposes of universities as trusted organisation means each of these roles is important. It argues that across the system the government, corporate leaders and Academia, each play an important, but distinct role in ensuring the system, and universities, function effectively. For the HE system and universities to be effective, as opposed to more efficient, we need better understanding of these distinctions and more clarity about the accountabilities that should apply to each group (Bovens, 2007; Kearns, 1998).

This work pays particular attention to understanding the academic role. It argues that, with the domination of a corporate mind-set, which values control, compliance, competitiveness and productivity, academics are seen as “mere employees” (Giroux, 2002; Harman 2003), whose autonomy and academic freedom need to be curtailed (Hanlon, 1999).

This paper argues this situation has been exacerbated by the failure of the academic profession to define their role in this more accountable HE environment. The paper points to research that aims to fill this gap by re-defining academic professionalism in the more accountable HE environment, but in a way that does not sacrifice its essential ethical and autonomous underpinnings.

It further argues these unique characteristics of academic work, which have compelling implications for the overall quality of university education, have come under sustained attack from the rise of political populism (Hiller et al, 2025), increased disinformation and misinformation on social media, and the growing use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

An extensive review of national and international literature identified four ‘foundational principles’ (Kenny et al, 2025) which present a definition of the academic role involving a holistic combination of academic leadership, shared professional values, and independence in scholarship, underpinned by a “special” employment relationship. The historical, political, legislative, educational and cultural context of any particular HE system, however, requires these ‘foundational principles’ to be translated into a set of ‘enabling principles’ to suit that HE context (Freidson, 1999; Kenny & Cirkony, 2022).

To test this empirically, a set of ‘enabling principles’ were developed for the Australian HE context as a case study. Kenny et al (2024) described how, in the three phases of this action research study already completed, a set of ‘enabling principles’ has been developed and incorporated into a Professional Ethical Framework for Australian Academics (The Framework).

This case study aims to re-define the nature of academic work to re-emphasise its contribution to the effectiveness of HE, both in Australia and around the globe. The Framework represents our current re-definition of the academic profession in the more accountable Australian HE context. However, the universality of the foundational principles suggests this approach might be replicable by researchers in other HE contexts (Kenny et al, 2025).

This work addresses the compelling question of the sustainability of the academic profession by:

  1. Providing greater alignment across the HE system between the broader social purpose of universities and the important role that academics play.
  2. Unifying individual academics as professional scholars through a set of common professional values and a justification for their professional autonomy and academic freedom.
  3. Contributing to the sustainability of the academic profession by enabling individual academics to better navigate the competing tensions within their institutions as they build their professional identity based-on transparent professional standards, adequate resourcing and accountability mechanisms that will minimise exploitative practices currently evident in the system (AUA, 2024).
  4. Providing a common language that enables non-academic stakeholders, including governments, university management, industry, students, etc, to better understand the unique role academics play in ensuring the HE system and universities are effective in meeting their obligations to Society.
  5. Providing foundational principles that can be adapted to other HE contexts and facilitate the creation of a global academic community of practice through which the profession can enhance is voice in shaping the future of HE around the globe.

This work should help to restore a balance of power between the academic and corporate leadership in the governance of universities by facilitating more purposefully designed governance structures and accountability mechanisms that enable academic staff to influence HE policy formation, decision-making and resource allocation, which is especially important against a backdrop of growing political and economic challenges to universities.

Feedback from our national and international academic colleagues is encouraged. Those wishing to find out more are directed to the website of the Australian Association of University Professors (AAUP) at https://professoriate.org, where more information can be found about this research and how you might participate in the further development of The Framework,which has been made available for consultation with and feedback from a broader national and international academic audience.

John Kenny has extensive experience as a teacher and teacher educator and leadership in academic professional issues. His growing concern over the long-standing systemic issues in higher education, loss of independence for universities and loss of prestige for the academic profession led him to take a more systemic perspective and initiate this research looking into the role of academia in the effectiveness of higher education.

The author may also be contacted directly by email (John.Kenny@utas.edu.au).


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What is a ‘governing document’ in the University of Sussex?

by GR Evans

The  Office for Students has found that the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement  of the University of Sussex involves breach of two of the relevant OfS Regulatory Requirements in late March 2025, and imposed an unprecedentedly substantial fine. The first of those criticised (OfS Condition E1) concerns the duty to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom:

The provider’s governing documents must uphold the public interest governance principles that are applicable to the provider.

A further OfS Condition (E2) requires that ‘the provider must have in place adequate and effective management and governance arrangements’ so as  to ‘operate in accordance with its governing documents’.

On 9 April 2025 the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sussex published a fierce criticism of the unprecedented decision of Office for Students that it had failed to comply with one of its own ‘policies’. The Vice-Chancellor considered that the policy in question was:

a really small statement, of which we have many dozens, if not hundreds, of similar policies and statements. Whereas the governing documents of the university  are its charter and statutes and regulations.

There was press coverage about the ensuing uncertainty. UniversitiesUK, as the ‘collective voice’ of universities promised to write to the OfS to ask for clarity as its decision appears to find that it is a ‘failure to uphold freedom of speech and academic freedom’ if a university has ‘policies’ to prevent ‘abusive, bullying and harassing’ material or speech.

The University has notified the OfS of its intention to apply for judicial review.  Among the grounds Sussex relies on is that the Office for Students did not have powers to treat ‘documents that are not a provider’s “governing documents”’ as creating the public interest governance condition necessary to permit the OfS to seek judicial review. The OfS defines ‘governing documents’ somewhat inadequately as ‘set out in’ its ‘Regulatory Framework’, where  ‘the provider’s governing documents must uphold the public interest governance principles that are applicable to the provider. In this case it held:

that the University of Sussex breached ongoing condition of registration E2 because it failed to have adequate and effective management and governance arrangements in place to ensure that it operates in accordance with its governing documents.

The definition of ‘governing documents’ is therefore of the first importance if a precedent is to be set by this OfS decision. The Higher Education and Research Act (2017) s.3(8)(a) protects the autonomy of higher education providers, defining it as ‘the freedom of English higher education providers within the law to conduct their day to day management in an effective and competent way’. Sussex was created among the batch of new universities of the 1960s.

The Act created a new Regulator, the Office for Students, stating that the Regulator ‘must have regard to’ the ‘need to protect the institutional autonomy of English higher education providers’. This requires a fine balance if the OfS is to avoid intrusion upon a provider’s autonomy.

The institutional autonomy of higher education providers gives them control of the drafting of their internal legislation. External authorities may insist on particular points in certain cases. For example medical qualifications set by a provider cannot constitute a qualification to be a doctor unless they are recognised by the General Medical Council.  But the right to create its own rules (within the law) largely lies with the provider, who may design them  and order them in its own preferred hierarchy.  The Office for Students may not interfere.

Nevertheless the creation of ‘governing documents’ must carry certain implications about the source of the internal or external authority to create, review or amend them.  It is suggested that ‘Sussex contends that these are matters for our old friend the Visitor, a traditional legal role in UK university governance, who in Sussex’s case is the actual King’, and:

cites longstanding legal authority confirming that the Visitor has exclusive jurisdiction over internal governance questions, including interpretation and application of the university’s own rules, and says that unless Parliament clearly removes or overrides that jurisdiction, external bodies like OfS can’t interfere.

Where the Monarch is not the Visitor it is normally a Bishop.

However a Visitor is not essential to the law-making of a higher education provider. ‘Alternative providers’ may not have Visitors. As eleemosynary bodies their Colleges normally have Visitors of their own but neither Oxford nor Cambridge has a Visitor. Under the Oxford and Cambridge Universities Act of 2023, both Universities create their own Statutes. In Oxford’s case those which are King-in-Council Statutes require the consent of the Privy Council on behalf of the King. In Cambridge all its Statutes require that consent to their creation or modification. Their subordinate legislation, most Regulations in Oxford (some of Oxford’s Regulations may be created by its Council) and Special Ordinances and Ordinances in Cambridge, simply require the consent of their governing bodies, Oxford’s Congregation of over 5000 and Cambridge’s Regent House of over 7000 members.

The rules at the top of a provider’s hierarchies may constitute governing documents but it is far from clear how far down that status applies. For purposes of management ‘procedural or process documents’ explain the required ways of doing things and the processes which must be followed’. Among these are Codes of Practice and ‘Guidance documents’. This seems to be where the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement fits, as approved by the Executive Group in 2018, 2022, 2023 and 2024 and placed under the heading of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion(revised in 2022, 2023 and 2024).  Is it a governing document in this lowly position?

Also found relevant by the Office for Students in the Sussex case was the exercise of powers of delegation. It identified ‘a pattern of decisions taken at the university to adopt and/or revise policies without proper delegated authority’, both that its:

Prevent Steering Group approved and adopted the 2021 version of the University’s Freedom of Speech Code of Practice despite not having delegated authority to do so

and also that ‘the 2023 version of the External Speakers Procedure was approved by the University Executive Group, despite that group not having delegated authority to do so’.

Like similar universities Sussex has an Executive Team composed of a Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellors, their deputies, Deans of Schools and Faculties, with senior academic-related staff headed by a University Secretary, a Financial Officer and various Directors. These are not directly responsible for framing its legislation but may have authority to apply it, though not necessarily powers to delegate its application.

The Office for Students could turn to the University’s rules about delegation in framing its criticism. Sussex has given thought to that. Sussex’s Council approved a Scheme of Delegation in March 2018. ‘Responsibility’ may be delegated by the Council except for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor and President; ‘the variation, amendment or revocation of the Charter or Statutes’; and responsibility for approving the University’s annual audited accounts or the appointment of Auditors. The Scheme of Delegation clarifies where roles and responsibilities are allocated between Council and its Committees, among Committees, and between Council and Senate. The ‘Executive’ and a University Executive Group are described as exercising ‘leadership’ and there is also a University Leadership Team, though ‘leadership’ is undefined.

Sussex has also given thought to overall responsibilities for supervision of the exercise of its internal rules. It has chosen to describe them collectively as ‘policies’. It is recognised to be ‘important that a clear and consistent approach is taken to drafting and updating policies across the institution’ details the requirements for the creation, approval, review, and updating of policies.  However it clarifies the difference between policies and other associated documents, sets out responsibilities relating to policies, and details the requirements for the creation, approval, review, and updating of policies. An overarching Policy on Policies has been agreed by the ‘University Executive Team and Council’. This consists in a Policy on the Creation and Management of University Policies (‘Policy Framework’).

The aim of the University’s Policy Framework is to make clear what a policy is and what policies should be used for, to differentiate between policies and other types of documents (e.g. procedural documents, codes of practice, etc), and to outline the process that should be followed when drafting, reviewing, and updating policies. An outline of where responsibilities lie in relation to policies is also included.

This suggests that if pressed Sussex might take all these to constitute its ‘governing documents’, while recognising distinctions among them.

Nevertheless Sussex distinguishes governance and management. ‘A policy is a high-level statement of principles, requirements or behaviours that apply broadly across the University’ and ‘reflects institutional values’, thus supporting ‘the delivery of the University’s strategy’.  It  reflects ‘legal and regulatory obligations, sector standards, or high-level operational requirements’. These create obligations.

Among them Sussex lists ‘Regulations’, which  must be made ‘pursuant to the Charter’. These contain detailed rules governing a wide variety of actions of, or on behalf of, the University falling under governance but extending into management: staffing procedures, student disciplinary and appeals procedures, the Students’ Union, the composition of Council and Senate, titles of degrees and Schools, roles of Heads of Schools, lists of collaborative institutions, academic titles and dress, the various degree courses awarded by the University, and general University regulations (library, ICT, administrative). These Regulations are updated annually and approved by Council and/or Senate. Next come written ‘Resolutions’ which Council members may choose to approve or not, ‘in accordance with procedures set out in the Regulations’, though amendments to the Charter and the Statutes and certain Regulations require ‘a three-fourths majority’.

For purposes of management ‘procedural or process documents’ going beyond these categories explain the required ways of doing things at Sussex and ‘the processes which must be followed’. Among these are Codes of Practice and ‘Guidance documents’. This seems to be where the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement fits, as approved by the Executive Group in 2018, revised in 2022, 2023 and 2024. placed under the heading of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion.  Are they still among ‘governing documents’ with a constitutional role in the University’s  governance? An application for a judicial review will take a considerable time to produce a recommendation even if it supports Sussex’s argument

SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.


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Surviving and thriving in HE professional services

by GR Evans

This blog was first published in the Oxford Magazine No 475 (Eighth Week, Hilary term, 2025) and is reproduced here with permission of the author and the editor.

Rachel Reeds’ short but comprehensive book, Surviving and Thriving in Higher Education Professional Services: a guide to success (Routledge, 2025), is both an instruction manual for the ‘professionals’ it was written for and an illuminating account of what they do for the academics and students who benefit. However, Reeds is frank about what is sometimes described as ‘trench warfare’, a ‘tension’ between academics and ‘everyone else’, including differences of ‘perceived status’ among the staff of  ‘higher education providers’.

Her chapters begin with a survey of the organisation of ‘UK higher education today’. Then comes a description of  ‘job or career’ in ‘professional services’ followed by a chapter on how to get such a post. Chapter 4 advises the new recruit about ‘making a visible impact’ and Chapter 5 considers ‘managing people and teams’. The widespread enthusiasm of providers for ‘change’ and ‘innovation’ prompts the discussion in Chapter 6.

Reeds defines ‘Professional Services’ as replacing and embracing ‘terms such as administrators, non-academic staff or support staff’. In some providers there are not two but three categories, with ‘professional services’ sometimes described as ‘academic-related’ and other non-academics as ‘assistant’ staff. Some academics are responsible for both teaching and research but there may also be research-only staff, usually on fixed-term externally-funded contracts, which may be classified on the sameside of the ‘trench’ as academics. The ‘umbrella carriers’ of ‘middle management’ and ‘dealing with difficult things’ provide matter for Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 and the conclusion there is encouragement to see the task in broader terms and to share ‘knowledge’ gained. Each chapter ends with suggestions for further reading under the heading ‘digging deeper’.

The scope of the needs to be met is now very wide. Government-defined ‘Levels’ of higher education include Levels 4 and 5, placing degrees at Level 6, with postgraduate Masters at 7 and doctorates at 8. The Higher Education and Research Act of 2017 therefore includes what is now a considerable range of ‘higher education providers’ in England, traditional Universities among them, but also hundreds of ‘alternative providers’. Some of these deliver higher education in partnership with other providers which have their own degree-awarding powers, relying on them to provide their students with degrees. These all need ‘professional services’ to support them in their primary tasks of teaching and, in many cases, also research.

Providers of higher education need two kinds of staff: to deliver education and research and others to provide support for them. That was noticed in the original drafting of the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 s.65, 2 (b) which approved the use of (the then significant) ‘block grant’ public funding for:

the provision of any facilities, and the carrying on of any other activities, by higher education institutions in their area which the governing bodies of those institutions consider it necessary or desirable to provide or carry on for the purpose of or in connection with education or research.

In what sense do those offering such ‘services’ constitute a Profession? The Professional Qualifications Act of 2022, awaiting consideration of amendments and royal approval, is primarily concerned with licence to practise and the arrangements for the acceptance of international qualifications. It is designed to set out a framework ‘whereby professional statutory regulatory bodies (PSRBs) can determine the necessary knowledge and experience requirements to work in a regulated profession (for example nursing or architecture)’. It will permit ’different approaches to undertaking’ any ‘regulatory activity’ so as ‘to ensure professional standards’This is not stated to include any body recognising members of the Professional Services of higher education.  Nor does the Government’s own approved list of regulated professions.

The modern Professional Services came into existence in a recognisable form only in the last few decades.The need for support for the work of the ‘scholars’ got limited recognition in the early universities. When Oxford and Cambridge formed themselves as corporations at the beginning of the thirteenth century they provided themselves with Chancellors, who had a judicial function, and Proctors (Procuratores) to ensure that the corporation stayed on the right side of the law. The office of Registrar (Oxford) and Registrary (Cambridge) was added from the fifteenth sixteenth century to keep the records of the University such as its lists and accounts.

The needs to be met expanded towards the end of the nineteenth century. Oxford’s Registrar had a staff of five in 1914. The Oxford and Cambridge Universities Commission which framed the Act of 1923 recommended that the Registrar’s role be developed. The staff of Oxford’s Registrar numbered eight in 1930 and forty in 1958. By 2016 the Registrar was manager to half the University’s staff.

The multiplication of universities from the 1890s continued with a new cluster in the 1960s,  each with its own body of staff supporting the academics. A body of University Academic Administrative Staff created in 1961 became the Conference of University Administrators in 1993. The  resulting Association of University Administrators (AUA) became the  Association of Higher Education Professionals (AHEP) in 2023. CUA traced its history back to the Meeting of University Academic Administrative Staff, founded in 1961. Its golden jubilees was celebrated in 2011 in response to the changing UK higher education sector. It adopted the current name in 2023.

This reflects the development of categories of such support staff not all of whom are classified as ‘Professional’.  A distinction is now common between ‘assistant staff’ and the ‘professionals’, often described as ’academic-related’ and enjoying a comparable status with the ‘academic’.

The question of status was sharpened by the creation of a Leadership Foundation in Higher Education (LFHE) in 2004, merged with AdvanceHE in 2018.  This promises those in  Professional Services ‘a vital career trajectory equal to research, teaching and supporting learning’ and, notably, to ‘empower leaders at all levels: from early-career professionals to senior executives’ That implies that executive leadership in a provider will not necessarily lie with its academics. It may also be described as managerial.

Reading University identifies ‘role profiles’ of four kinds: ‘academic and research’; ‘professional and managerial’; support roles which are ‘clerical and technical; ‘ancillary and operational support’. The ‘professional and managerial’ roles are at Grades 6-8. It invites potential recruits into its ‘Professional Services’ as offering career progression at the University. The routes are listed under Leadership and Management Development; ‘coaching and mentoring’ and ‘apprenticeships’. This may open a ‘visible career pathway for professional services staff’ and ‘also form part of succession planning within a team, department or Directorate or School where team members showing potential can be nurtured and developed’.

Traditional universities tend to adopt the terminology of ‘Professional Services’. Durham University, one of the oldest, details its ‘Professional Services’ in information for its students, telling them that they will ‘have access to an extensive, helpful support network’. It lists eleven categories, with ‘health and safety’ specifically stated to provide ‘professional’ advice. York University, one of the group of universities founded during the 1960s, also lists Professional Services. These are ‘overseen by the Chief Financial and Operating Officer’ and variously serving Technology; Estates and Facilities; Human Resources; Research and Enterprise; Planning and Risk; External Relations; student needs etc. The post-1992 Oxford Brookes University also has its Professional Services divided into a number of sections of the University’s work such as ‘academic, research and estates’. Of the alternative providers which have gained ‘university title’ Edge Hill (2006) lists seven ‘administrative staff’, two ‘part-time’, one described as administration ‘co-ordinator’, one as a ‘manager’ and one as a ‘leader’.

Reeds’ study draws on the experience of those working in a wide range of providers, but it does not include an account of the provision developed by  Oxford or Cambridge. Yet the two ancient English Universities have their own centuries-long histories of creating and multiplying administrative roles. The Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge similarly distinguish their ‘academic’ from their other staff. For example St John’s College, Oxford and Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge list more than a dozen ‘departments’, each with its own  body of non-academic staff.

In Oxford the distinction between academics and ‘professional’ administrators is somewhat blurred by grading administrators alongside academics at the same levels. Oxford’s Registrar now acts ‘as principal adviser on strategic policy to the Vice-Chancellor and to Council’, and to ‘ensure effective co-ordination of advice from other officers to the Vice-Chancellor, Council, and other university bodies’ (Statute IX, 30-32). Cambridge’s Registrary is ‘to act as the principal administrative officer of the University, and as the head of the University’s administrative staff’ and ‘keep a record of the proceedings of the University, and to attend for that purpose’ all ‘public proceedings of the University’, acting ‘as Secretary to the Council.’

The record-keeping responsibility continues, including ‘maintaining a register of members of the University’, and ‘keeping records of matriculations and class-lists, and of degrees, diplomas, and other qualifications’. The Registrary must also edit the Statutes and Ordinances and the Cambridge University Reporter (Statute C, VI). The multiplication of the Registrary’s tasks now requires a body offering ‘professional’ services. ‘There shall be under the direction of the Council administrative officers in categories determined by Special Ordinance’ (Statute c, VI).

Oxford and Cambridge each created a ‘UAS’ in the 1990s. Both are now engaged in ‘Reimagining Professional Services’. Oxford’s UAS (‘University Administration and Services’, also known as ‘Professional Services and University Administration’) is divided into sections, most of them headed by the Registrar. These are variously called ‘departments’, ‘directorates’, ‘divisions’, ‘services’ and ‘offices’ and may have sub-sections of their own. For example ‘People’  includes Childcare; Equality and Diversity; Occupational Health; Safety; ‘Organisational Development’; ‘Wellbeing’ and ‘international Development’, each with its own group of postholders. This means that between the academic and ‘the traditional student support-based professional services’ now fall a variety of other tasks some leading to other professional qualifications, for example from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, the Chartered Management Institute or in librarianship and technology.

Cambridge’s UAS (Unified Administrative Service), headed by its Registrary and now similarly extensive and wide-ranging, had a controversial beginning. Its UAS was set up in 1996 bringing together the Financial Board, the General Board, and the Registry. Its intended status and that of its proposed members proved controversial. Although it was described as ‘professional’, the remarks made when it was proposed in a Report included the expression of concerns that this threatened the certainty that the University was ‘academic led’. This prompted a stock-taking Notice published on 20 June 2001 to provide assurance that ‘the management of the University’s activities, which is already largely in the hands of academic staff, must also continue to be academic-led’ and that the ‘role of the administration is to support, not to manage, the delivery of high-quality teaching and research’.  But it was urged that the UAS needed ‘further development both in terms of resourcing and of organization’. The opportunity was taken to emphasise the ‘professionalism’ of the service.

With the expansion of Professional Services has gone a shift from an assumption that this forms a ‘Civil Service’ role to its definition as ‘administrative’ or ‘managerial’. ‘Serving’ of the academic community may now allow a degree of control. Reeds suggests that ‘management’ is a ‘role’ while ‘leadership’ is a ‘concept’, leaving for further consideration whether those in Professional Services should exercise the institutional leadership which is now offered for approval.

In Cambridge the Council has been discussing ways in which, and with whom, this might be taken forward. On 3 June 2024 its Minutes show that it ‘discussed the idea of an academic leaders’ programme to help with succession planning by building a strong pool of candidates for leadership positions within the University’. It continued the discussion at its July meeting and agreed a plan which was published in a Notice in the Reporter on 31 July:

to create up to six new paid part-time fellowships each year for emerging academic leaders at the University, sponsored by the Vice-Chancellor. Each fellow would be supported by a PVC or Head of School (as appropriate) and would be responsible for delivering agreed objectives, which could be in the form of project(s).

‘In addition to financial remuneration’, the Fellows would each receive professional coaching, including attendance on the Senior Leadership Programme Level 3. Unresolved challenge has delayed the implementation of this plan so far.

The well-documented evolution and current review of Professional Services in Oxford and Cambridge is not included, but the story of Professional Services told in this well-written and useful book is illustrated with quotations from individuals working in professional services.

SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.


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Open universities: between radical promise and market reality

by Ourania Filippakou

Open universities have long symbolised a radical departure from the exclusivity of conventional universities. Conceived as institutions of access, intellectual emancipation, and social transformation, they promised to disrupt rigid academic hierarchies and democratise knowledge. Yet, as higher education is increasingly reshaped by market logics, can open universities still claim to be engines of social progress, or have they become institutions that now reproduce the very inequalities they sought to dismantle?

This question is not merely academic; it is profoundly political. Across the globe, democratic institutions are under siege, and the erosion of democracy is no longer an abstraction – it is unfolding in real time (cf EIU, 2024; Jones, 2025). The rise of far-right ideologies, resurgent racism, intensified attacks on women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, and the erosion of protections for migrants and marginalised communities all point to a crisis of democracy that cannot be separated from the crisis of education (Giroux, 2025). As Giroux (1984) argues, education is never neutral; it can operate as both a potential site for fostering critical consciousness and resistance and a mechanism for reproducing systems of social control and domination. Similarly, Butler (2005) reminds us that the very categories of who counts as human, who is deemed grievable, and whose knowledge is legitimised are deeply political struggles.

Open universities, once heralded as radical interventions in knowledge production, now find themselves entangled in these struggles. Increasingly, they are forced to reconcile their egalitarian aspirations with the ruthless pressures of neoliberalism and market-driven reforms. The challenge they face is no less than existential: to what extent can they uphold their role as spaces of intellectual and social transformation, or will they become further absorbed into the logics of commodification and control?

My article (Filippakou, 2025) in Policy Reviews in Higher Education, ‘Two ideologies of openness: a comparative analysis of the Open Universities in the UK and Greece’, foregrounds a crucial but often overlooked dimension: the ideological battles that have shaped open universities over time. The UK Open University (OU) and the Hellenic Open University (HOU) exemplify two distinct yet converging trajectories. The UK OU, founded in the 1960s as part of a broader post-war commitment to social mobility, was a political project – an experiment in making university education available to those long excluded from elite institutions. The HOU, by contrast, emerged in the late 1990s within the European Union’s push for a knowledge economy, where lifelong learning was increasingly framed primarily in terms of workforce development. While both institutions embraced ‘openness’ as a defining principle, the meaning of that openness has shifted – from an egalitarian vision of education as a public good to a model struggling to reconcile social inclusion with neoliberal imperatives.

A key insight of this analysis is that open universities do not merely widen participation; they reflect deeper contestations over the purpose of higher education itself. The UK OU’s early success inspired similar models worldwide, but today, relentless marketisation – rising tuition fees, budget cuts, and the growing encroachment of corporate interests – threatens to erode its founding ethos.

Meanwhile, the HOU was shaped by a European policy landscape that framed openness not merely as intellectual emancipation but as economic necessity. Both cases illustrate the paradox of open universities: they continue to expand access, yet their structural constraints increasingly align them with the logic of precarity, credentialism, and market-driven efficiency.

This struggle over education is central to the survival of democracy. Arendt (1961, 2005) warned that democracy is not self-sustaining; it depends on an informed citizenry capable of judgment, debate, and resistance. Higher education, in this sense, is not simply about skills or employability – it is about cultivating the capacity to think critically, to challenge authority, and to hold power to account (Giroux, 2019). Open universities were once at the forefront of this democratic mission. But as universities in general, and open universities in particular, become increasingly instrumentalised – shaped by political forces intent on suppressing dissent, commodifying learning, and hollowing out universities’ transformative potential – their role in sustaining democratic publics is under threat.

The real question, then, is not simply whether open universities remain ‘open’ but how they define and enact this openness. To what extent do they serve as institutions of intellectual and civic transformation, or have they primarily been reduced to flexible degree factories, catering to market demands under the guise of accessibility? By comparing the UK and Greek experiences, this article aims to challenge readers to rethink the ideological stakes of openness in higher education today. The implications extend far beyond open universities themselves. The broader appeal of this analysis lies in its relevance to anyone interested in universities as sites of social change. Open universities are not just alternatives to conventional universities – they represent larger struggles over knowledge, democracy, and economic power. The creeping normalisation of authoritarian politics, the suppression of academic freedom, and the assault on marginalised voices in public discourse demand that we reclaim higher education as a site of resistance.

Can open universities reclaim their radical promise? If higher education is to resist the encroachment of neoliberalism and reactionary politics, we must actively defend institutions that prioritise intellectual freedom, civic literacy, and higher education for the public good. The future of open universities – and higher education itself – depends not only on institutional policies but on whether scholars, educators, and students collectively resist these forces. The battle for openness is not just about access; it is about the kind of society we choose to build – for ourselves and the generations to come.

Ourania Filippakou is a Professor of Education at Brunel University of London. Her research interrogates the politics of higher education, examining universities as contested spaces where power, inequality, and resistance intersect. Rooted in critical traditions, she explores how higher education can foster social justice, equity, and transformative change.