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Can income-contingent loans help Vietnam widen access without sacrificing quality

By Thong Minh Trinh and Mai Lan Nguyen

A university place can open doors, but for students whose families struggle with fees, accepting that place can also mean taking on a financial risk before anyone knows what the degree will earn them. In our article in Policy Reviews in Higher Education (Trinh and Nguyen, 2026), we examine whether income-contingent student loans could help Vietnam widen access to higher education while maintaining educational quality.

When university funding rests on families

Vietnamese public universities have become increasingly dependent on tuition. From 2017 to 2021, household contributions rose from 57% of total revenue, while direct state support fell to 9% (Tran et al, 2023). While higher fees allow universities to invest in teachers, facilities, and learning, they risk pricing out the students who would benefit most. The financial barrier has already created a substantial gap. In 2016, university enrolment stood at 52% for the richest fifth of households, compared to just 19% for the poorest fifth (Doan et al, 2020). Consequently, tuition policy cannot be separated from the need for effective student finance.

To help bridge this divide, Vietnam offers a public student loan programme administered by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). At a glance, the system appears stable, with reported arrears of just 0.27% in May 2026 (Do, 2026). However, this point-in-time measure does not prove that the loans remain affordable throughout a graduate’s working life. Furthermore, the program’s reach is severely limited. Fewer than 3% of tertiary and vocational students actually received government loans in 2018. Compounding the problem, these loans are generally issued through households, leaving parents or guardians entirely responsible for repayment regardless of what the graduate eventually earns.

What would an income-contingent loan change?

An alternative approach, an income-contingent loan (ICL), links repayments directly to actual earnings. Graduates repay nothing while their income is below a defined threshold; once they earn more, they pay a proportion of the excess. While this does not remove the overall cost of education, it fundamentally shifts when people pay and who bears the risk of low earnings. This shift in risk is crucial. Families deciding whether to borrow cannot know if a student will eventually find stable, well-paid work. Income-linked repayments make that unpredictability less threatening, especially for lower-income students. However, the theoretical promise of security does not guarantee that a specific loan design will work in practice.

To explore how such a system might function, our paper illustrates the trade-offs using Vietnamese income benchmarks. For instance, with a monthly repayment threshold of VND 8.4 million and a 6% rate on earnings above it, a graduate earning VND 12 million would pay VND 216,000 a month. By contrast, with a higher threshold of VND 10.1 million and a 4% rate, that same graduate would pay just VND 76,000.

These scenarios highlight a core policy tension: the first approach recovers public funds faster, while the second offers stronger protection to lower earners. Currently, neither can be declared the ‘optimal’ formula, as Vietnam lacks the detailed longitudinal data needed to track how graduates’ earnings change over time.

Five tests before expanding the scheme

First, can the government accurately distinguish genuine low earnings from deliberate non-payment? While some graduates will never earn enough to repay in full, a legitimate outcome that must be budgeted for as a public subsidy, a very different problem arises when high earners under-report their income or remain unverified.

This verification challenge leads directly to the second test: can repayments actually be collected? Informal work accounted for 63.1% of all employment in Vietnam in 2025, though specific figures for university graduates are lacking (National Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2026). While linking the VBSP with tax, payroll, and social-insurance records could capture formal employees, collecting data on irregular or unrecorded income would be far more difficult.

Beyond administrative hurdles, there is a broader economic risk: will easier borrowing encourage higher tuition? If students feel insulated from the immediate price of education, universities may face less pressure to justify fee increases. To counter this, institutions must publish accessible, comparable data on tuition, completion rates, and graduate outcomes.

Even with stable fees, policymakers must address a fourth question: who ultimately receives the public subsidy? Repayment thresholds, interest rules, and debt write-offs dictate whether state support truly reaches disadvantaged students or inadvertently benefits those taking expensive courses. Fairness must be proven through transparent distributional analysis, rather than assumed simply because a loan is income-contingent.

Finally, will the reform actually improve educational value? A better loan scheme cannot substitute for effective teaching or accountable university management. For the system to succeed, modernized student finance and institutional transparency must advance side by side.

Test the system before transforming it

Before an immediate national rollout, we recommend a three-to-five-year pilot alongside the current VBSP programme, enrolling 5,000 to 10,000 new borrowers annually. This could begin at large public universities in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang, specifically in subjects where graduates are more likely to enter formal employment. Under this model, VBSP would continue issuing and administering the loans, but repayment obligations would shift away from households to the individual graduates, linked directly to their verified earnings.

To manage this risk, the pilot must have a defined fiscal limit and routinely publish evidence detailing who falls below the threshold, what repayments are collected, where earnings cannot be checked, and who ultimately benefits. Our illustrative stress test puts the maximum loan principal across these pilot cohorts at VND 2.88–9.60 trillion. Even if 60% of this were ultimately unrecovered, the state’s exposure would be VND 1.73–5.76 trillion – at most 0.182% of approved 2026 state expenditure. While these figures exclude certain costs and do not guarantee national affordability, they outline a manageable starting point.

However, the resulting pilot data would still require careful interpretation. Because graduates in urban, formal-sector jobs are inherently easier to monitor, any wider expansion must account for these regional and sectoral differences, rather than simply scaling up based on early, optimistic collection rates. Importantly, such a program is not a cure-all. Income-linked loans should never replace scholarships or living-cost grants. Students facing severe poverty, heavy family obligations, or high non-tuition expenses will still require financial support they never have to repay.

Ultimately, the question for Vietnam is not whether an ICL sounds fair in principle. It is whether the country can build a practical system that protects low earners, collects reliably, accounts openly for subsidies, and compels universities to deliver value. While changing when graduates pay could significantly widen access, making the system work will require fundamentally changing how higher education is governed.

Thong Minh Trinh is a PhD researcher in Education at the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on higher education policy and finance, particularly student loans, financial aid, university financial sustainability, and access to higher education. He uses quantitative methods to investigate higher education policy issues.

Mai Lan Nguyen is a PhD student in the Department of English, Linguistics and Theatre Studies at the National University of Singapore, researching bilingualism and language education. Her work as a university admissions consultant in Viet Nam has given her a close view of how tuition costs shape students’ study choices.