UK higher education is pulled between its lofty ambitions for transformative learning and the managerialism that sometimes constrains their realisation. This tension defines the contemporary Higher Education workplace, where the mantras of “more with less” and “highly regulated freedom” collide with the desire for rich, personalised student experiences amidst fiscal belt-tightening, quantification, and standardisation. Bubbling through the cracks in any long-term political or economic vision for the sector is a professional identity steeped in ambivalence of purpose and position, one whose contradictions are nowhere rendered more vividly than in England’s higher and degree apprenticeships (HDAs). Conceived to braid university learning with workplace productivity, HDAs promise the best of both worlds yet must be delivered within one of the most prescriptive funding and inspection regimes in UK higher education. This provision also sits amidst a precarious and volatile political landscape, with continuous changes to funding rules, age limits and eligibility of different levels of study, and ‘fit’ within a still poorly defined skills and lifelong learning landscape.
At the heart of this ongoing policy experiment stands an until-recently invisible workforce: Higher Education Tripartite Practitioners (HETP). These quiet actors emerged as a series of pragmatic institution level responses to the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA, now subsumed into the Department of Education) related to progress reviews involving the provider, apprentice, and employer. Yet, as we argued in our paper at the SRHE International Conference in December last year, they have evolved into nuanced, often misunderstood boundary-spanners who simultaneously inhabit academia, industry, and compliance. Part coach, part conduit, part compliance specialist, they facilitate developmental conversations, broker cultural differences, and ensure every clause of the ESFA rulebook is honoured. The quality of this brokerage is decisive; without it even the most carefully designed apprenticeship fractures under audit pressure.
Consider the core activities of HETPs. Much of their time is spent in close personal engagement with apprentices – fostering professional growth, guiding reflective practice, and offering pastoral support traditionally associated with mentoring. They encourage apprentices to think holistically, integrate theory with workplace reality, and map long-term career aspirations. Almost simultaneously, they must document progress reviews, monitor the evidence of every single hour of learning, and tick every regulatory box along a journey from initial skills analysis through to end point assessment.
This duality produces a daily oscillation between inspiring conversations and tedious paperwork. The tension is palpable and exhausting, revealing a deeper struggle between two visions of education: one expansive, transformative, and relational; the other restrictive, measurable, and dominated by compliance. Fuller and Unwin’s expansive–restrictive continuum maps neatly onto this predicament, underscoring how universities are urged by policymakers to deliver high-skilled graduates for economic growth while simultaneously squeezed by intensifying regulation and managerial oversight.
Little wonder, then, that HETPs describe their roles with the language of complexity, ambiguity, and invisibility. They are neither purely academic nor purely administrative. Instead, they occupy a liminal institutional space, mediating competing demands from employers, regulators, apprentices, and colleagues. Esmond captures the resulting “subaltern” status of these practitioners, whose contributions remain undervalued even as they shoulder the brunt of institutional attempts to innovate without overhauling legacy systems.
Their experiences lay bare the contradictions of contemporary university innovation. Institutions routinely trumpet responsiveness to labour-market need yet bolt new programmes onto structures optimised for conventional classroom delivery, leaving HETPs to reconcile expansive educational ideals with restrictive managerial realities. The role becomes a flashpoint: universities ask boundary-spanners to maintain quality, build relationships, and inspire learners within systems designed for something else entirely.
Yet amidst these tensions lies opportunity. The very ambiguity of the HETP role highlights the limits of existing support systems and points towards new professional identities and career pathways. Formal recognition of boundary-spanning expertise – relationship-building, negotiation, adaptability – would allow practitioners to progress without abandoning what makes their contribution distinctive. Communities of practice could break the apprenticeship echo-chamber and enrich the wider HE ecosystem, while institutional investment in bespoke professional development would equip practitioners to navigate the inherent tensions of their work.
Senior leadership must also acknowledge the strategic value of these hidden roles, reframing them not as incidental administrative burdens but as essential catalysts for integrated educational practice. Making such roles visible and valued would help universities reconcile expansive aspirations with regulatory realities and signal genuine commitment to reshaping education for contemporary challenges.
Policymakers and regulators, too, have lessons to learn. While accountability has its place, overly rigid compliance frameworks risk stifling innovation. Trust-based, proportionate regulation – emphasising quality, transparency, and developmental outcomes – would free practitioners to focus on learning rather than bureaucratic survival. The current neo-liberal distrust that imagines only regulation can safeguard public value inflates compliance costs and undermines the very economic ambitions it seeks to serve.
Ultimately, the emergence of HETPs challenges HE institutions to decide how serious they are about bridging academic learning and workplace practice. Recognising and empowering these quiet brokers would signal a genuine commitment to integrated, expansive education – an education capable of meeting economic demands without losing sight of deeper human and intellectual aspirations. HETPs are far more than practitioners managing checklists; they are a critical juncture at which universities must choose either to treat boundary-spanning labour as a stop-gap or to embrace the complexity and potential it represents.
Dr Phil Power-Mason is Head of Department for Strategic Management at Hertfordshire Business School, University of Hertfordshire, where he leads a diverse portfolio spanning executive education, apprenticeships and professional doctorates. A practice-focussed academic with a passion for innovative workforce development, Phil has overseen significant growth in the school’s business apprenticeships, MBA, and generalist provision, while nurturing cross-sector partnerships and embedding work-aligned learning at every level. With a research background in educational governance and strategy, he is a Senior Fellow of Advance HE and co-convenor of national apprenticeship knowledge networks. Phil’s research and sector leadership focus on emerging pedagogic and HE workforce practices, driving collaborative solutions that meet employer, learner and university needs. An invited speaker at national forums and a frequent contributor to sector conferences and publications, he remains committed to transforming vocational and work-ready learning practice for the future. (herts.ac.uk)
Dr Helen Charlton is Associate Professor of Work Aligned Learning and Head of Executive Education at Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, where she leads the school’s business apprenticeships, executive CPD and distance-learning programmes. After almost a decade steering apprenticeship design and compliance, she stays keenly attuned to each fresh regulatory tweak – and the learning opportunities it provides. A former senior HR manager in the arts and not-for-profit sectors, Helen holds a Doctorate in Education and an MSc in Human Resource Management, is a Senior Fellow of Advance HE, a Chartered MCIPD, and a Chartered Manager and Fellow of the CMI. Her research examines how learners, employers and universities negotiate the tripartite realities of degree apprenticeships. (northumbria.ac.uk)
US higher education is exposed both to presidential and to state interference. Government powers to intervene in US HE reside in presidential control of federal funding, which may come with conditions. Trump cannot simply shut down the Department of Education by executive order but it seems he can direct that the Department’s grant- and loan-giving functions are taken on by another government department.
A letter to Harvard dated 11 April signed on behalf of the Department of Education and other federal agencies asserted that the United States had ‘invested in Harvard University’s operations’ because of ‘the value to the country’ of its work, but warned that ‘an investment is not an entitlement.’ This letter, if accepted, was to constitute ‘an agreement in principle’. Governance was to be ‘exclusively’ in the hands of those ‘tenured professors’ and ‘senior leadership’ who were ‘committed to the ‘changes indicated in this letter’. Its ‘hiring and related data’ and its student ‘admissions data’ were to be ‘shared with the federal Government’. International students ‘hostile to American values’ were not to be admitted and those already admitted were to be reported to federal authorities. Policies on diversity, equity and inclusion were to end and student protest restricted.
Harvard and other Ivy League Universities were indignant. Harvard in particular rode the headlines for some days, objecting to the Government demand that it immediately agree:
to implement the Trump administration’s demands to overhaul the University’s governance and leadership, academic programs, admissions system, hiring process, and discipline system—with the promise of more demands to come
and thus ‘overtly seek to impose on Harvard University political views and policy preferences advanced by the Trump administration and commit the University to punishing disfavored speech’. There were reports that US academics were seeking to escape to employment in Canada, the UK or Europe.
American institutions of higher learning have in common the essential freedom to determine, on academic grounds, whom to admit and what is taught, how, and by whom
and that such ‘American institutions of higher learning’ were ‘essential to American prosperity’.
It stressed a ‘longstanding collaboration between universities such as Harvard and the federal government dating back to the Second World War’. It pointed to Harvard’s success in using federal funding to achieving significant research outcomes. The recent ‘broad attack of Government’ on ‘universities across America’, not only on Harvard and the other Ivy League Universities listed, had affected the ‘critical funding partnerships’ that made this invaluable research possible.
This case was being brought because, it was argued, the Government had been using ‘the withholding of federal funding as leverage to gain control of academic decision making at Harvard’. Harvard cited the Government’s letter of 11 April as demanding governance reform and a ‘third-party’ audit ‘of the viewpoints of Harvard’s student body, faculty, and staff’, followed by the hiring of new Faculty and admission of students whose views were satisfactory to the Government. It had asserted that teaching should be ‘to the Government’s satisfaction as determined in the Government’s sole discretion’ and to that end Harvard should ‘terminate or reform its academic “programs” to the Government’s liking’. The Government had since ‘launched multiple investigations and other actions against Harvard’.
The Government had ‘within hours of the Freeze Order ‘ended ‘$2.2 billion in multiyear grants and $60M in multiyear contract value to Harvard University’ and Harvard began receiving ‘stop work orders’. In order to bring a case against the Government it was essential for Harvard to establish that the Government’s action constituted a breach of public law. To that end it stated that the ‘Court has jurisdiction over Harvard’s claims’ because the University did not ‘seek money damages or an order mandating specific performance of any contract’, but:
an order declaring unlawful and setting aside sweeping agency action taken in violation of Harvard’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and its rights guaranteed by statute and regulation.
Harvard stressed that even though it is a private university its research is federally funded ‘through a grant process administered by federal agencies’. It cited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which requires ‘a detailed and mandatory statutory framework’ of procedures to be followed. Harvard had its own procedures, added to or created in August, September and November 2024. Specifically in March 2025, Harvard released updated “Frequently Asked Questions” clarifying that both Jewish and Israeli identities are covered by the University’s Non-Discrimination Policy.
Harvard explained that it had attempted ‘collaboration’ in the weeks following the government letter and the Federal Task Force’s press release announcing campus visits. It had sought to arrange a meeting on the campus and that was scheduled for late April 2025, yet on April 20 it was reported that the ‘Trump administration has grown so furious with Harvard University’ that ‘it is planning to pull an additional $1 billion of the school’s funding for health research.’
Trump’s threatened sanctions concerned the future of Harvard’s funding. Harvard has endowments of c$53 billion so any threat from Trump to reduce federal funding posed a limited risk to its future. However he made a further proposal on 18 April to remove Harvard’s exemption from Government tax on its income, which could have hit its normal operation harder.
The US counterpart to HMRC is its Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS may grant tax-exempt status to a charitable, religious, scientific or literary organization, on condition that it refrains from campaigning or seeking to modify legislation. However, the President is not permitted to direct the IRS to conduct an investigation or audit. To that extent the counterbalancing of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the US seems to be holding.
Harvard was making its challenge at a time when the balance between the executive and the judiciary in the US had come into question in a number of cases where Trump’s executive orders sought to override the courts. It claimed that ‘the Freeze Order is part of a broader effort by the Government to punish Harvard for protecting its constitutional rights. … multiple news outlets have reported that the Internal Revenue Service is considering revoking its recognition of Harvard’s tax exempt status’. Representing 86 universities, the Presidents’ Alliance has filed an Amicus brief supporting the litigation.
Harvard sought in its litigation to have the Freeze Order declared unconstitutional and also the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ sought to be imposed in the April 3 and April 11 and any action taken under it so far, also banning any future orders in the same vein. It pleaded six Counts, first a violation of the First Amendment in that the letters had targeted the ‘academic content that Harvard professors “teach students”’. Count 2 was that ‘even if the prerequisites of review under the Administrative Procedure Act were not satisfied, federal courts have the “equitable power” to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers.”’ Count 3 was that Title VI does not permit wholesale freezing of a recipient’s federal financial assistance. Instead, it requires that a “refusal to grant or to continue assistance” be “limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been so found.” Count 4 was the Government’s failure to ‘comply with their own regulations before freezing Harvard’s federal financial assistance’. Count 5 alleged that the action had been arbitrary and capricious and Count 6 that it had been ultra vires.
At Indiana University a professor of Germanic studies was recently investigated under a state law after a student accused him of speech in support of Palestine.
Could this happen in the UK?
English higher education providers have their autonomy protected by the Higher Education and Research Act (2017)s.2 [HERA]. This legislation created the Office for Students, a non-departmental public body, whose nearest US counterpart is the Higher Learning Commission, an independent agency founded in 1895 which accredits higher education institutions. The University of Michigan, for example seeks, renewal of its accreditation from the Higher Learning Commission every ten years.
The Office for Students is both regulator and funder, and distributes Government funding to higher education providers. This may take into account ‘particular policy areas and government priorities. Yet HERA outlaws any attempt by the OfS to impose the restrictions Trump sought to impose on the universities of the USA. English higher education providers must be free:
(i) to determine the content of particular courses and the manner in which they are taught, supervised and assessed,
(ii) to determine the criteria for the selection, appointment and dismissal of academic staff and apply those criteria in particular cases, and
(iii) to determine the criteria for the admission of students and apply those criteria in particular cases.
Academic staff in England also enjoy ‘freedom within the law’:
(i) to question and test received wisdom, and
(ii) to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions,
without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at the providers.
There is some Government oversight. In protecting ‘the institutional autonomy of English higher e providers’, the Office for Students is subject to the ‘guidance’ of the Secretary of State, though Government requirements are held off by the legislative fencing. The guidance of a higher education provider by the Office for Students:
must not relate to—
(a) particular parts of courses of study,
(b) the content of such courses,
(c) the manner in which they are taught, supervised or assessed,
(d) the criteria for the selection, appointment or dismissal of academic staff, or how they are applied, or
(e) the criteria for the admission of students, or how they are applied.
The legislation adds that:
guidance framed by reference to a particular course of study must not guide the OfS to perform a function in a way which prohibits or requires the provision of a particular course of study.
This seems to place universities safely out of reach of the kind of restrictions Trump sought to impose on Harvard and other Ivy League Universities, but the Office for Students is potentially able not only to set its Government funding levels but also affect its students’ access to loans from the Student Loans Company. That can certainly be at risk, for example in the case of the Oxford Business College, whose funding (via franchise arrangements) was blocked in April 2025 when it was found to have abused the student loan system by admitting unqualified students.(US accreditors do hold a lot of power, because universities must be accredited by a federally recognized agency in order to access federal student aid.)
Access to Government funding through the OfS requires listing by the Office for Students on its Register as an approved provider. The Office for Students did not impose its Conditions of Registration on pre-existing universities before including them in 2018 on its first Register under HERA. It simply treated them as proven acceptable providers of higher education. Each university duly publishes an account of its compliance (eg at Oxford) with the requirements which enable it to remain on the Office for Students Register. What might happen if they were found not to have done so? Short of removal from its Register the OfS has been known to impose fines, notably of more than £500,000 in the recent case of the University of Sussex when it was alleged to have failed to follow its own procedures designed to protect academic freedom.
Government oversight of the work of HE providers may overlap with or sit uneasily beside forms of ‘accreditation’ and ’qualification’. The accreditation of qualifications in the UK may be the responsibility of a number of ‘agencies’ external to HE providers, some of which are bodies offering professional qualifications. For example the Solicitors Regulation Authority keeps its own register of qualified solicitors. A university degree may not constitute a ‘qualification’ without the completion of further recognised study, some of which may be provided by the university itself, for example the Postgraduate Certificate in Education.
An area of ‘accreditation’ undergoing significant reform and expansion in the UK covers ‘skills’, including apprenticeships. Not all universities offer their own apprenticeships, though they may recognise some of those available from other providers at Levels 4 and 5. Nevertheless ‘skills’ are potentially at risk of Government intervention. At the beginning of March 2025, the House of Lords was debating whether ‘skills’ might benefit from the establishment of a ‘new executive agency’.
It was recognised that there would need to be a report from the Secretary of State ‘containing draft proposals’ for an agency, ‘to be known as “Skills England”. Ian Sollom MPobjected that that that would represent ‘a significant centralising of power in the hands of the Secretary of State, without providing proper mechanisms for parliamentary oversight or accountability.’ A ‘statutory, departmental body would have more clout’, he argued.
It looks as though some universities, at least, are safe from any initiative to interfere from above with the right to self-government and to determine what to teach and research. Harvard records a ‘revenue base’ of $65billion, with ‘federal funding ‘ as its largest source of support for research. The research income of Oxford, for example, is £778m, with commercial research income of £148m. That cannot compare with Harvard, but at least Oxford and some others will remain free to choose how to use that income for its academic purposes.
This is a modified version of an article first published by the Oxford Magazine No 477 in May 2025, republished with the permission of the editor and author.
SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.
The Office for Students has found that the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement of the University of Sussex involves breach of two of the relevant OfS Regulatory Requirements in late March 2025, and imposed an unprecedentedly substantial fine. The first of those criticised (OfS Condition E1) concerns the duty to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom:
The provider’s governing documents must uphold the public interest governance principles that are applicable to the provider.
A further OfS Condition (E2) requires that ‘the provider must have in place adequate and effective management and governance arrangements’ so as to ‘operate in accordance with its governing documents’.
On 9 April 2025 the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sussex published a fierce criticism of the unprecedented decision of Office for Students that it had failed to comply with one of its own ‘policies’. The Vice-Chancellor considered that the policy in question was:
a really small statement, of which we have many dozens, if not hundreds, of similar policies and statements. Whereas the governing documents of the university are its charter and statutes and regulations.
There was press coverage about the ensuing uncertainty. UniversitiesUK, as the ‘collective voice’ of universities promised to write to the OfS to ask for clarity as its decision appears to find that it is a ‘failure to uphold freedom of speech and academic freedom’ if a university has ‘policies’ to prevent ‘abusive, bullying and harassing’ material or speech.
The University has notified the OfS of its intention to apply for judicial review. Among the grounds Sussex relies on is that the Office for Students did not have powers to treat ‘documents that are not a provider’s “governing documents”’ as creating the public interest governance condition necessary to permit the OfS to seek judicial review. The OfS defines ‘governing documents’ somewhat inadequately as ‘set out in’ its ‘Regulatory Framework’, where ‘the provider’s governing documents must uphold the public interest governance principles that are applicable to the provider. In this case it held:
that the University of Sussex breached ongoing condition of registration E2 because it failed to have adequate and effective management and governance arrangements in place to ensure that it operates in accordance with its governing documents.
The definition of ‘governing documents’ is therefore of the first importance if a precedent is to be set by this OfS decision. The Higher Education and Research Act (2017) s.3(8)(a) protects the autonomy of higher education providers, defining it as ‘the freedom of English higher education providers within the law to conduct their day to day management in an effective and competent way’. Sussex was created among the batch of new universities of the 1960s.
The Act created a new Regulator, the Office for Students, stating that the Regulator ‘must have regard to’ the ‘need to protect the institutional autonomy of English higher education providers’. This requires a fine balance if the OfS is to avoid intrusion upon a provider’s autonomy.
The institutional autonomy of higher education providers gives them control of the drafting of their internal legislation. External authorities may insist on particular points in certain cases. For example medical qualifications set by a provider cannot constitute a qualification to be a doctor unless they are recognised by the General Medical Council. But the right to create its own rules (within the law) largely lies with the provider, who may design them and order them in its own preferred hierarchy. The Office for Students may not interfere.
Nevertheless the creation of ‘governing documents’ must carry certain implications about the source of the internal or external authority to create, review or amend them. It is suggested that ‘Sussex contends that these are matters for our old friend the Visitor, a traditional legal role in UK university governance, who in Sussex’s case is the actual King’, and:
cites longstanding legal authority confirming that the Visitor has exclusive jurisdiction over internal governance questions, including interpretation and application of the university’s own rules, and says that unless Parliament clearly removes or overrides that jurisdiction, external bodies like OfS can’t interfere.
Where the Monarch is not the Visitor it is normally a Bishop.
However a Visitor is not essential to the law-making of a higher education provider. ‘Alternative providers’ may not have Visitors. As eleemosynary bodies their Colleges normally have Visitors of their own but neither Oxford nor Cambridge has a Visitor. Under the Oxford and Cambridge Universities Act of 2023, both Universities create their own Statutes. In Oxford’s case those which are King-in-Council Statutes require the consent of the Privy Council on behalf of the King. In Cambridge all its Statutes require that consent to their creation or modification. Their subordinate legislation, most Regulations in Oxford (some of Oxford’s Regulations may be created by its Council) and Special Ordinances and Ordinances in Cambridge, simply require the consent of their governing bodies, Oxford’s Congregation of over 5000 and Cambridge’s Regent House of over 7000 members.
The rules at the top of a provider’s hierarchies may constitute governing documents but it is far from clear how far down that status applies. For purposes of management ‘procedural or process documents’ explain the required ways of doing things and the processes which must be followed’. Among these are Codes of Practice and ‘Guidance documents’. This seems to be where the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement fits, as approved by the Executive Group in 2018, 2022, 2023 and 2024 and placed under the heading of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion(revised in 2022, 2023 and 2024). Is it a governing document in this lowly position?
Also found relevant by the Office for Students in the Sussex case was the exercise of powers of delegation. It identified ‘a pattern of decisions taken at the university to adopt and/or revise policies without proper delegated authority’, both that its:
Prevent Steering Group approved and adopted the 2021 version of the University’s Freedom of Speech Code of Practice despite not having delegated authority to do so
and also that ‘the 2023 version of the External Speakers Procedure was approved by the University Executive Group, despite that group not having delegated authority to do so’.
Like similar universities Sussex has an Executive Team composed of a Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellors, their deputies, Deans of Schools and Faculties, with senior academic-related staff headed by a University Secretary, a Financial Officer and various Directors. These are not directly responsible for framing its legislation but may have authority to apply it, though not necessarily powers to delegate its application.
The Office for Students could turn to the University’s rules about delegation in framing its criticism. Sussex has given thought to that. Sussex’s Council approved a Scheme of Delegation in March 2018. ‘Responsibility’ may be delegated by the Council except for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor and President; ‘the variation, amendment or revocation of the Charter or Statutes’; and responsibility for approving the University’s annual audited accounts or the appointment of Auditors. The Scheme of Delegation clarifies where roles and responsibilities are allocated between Council and its Committees, among Committees, and between Council and Senate. The ‘Executive’ and a University Executive Group are described as exercising ‘leadership’ and there is also a University Leadership Team, though ‘leadership’ is undefined.
Sussex has also given thought to overall responsibilities for supervision of the exercise of its internal rules. It has chosen to describe them collectively as ‘policies’. It isrecognised to be ‘important that a clear and consistent approach is taken to drafting and updating policies across the institution’ details the requirements for the creation, approval, review, and updating of policies. However it clarifies the difference between policies and other associated documents, sets out responsibilities relating to policies, and details the requirements for the creation, approval, review, and updating of policies. An overarching Policy on Policies has been agreed by the ‘University Executive Team and Council’. This consists in a Policy on the Creation and Management of University Policies (‘Policy Framework’).
The aim of the University’s Policy Framework is to make clear what a policy is and what policies should be used for, to differentiate between policies and other types of documents (e.g. procedural documents, codes of practice, etc), and to outline the process that should be followed when drafting, reviewing, and updating policies. An outline of where responsibilities lie in relation to policies is also included.
This suggests that if pressed Sussex might take all these to constitute its ‘governing documents’, while recognising distinctions among them.
Nevertheless Sussex distinguishes governance and management. ‘A policy is a high-level statement of principles, requirements or behaviours that apply broadly across the University’ and ‘reflects institutional values’, thus supporting ‘the delivery of the University’s strategy’. It reflects ‘legal and regulatory obligations, sector standards, or high-level operational requirements’. These create obligations.
Among them Sussex lists ‘Regulations’, which must be made ‘pursuant to the Charter’. These contain detailed rules governing a wide variety of actions of, or on behalf of, the University falling under governance but extending into management: staffing procedures, student disciplinary and appeals procedures, the Students’ Union, the composition of Council and Senate, titles of degrees and Schools, roles of Heads of Schools, lists of collaborative institutions, academic titles and dress, the various degree courses awarded by the University, and general University regulations (library, ICT, administrative). These Regulations are updated annually and approved by Council and/or Senate. Next come written ‘Resolutions’ which Council members may choose to approve or not, ‘in accordance with procedures set out in the Regulations’, though amendments to the Charter and the Statutes and certain Regulations require ‘a three-fourths majority’.
For purposes of management ‘procedural or process documents’ going beyond these categories explain the required ways of doing things at Sussex and ‘the processes which must be followed’. Among these are Codes of Practice and ‘Guidance documents’. This seems to be where the Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement fits, as approved by the Executive Group in 2018, revised in 2022, 2023 and 2024. placed under the heading of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion. Are they still among ‘governing documents’ with a constitutional role in the University’s governance? An application for a judicial review will take a considerable time to produce a recommendation even if it supports Sussex’s argument
SRHE member GR Evans is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Theology and Intellectual History in the University of Cambridge.
by Hans de Wit, Tessa DeLaquil, Ellen Hazelkorn and Hamish Coates
Hans de Wit, Ellen Hazelkorn and Hamish Coates are editors and Tessa DeLaquil is associate editor of Policy Reviews in Higher Education. This blog is based on their editorial for issue 1, 2025.
Transnational education (TNE), also referred to as crossborder education, is growing and morphing in all kinds of interesting ways which, while exciting for innovators, surface important policy, regulatory, quality and ethical concerns. It is therefore vital that these developments do not slip around or through policy gaps. This is especially true for on-line TNE which is less visible than traditional campus-based higher education. Thus, it is vital that governments take the necessary actions to regulate and quality assure such education and training expansion and to inform the sector and broader public. Correspondingly, there is a pressing need for more policy research into the massive transformations shaking global higher education.
TNE and its online variants have been part of international higher education for a few decades. As Coates, Xie, and Hong (2020) foreshadowed, it has seen a rapid increase after the Covid-19 pandemic. In recent years, TNE operations have grown and diversified substantially. Wilkins and Huisman (2025) identify eleven types of TNE providers and propose the following definition to help handle this diversity: ‘Transnational education is a form of education that borrows or transfers elements of one country’s higher education, as well as that country’s culture and values, to another country.’
International collaboration and networking have never been more important than at this time of geopolitical and geoeconomic disruption and a decline in multilateral mechanisms. But TNE’s expansion is matched by growing risks.
International student mobility at risk
International degree student mobility (when students pursue a bachelor, master and/or doctoral degree abroad) continues to be dominant, with over six million students studying abroad, double the number of 10 years ago. It is anticipated that this number will further increase in the coming decade to over 8 million, but its growth is decreasing, and its geographical path from the ‘global south’ to the ‘global north’ is shifting towards a more diverse direction. Geopolitical and nationalist forces as well as concerns about adequate academic services (accommodation in particular) in high-income countries in the global north are recent factors in the slowing down of the growth in student mobility to Australia, North America and Europe, the leading destinations. The increased availability and quality of higher education, primarily at the undergraduate level, in middle-income countries in Asia, Latin America and parts of the Middle East, also shape the decrease in student mobility towards the global north.
Several ‘sending countries’, for instance, China, South Korea and Turkey, are also becoming receiving countries. Countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine (until the Russian invasion), Egypt and some of the Caribbean countries have also become study destinations for students from neighbouring low-income countries. These countries provide them with higher education and other forms of postsecondary education sometimes in their public sector but mostly in private institutions and by foreign providers.
An alternative TNE model?
Given the increased competition for international students and the resulting risks of falling numbers and related financial security for universities, TNE has emerged as an alternative source of revenue. According to Ilieva and Tsiligiris (2023), United Kingdom TNE topped more than 530,000 students in 2021. In the same year, its higher education institutions attracted approximately 680,000 international students. It is likely that TNE will surpass inward student mobility.
As the United Kingdom case makes clear, TNE originally was primarily a ‘north-south’ phenomenon, in which universities from high-income and mostly Anglophone countries, offered degree programmes through branch campuses, franchise operations and articulation programmes. Asia was the recipient region of most TNE arrangements, followed by the Middle East. As in student mobility, TNE is more diverse globally both in provision and in reception.
The big trend in TNE is the shift to online education with limited in-person teaching. A (2024) report of Studyportals found over 15,000 English-taught online programmes globally. And although 92 per cent of these programmes are supplied by the four big Anglophone countries – the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia – the number of programmes offered outside those four doubled since 2019 from 623–1212, primarily in Business and Management, Computer Sciences and IT.
Private higher education institutions
This global growth in online delivery of education goes hand in hand with the growth in various forms of private higher education. Over 50% of the institutions of higher education and over one-third of global enrolment are in private institutions, many of which are commercial in nature. Private higher education has become the dominant growth area in higher education, as a result of the lack of funding for public higher education as well as traditional HE’s sluggish response to diverse learner needs. Although most private higher education, in particular for-profit, is taking place in the global south, it is also present in high-income countries, and one can see a rise in private higher education recently in Western Europe, for instance, Germany and France.
TNE is often a commercial activity. It is increasingly a way for public universities to support international and other operations as public funding wanes. Most for-profit private higher education targets particular fields and education services and tends to be more online than in person. There is an array of ownership and institutional structures, involving a range of players.
Establishing regulations and standards
TNE, especially online TNE, is likely to become the major form of international delivery of education for local and international students especially where growing demand cannot be met domestically. Growth is also increasingly motivated by an institution’s or country’s financial challenges or strategic priorities – situations that are likely to intensify. This shift could help overcome some of the inequities associated with mobility and address concerns associated with climate change but online TNE is significantly more difficult to regulate.
A concerning feature of the global TNE market is how learners and countries can easily become victims. Fraud is associated with the exponential rise in the number of fake colleges and accreditors, and document falsification. This is partly due to different conceptions and regulatory approaches to accreditation/QA of TNE and the absence of trustworthy information. Indeed, the deficiency in comprehensive and accessible information is partly responsible for on-going interest in and use of global rankings as a proxy for quality.
A need for clearer and stronger TNE and online quality assurance
The trend in growth of private for-profit higher education, TNE and online delivery is clear and given its growing presence requires more policy attention by national, regional and global agencies. As mentioned, public universities are increasingly active in TNE and online education targeting countries and learners underserved in their home countries whilst looking for other sources of income as a result of decreasing public support and other factors.
The Global Convention on the Recognition of Qualificationsmakes clear the importance of ensuring there are no differences in quality or standards between learners in the home or host country regardless of whether the delivery of education programmes and learning activities is undertaken in a formal, non-formal or informal setting, in face-to-face, virtual or hybrid formats, traditional or non-traditional modes. Accordingly, there are growing concerns about insufficient regulation and the multilateral framework covering international education, and especially online TNE.
In response, there is a need for clearer and stronger accreditation/quality assurance and standards by national regulators, regional networks and organisations such as UNESCO, INQAAHE, the International Association of Universities (IAU) with regards to public and private involvement in TNE, and online education. This is an emerging frontier for tertiary education, and much more research is required on this growing phenomenon.
Professor Ellen Hazelkorn is Joint Managing Partner, BH Associates. She is Professor Emeritus, Technological University Dublin.
Hamish Coates is professor of public policy, director of the Higher Education Futures Lab, and global tertiary education expert.
Hans de Wit is Professor Emeritus and Distinguished Fellow of the Boston College Center for International Higher Education, Senior Fellow of the international Association of Universities.
Tessa DeLaquil is postdoctoral research fellow at the School of Education at University College Dublin.
