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From TPS to USS – is now the time to move pension scheme?

by John Ingoe

Amid increasing financial pressures, a number of universities are considering a move from the Teachers’ Pension Scheme (TPS) to the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) for their teaching staff. In this blog post, I take a deep dive into each scheme to explore whether this makes sense.

On the surface, moving university teaching staff from the TPS to the USS seems rational. USS employer contributions are currently 14.5% of salaries, compared with a TPS employer rate of 28.68% of salaries. Even if we also allow for differing benefit structures, we can say that both offer valuable Defined Benefit (DB) pensions. But is cost the only consideration? In this blog post I will argue that it is not…

How USS and TPS work

Let’s take a step back and consider how each scheme operates. While both are DB in nature, they are fundamentally different beasts.

USS – an overview

USS is a multi-employer, private sector, funded hybrid scheme – meaning that it offers both DB and Defined Contribution (DC) benefits – and is managed by trustees. It currently provides members with a DB pension of 1/75th of salary (plus a lump sum of 3/75th) up to the salary threshold, as well as DC benefits on salary above that level.

The contributions paid by both employers and employees are invested, and pensions are paid out of the assets held. Under funding regulations that apply to the scheme, the trustee carries out a funding valuation every three years, or more quickly if needed, with the next one due as at 31 March 2026.

The results of those funding valuations determine the employer and employee contribution rates that will be paid between each valuation cycle – although the process isn’t quite as straightforward as that suggests. The 2026 valuation will determine the contribution rates payable from 2027; these will be reviewed again following completion of the 2029 valuation.

TPS – an overview

TPS is a public service, unfunded, pay-as-you-go DB scheme. It offers members a DB pension of 1/57th of salary. Contributions paid by employers and employees are used to pay current pensioners, with HM Treasury meeting the balance.

TPS isn’t governed by the same funding regulations as USS, but a funding valuation is carried out every four years, in a similar way to USS.

These valuations determine the employer contribution rate. The next valuation is due with an effective date of 31 March 2024 (yes you read that right), with the results of that valuation likely (but not certain) to result in changes to the employer contribution rate from 1 April 2027.

A brief history of the USS

Volatile contribution rates, benefit changes and industrial action

Since April 2016, USS has experienced repeated shifts in contribution rates and benefit design, with the latter often used as a lever to mitigate the former. Employer and member contribution rates rose between 2016 and 2023, before falling significantly in 2024, as shown below:

Effective dateEmployer rateMember rateTotal
April 201618.0%8.0%26.0%
April 201919.5%8.8%28.3%
October 201921.1%9.6%30.7%
October 202121.4%9.8%31.2%
April 202221.6%9.8%31.4%
January 202414.5%6.1%20.6%

However, the above table somewhat downplays both the impact of the 2020 valuation and the contribution rate increases that would have occurred had significant changes to benefits and the valuation methodology not been made. The schedule of contributions dated September 2021 would have seen contribution rates increases to 38.2% of salaries for employers and 18.8% of salaries for employees.

In the end, benefits were reduced to avoid this. From April 2022, this resulted in:

  • A lower rate of future pension build-up
  • A reduced salary threshold, which determines the split of DB and DC benefits earned
  • Capped inflation protection.

The outcome of the 2020 valuation was not particularly well received by either members or employers. The majority of these changes were reversed in 2024.

Impact of financial markets on USS

The USS employer rate is essentially determined by the size of any funding shortfall or surplus, and the cost of future benefit accrual. Changes in the value of pension scheme liabilities and the cost of future benefits are driven by changes in financial markets, and in particular bond yields. Changes in asset values depend on the actual assets held, and these will often move in different ways from the liability value. There can be significant swings in the funding position as a result of this mismatch.

This volatility was demonstrated in the valuations carried out between 2018 and 2023. A funding shortfall of £3.6bn in 2018 increased to £18.4bn in 2020 but then flipped to a surplus of £7.4bn in 2023. These changes were predominantly driven by unprecedented changes in bond yields, which went from c1.7% (2018) down to c0.7% (2020), and then up to c3.8% (2023).

While there were several second order changes (changes to demographic assumptions; changes to the funding target; member experience; asset performance), these tended to be drowned out by the impact of changing bond yields.

A brief history of the TPS

Sharply increasing contribution rates

TPS employer rates have risen sharply since 2019, as shown below:

Effective dateEmployer contribution rate
September 201516.48%
September 201923.68%
April 202428.68%
April 2027Next scheduled change

Since 2019, the TPS employer rate has increased by almost 75%. For many employers (including local authority-maintained schools and academies), grant mechanisms have largely cushioned these increases. Our understanding is that post-1992 universities have not been insulated, prompting difficult strategic choices.

While the employer rate has risen significantly, member rates have remained broadly stable over that period, increasing by around 0.3% of salaries.

Impact of lower expectations of economic growth on the TPS

Pension valuations estimate the size and timing of future pension payments using financial and demographic assumptions. Those future payments are then converted to a present value using a discount rate – which can be thought of as an advance allowance for expected long‑term investment returns.

“I thought the TPS held no assets,” you say. Well, you’d be right. But there is a notional pot of assets, as well as a notional shortfall to be made good. That may be one for another blog, but it does underline that the discount rate remains a key assumption.

A lower discount rate means more money must be set aside today, making pension costs more expensive. Even relatively small movements in the discount rate can have a big impact on contributions. For unfunded public service schemes such as the TPS, the discount rate is the SCAPE rate (Superannuation Contributions Adjusted for Past Experience) – which is linked to long‑term UK GDP growth, as forecast by the Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR).

As long‑term GDP forecasts fell over the past decade, the SCAPE rate also fell. This has been the principal driver of higher TPS employer contribution rates, outweighing the impact of other valuation assumptions.

How costs might change in the future

In both schemes, contribution rates are determined by factors beyond the control of sponsoring employers. The table below sets out the key influences on the costs of each scheme:

DriverTPSUSS
Economic assumptionsCosts are driven by the SCAPE discount rate, which is linked to long-term UK GDP forecasts.Liability values can be sensitive to long-term bond yields and inflation expectations.
Investment performanceNo impact as TPS holds no assets. Its notional pot of assets increases in a prescribed way.USS investment performance directly affects funding position. It can move differently from liabilities.
Benefit designBenefits are set out in legislation. Short-term changes are unlikely.Benefit structure directly affects cost of accrual. Changes have been made to avoid large contribution increases.
Demographic trendsLongevity and other member behaviours influence valuations.Longevity and other member behaviours influence valuations.
Regulation and governanceKey valuation assumptions are set by HM Treasury, and are potentially subject to political influence.Valuations must reflect regulatory expectations and employer covenant considerations.

Key drivers of the TPS

The key driver of the TPS contribution rate is the SCAPE discount rate. The current SCAPE methodology based on the GDP approach was introduced in 2011 and reviewed ten years later, as scheduled, during the last completed valuation cycle. This framework remains in place unless HM Treasury directs otherwise.

While recent headline GDP growth has been modest, it’s the long‑term GDP forecasts that determine the SCAPE rate. The OBR’s long‑term projections (published in July 2025) show a material improvement compared with those underpinning the current 28.68% TPS employer rate.

If this improved outlook persists, the SCAPE discount rate will rise (potentially materially) and, all else being equal, from April 2027, the TPS employer rate will go down (potentially materially).

So, all else being equal, we might expect the TPS employer rate to fall from its current rate in 2027. But that’s not guaranteed – “all else being equal” is doing a lot of heavy lifting here, and almost never turns out to be the case.

Other valuation assumptions – including salary growth, inflation, longevity and scheme member behaviour – will also influence the result. Perhaps more importantly, long-term GDP forecasts can change – reflecting changing views due to macroeconomic factors or political pressures. And finally, there is still scope for HM Treasury to tweak the SCAPE rate methodology.

Until the HM Treasury valuation direction is published, nothing is set in stone

Key drivers of the USS

There are more moving parts driving the USS employer rate than there are in the case of TPS. Asset performance, changes in long-term bond yields, covenant strength and benefit changes can all alter employee and employer rates. And while past performance is not an indication of the future, we only have to look back to the 2020 valuation to see the possibility of the employer rate exceeding 30% of salaries.

While we don’t expect to see material changes following the 2026 valuation, there are no guarantees that this will continue to be the case after the 2029 valuation. USS continues to invest heavily in growth assets, so some volatility is to be expected. While the expectation is that these assets will provide higher returns in the long term, a valuation is a snapshot of a moment in time, and a 31 March valuation date often coincides with some financial shock or other.

USS also operates in a regulatory environment that pushes DB schemes to link liability measurements to bond prices. This can result in a funding position (assets v liability value) that can move materially, and any deficit arising from that is likely to result in increased contributions. UCU and UUK are working with USS to put in place a valuation methodology which looks to mitigate this volatility, but this may only soften, rather than remove, future swings in position due to changes in financial markets.

Finally, the higher education sector is facing more financial pressures than ever before. All else being equal, this could lead to a stronger funding target (and therefore increased contribution rates).

Which is better – TPS or USS?

It depends.

Each employer faces a unique set of challenges, and appropriate pension strategies will vary. As with any decision about pensions, it’s about balancing risk and reward. There’s a definite short-term gain for employers from moving to USS (all else being equal), but scheme costs will vary over time. USS may be more cost-effective now, but that may not always be the case. There are signs that the TPS employer rate could fall from 2027 (potentially materially), while costs and benefits in the USS are intrinsically more volatile due to the different funding approach.

In any case, it’s not enough to simply compare the cost of the two schemes. Each offers a different level of benefits for members, at a different cost to members, and with a different perceived value for members.

All in all, not a straightforward decision and one that requires a lot of consideration.

John Ingoe is an Associate Partner and Head of Employer Actuarial Services at First Actuarial, a Gallagher Company. He has over 18 years’ experience working with employers such as higher education institutions and other not‑for‑profit organisations. He helps them meet strategic pension challenges including defined benefit scheme funding, multi‑employer pension arrangements and complex pension change projects. www.firstactuarial.co.uk. john.ingoe@firstactuarial.co.uk

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Happy New Year? If I were you, I wouldn’t start from here

By Rob Cuthbert

As the new year begins there is news of balloting for more industrial action by university staff. The continuing dispute between university staff and their employers is deep-rooted and deeply worrying. It may not be like previous disputes, and the employers may not be well-equipped to resolve it, for two reasons. First, because the roots of the dispute are in the marketisation of HE, the result of political initiatives which university employers cannot easily remedy. And second, because too many university employers have done too little to ameliorate the precarity and increased workload which quasi-markets encourage.

Staff at 60 universities across the UK announced in early November their intention to stage an eight-day strike at the end of November over pensions, pay and conditions. Universities UK and UCEA, the employers’ association, wrote an open letter to all staff on 19 November 2019 setting out their arguments, headed ‘letter to staff impacted by the UCU pensions and pay disputes’. The heading blaming UCU (begging the question: ‘who started it?’) may be a misjudgment, but is perhaps only what one side of the disputants would say. Jo Grady, UCU general secretary, wrote for The Guardian on 7 November 2019 that “University staff don’t want to strike for fair pensions and pay, but we’re being forced to”, a statement which the employers objected to. Both sides accuse the other of refusing to come to the table to negotiate. So far, so completely normal in any employment dispute. But then …

“Universities accused of using ‘strong-arm tactics’ to undermine strike action”, wrote Sally Weale and David Batty for The Guardian on 24 November 2019. Cheche Spencer, Students’ Union Women’s Officer at Liverpool University, on 22 November 2019 tweeted her disgust at the University’s message to students, which said it was ‘unlawful’ for students to join pickets. The message said the university would make no allowances for non-attendance when it comes to assessment, and warned international students that failure to attend might jeopardise their visa status. This went well beyond the more measured USS employers’ advice to students during the strike.

Sheffield Hallam University invited students to complete a form stating which of their classes had been disrupted and naming the member of staff concerned. After a student backlash the university removed the section asking for staff names. Students condemned the move as ‘a surveillance tool’ – perhaps a misunderstanding, since the identities of the strikers are hardly a secret, but symptomatic of a misguided managerial mindset. It is also reported that universities have warned staff not to speak to students about the dispute.

These things tend to happen in any dispute: excesses of local zeal going beyond a difficult-to-maintain national party line. But Liverpool and Sheffield Hallam have VCs whom some might regard as members of the sensible tendency, in Janet Beer and Chris Husbands. Beer, as a former chair of UUK, might  be expected to be impeccable in holding the line. Husbands is a leading figure in the hardly popular TEF, but has nevertheless seemed able to sustain reasoned debate and argue the case for improvement from within the TEF regime. If these are the zealots, what is going on? It seems as if the employers are deliberately taking a hard line.

The current dispute brings together two arguments, one about pensions and one about pay and conditions. But there is really only one grievance, and that is the growing alienation of staff, increasingly fixed-term, part-time and precarious, in an excessively marketised and too often managerialist higher education regime. As Liz Morrish observed in her blog after the Spring 2018 dispute on 8 June 2018: “The pensions issue seemed to be a conductor for a whole host of other grievances about marketization, financialization, audit culture, management by metrics and the distortions of league tables and concern with university ‘reputation’.” The UCEA/UUK letter said: “While the collective employers’ view is that a fair and realistic outcome has been reached on pay, they acknowledge however that UCU pursued its campaign on three other themes around workload, gender pay/equality and casual employment arrangements, and that these are important matters that their members, and indeed other colleagues, feel strongly about.”

The earlier dispute over USS benefits saw increased militancy and unionisation among many staff who had previously eschewed industrial action; the action succeeded in overturning the threat to move away from a defined-benefits scheme. (Meanwhile a change to TPS employers’ contributions raised the rate to 23.68% from September 2019, which was said to be enough to give UCU what they are asking for from USS employers.) Since the first dispute the UCU-nominated USS trustee Jane Hutton (Warwick) has been dismissed by the USS Board for “breaches of her duties as a director under company law and contract”. An independent investigation led to a report which USS relied on for her removal, but this has not been published in full despite Hutton’s request that it should be. Hutton, a professor of medical statistics and long-term critic of mistakes in USS calculations, had become a whistleblower writing to the Pensions Regulator. She had been denied data by USS executives and could not persuade the USS board to budge from what the Pensions Regulator called a mistake in its earlier controversial valuation. Clearly not everyone is convinced that USS does what it claims:

As the UCEA/UUK letter said, there has been some movement and learning by the employers since the earlier dispute. But not enough for UCU, and in particular nothing offering hope of enough change in the regime which exploits the goodwill of too many committed staff. Some universities (eg the University of Reading) are planning to withhold up to 100% of pay for ‘action short of a strike’ (ASOS), which involves working for contracted hours without the normal unpaid overtime – the irony of which seems to be lost on the universities concerned.

In normal times everyone might regard the hours stated in contracts as an acceptable fiction, knowing that professionally committed staff will do what is needed for a proper job, and professional leaders will not exploit their commitment. But these are not normal times. Marketisation in HE goes hand in hand with attempts at deprofessionalisation and growing workloads. In HE, just as in schools and in the health service, employers are discovering that contractualisation of what was once seen as professional obligation means that less of it gets done, and/or it ends up costing more. UCEA/UUK may complain that “The focus of the negotiations was almost entirely on the pay uplift”, but this is common in disputes, and market regimes drive that focus. What makes it much worse for UCEA is that in any pay dispute the employers’ position is fatally undermined. That UCEA/UUK letter might in different times have been more persuasive, but the credibility of vice-chancellors themselves has vanished as for too many years their own pay rises outstripped those of their staff, and universities relied increasingly on lower-paid, part-time, fixed term staff .

The employers are between a rock they did not create and a hard place which they have brought on themselves. The hard place is the deep concerns of many staff about their workload and working conditions, the precarity of their employment, their pay and pensions. (The results of a UCU survey on ‘Counting the costs of casualisation in higher education’ were published by UCU in June 2019.) The rock is the certainty that students collectively will begin to seek compensation from universities for disruption to their studies, even though many, perhaps most, students will at the same time sympathise with and support staff in their campaign. That compensation might turn out to be ruinously expensive and trigger a downward spiral for all concerned.

The UCEA/UUK letter no doubt aimed to win the hearts and minds of staff, perhaps encouraged by the failure of strike ballots in some institutions to cross the threshold needed for authorised action, but the signs are not good and the tactics seem misjudged. Universities need also to win the hearts and minds of students, but using threats about students’ assessment and international students’ visa status is an odd way to go about it. Some university employers in a hole are still digging: Liverpool UCU tweeted on 5 December 2019: “Here we go. @livuni have today asked staff to “recover” (‘make good’!) missed teaching asap. We will not “recover” work we’re not being paid for and our refusal is lawful under ASOS. With yet another intimidating email, the Uni has withdrawn its goodwill. We have withdrawn ours.” It may be that a few overzealous or overexposed institutions are undermining the employers’ argument, but in any dispute the employers’ side will be a coalition reflecting a wide range of opinion: now is the time for the moderates to assert themselves. Anna McKie for Times Higher Education reported on 25 November 2019 that: “At the University of Bristol … the vice-chancellor Hugh Brady … was seen on the picket line. It could be a further sign of university leaders starting to break ranks, after Anthony Forster, vice-chancellor of the University of Essex, said last week that his institution would be willing to pay more into pensions.”

After the long-running press furore over VCs’ pay the Office for Students has begun to survey and report on pay levels, although the Times Higher Education has gathered and published such data for many years. The OfS said on 19 February 2019: “where pay is out of kilter, or salary increases at the top outstrip pay awards to other staff, vice-chancellors should be prepared to answer tough questions from their staff, student bodies and the public. It is good to see signs of pay restraint at some universities, with some vice-chancellors refusing a salary increase. A number of governing bodies have reduced the basic pay of their vice-chancellor, though we acknowledge that it can be difficult to revisit contractual obligations while a vice-chancellor is in post. We expect to see further progress next year.”

Perhaps it is time for a different kind of leadership, and a different kind of leadership pay. The Committee for University Chairs (CUC) published The Higher Education Staff Remuneration Code in June 2018, full of worthy sentiment and careful drafting, but the only potential limit on pay was this: “Institutions must publish the multiple of the remuneration of the Head of Institution and the median earnings of the institution’s whole workforce annually. This should be accompanied by sufficient explanation and context to enable useful comparison.” Salaries are decided by Remuneration Committees, too often full of people whose yardsticks are drawn from the private sector. In the current dispute, as always, UUK has trotted out the line about needing to pay the best to attract the best talent in a global market, an argument that seems to apply in every case to the field marshals, but much less frequently to the poor bloody infantry. And the VC population is not noticeably more global than the staff themselves. We need a different kind of leadership from governors too. A national formula to guide VCs’ pay may be impracticable, even though it has been achieved for other groups of staff. But putting a staff member of the governing body on the Search/Remuneration Committee for VC appointments would be more straightforward. Such staff governors would naturally be obliged to maintain strict confidentiality, as with so many other issues for all governors. Advertise an explicit salary range for every vacancy of VCs and perhaps others in the senior management team, and apply the same annual uplift as the weighted mean of the uplift for all staff in the university. Allow those presently overpaid to continue to the end of their hopefully fixed terms, then reboot. Then institutional leaders might be able to restore some credibility as leaders in discussions about pay and conditions. The UCU has its own difficulties in seeking to swing its diverse set of members behind any effective collective action. In the present dispute the employers are making it easy for UCU, by appearing to ignore or deny the realities that their highly committed, intelligent, articulate and analytical staff confront every day.

Rob Cuthbert is Emeritus Professor of Higher Education Management, University of the West of England and Joint Managing Partner, Practical Academics